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Abstract
 
This thesis includes an introduction to and translation
 
of Roland Barthes's L'ancienne rh^toriaue. Originally
 
delivered as a series of lectures, Barthes's ancient
 
rhetoric offers a chronological study of rhetoric from its
 
beginnings in ancient Greece through the nineteenth century.
 
Following the principles of Saussurean linguistics,
 
Barthes divides his work into two main sections, a
 
syntagmatic section and a paradigmatic section. The first
 
deals with the origins of rhetoric as it was used in courts
 
of law to try property cases and introduces the reader to
 
the works of Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc. It traces
 
the various turns of classical rhetoric through the Middle
 
Ages and into the modern era, with special attention to
 
pedagogical methods and trends.
 
The second introduces the technical workings of
 
rhetoric through taxonomic systems and more importantly
 
through an analysis of the inventio. dispositio and
 
elocutio. Barthes concludes his essay with a lengthy
 
peroration in which he calls for a new history of rhetoric
 
based on linguistics, semiology, Marxism, etc. At the end
 
of his peroration, he draws attention to the ideology of
 
m.ass culture which is inherent in the history of rhetoric up
 
to the present.
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V
 
From philosophY, rhetoric. That is,
 
here, to make from a volume, approximately,
 
more or less, a flower, to extract a flower,
 
to mourit it, or rather to have it mount
 
itself, bring itself to light--an(3 turning
 
away, as if from itself, come round again,
 
such a flower engraves--learning to
 
cultivate, by means of a lapidary's
 
reckoning, patience . . .
 
Jacques Derrida
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INTRODUCTION
 
The Study of rhetoric has traditionally unearthed more
 
questions than it can answer and di£5covered more problems
 
than it can solve. As Roland Barthes explains at the
 
beginning of his treatise on ancient rhetoric,^ he undertook
 
to compile a brief overview of what was known of rhetoric's
 
history in order to lecture systematically on the subject.
 
Putting together the best sources on ancient rhetoric,
 
Barthes applied what he drew from the history of rhetoric
 
and his earlier studies in sociology, linguistics, and
 
semiology to these general questions.
 
It is true, as Barthes points out in his introduction,
 
that no brief, systematic treatment of ancient rhetoric
 
existed at the time. George A. Kennedy's Classical Rhetoric
 
and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to
 
Modern Times. the closest work to approach what Barthes was
 
seeking, appeared only in 1980, sixteen years after
 
Barthes's course in ancient rhetoric. Although larger in
 
scope than what Barthes proposes here, Kennedy's work
 
fulfills Barthes's request for a "chronological and
 
systematic" treatment of ancient rhetoric. But a comparison
 
of the two would reveal Barthes's distinguishing
 
characteristics. For example, Kennedy's v/ork in no way
 
connects rhetoric with social issues of class and power as
 
such. And, whereas Barthes relies heavily upon linguistics
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and semiology, Kennedy's history of rhetoric makes no use of
 
any extra-disciplinary systems. There are also more
 
ambitious examinations of ancient rhetoric and its
 
applications to teaching, e.g., Edward P.J. Corbett's
 
Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student, but Corbett's
 
compendious and tendentious work was not what Barthes had in
 
mind for his more concise and probing "aide-memoire."
 
(Besides, the first edition of Corbett's rhetoric appeared
 
in 1965, a year after Barthes's seminar).
 
There exists a basic difference between traditional
 
Anglo-American studies of language and literature and
 
continental theories. English—speaking scholars have tended
 
to focus on the individual work and its place in the history
 
of literature, while continental scholars have tended to
 
devise systems for the study of language and literature in
 
general. The rhetoric of Anglo—American writers, whether
 
"new" or "old," is most often dogmatically objective; their
 
"history" of rhetoric is concerned only with the
 
chronological facts. Thus for Kennedy, it matters not at
 
all that rhetoric sprang up in Ancient Greece out of
 
pjfoperty disputes, or that rhetoric has been used through
 
the ages to enhance the authority of certain groups at the
 
expense of oppressed minorities. It matters only that
 
rhetoric was used in the political arena, that rhetoric was
 
taught to certain young men down through the centuries. But
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for Barthes arid some of, his colleagues, these subjects are
 
of fundamental importarice. No strangers to Marxism, they
 
are quick to pick up concerns over such issues as private
 
property, the oppression of certain classes, and the
 
situation of power among an elect group.
 
The ideology inherent in Barthes's "aide-memoire" and
 
in much of his other writing is clear. It is a desire to
 
dislodge the comfortable assumptions of the petit­
bourgeoisie, the Ways in which it turns its myths into .
 
"uniyersal nature Bafthes states in "Introduction: The
 
Semiological Adventure" (1974), that
 
what Semiology must attack is not only . . . the
 
petit-bourgeois good conscience, but the symbolic
 
and semantic system of our entire civilization; it
 
is not enough to seek to change contents, we must
 
above all aim at fissurina the meaning-system
 
itself: we must emerge from the Occidental
 
enclosure . . . (8)
 
The emphasis of classical rhetoric has traditionally
 
been on teaching and performing. From, its earliest sources
 
in ancient Greece down to modern times, rhetoric has been
 
used to teach students to speak and write well. The "new
 
rhetoric," such as that expounded by Group , has been
 
employed almost exclusively as a means of literary study and
 
a system for literary analysis. The "new rhetoric," or what
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Jonathan Culler calls "the structuralist revival of
 
rhetoric," has succeeded in utilizing figures--especiallY
 
synecdoche, metaphor and metdnymy--as a way to inform
 
reading and interpretation.^ Thus, as Culler states in
 
Structuralist Poetics, when the reader comes upon a given
 
figure, he or she can perform a series of systematic
 
operations which will lead him or her "from one meaning to
 
another—from the 'deviant' to the integrated . . .
 
labelling this transformation as appropriate to a particular
 
poetic mode" (179). Further on, he writes that
 
the repertoire of rhetorical figures serves as a
 
set of instructions which readers can apply when
 
they encounter a problem in the text, though in
 
some cases it is not so much the operations
 
themselves that are important as the reassurance
 
that rhetorical categories offer the reader:
 
reassurance that what seems odd is in fact
 
perfectly acceptable since it is figurative
 
expression of some kind and therefore capable of
 
being understood. (181)
 
What Barthes does initially in his "aide-memoire" is to
 
disregard this new rhetoric, saying that "it does not yet
 
exist," and decide that the questions posed by rhetoric are
 
best answered by approaches introduced from the study of
 
linguistics and semioiogy; one of his more important
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"moves," in order to expose the underlying importance and
 
sociological significance of ancient rhetoric in Barthes's
 
work, is this assertion which he purports to address in his
 
essay. Despite his avov;ed distance from new rhetoric,
 
Barthes cites the innovative work of PcreIman and Obrechts-

Tyteca, but more revealingly, his essay also shares many
 
common concerns with Group 's General Rhetoric. which came
 
out simultaneously with Barthes's publication of his "aide-

Indeed, Group JU , in its introduction to the General
 
Rhetoric. states that "rhetoric appears not only as a
 
science of the future but also as a timely science within
 
the scope of structuralism, new criticism and semiology"
 
(1). In fact. Group jm's General Rhetoric is based upon
 
semiological analyses of metaboles (changes in any aspect of
 
language), a concept obviously called for by Barthes in his
 
earlier work and reaffirmed in the peroration of his essay
 
on ancient rhetoric. This project was perhaps influenced by
 
Barthes and the work of the Tel Ouel group, especially when
 
it comes to the study of narrative structures, something
 
Barthes does in his "Introduction to the Structural .Analysis
 
of Narratives" (1966). (Dates given for Barthes's work
 
refer to the original French texts.) In addition the
 
General Rhetoric asserts that "the rhetorical function has
 
the effect of reifying language (21), i.e., it makes
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 language an object of study and classification.
 
Annette Lavers ill Roland Barihes: Structuralism and
 
After. also speculates that Barthes dissociates himself from
 
the new rhetoric because of its reliance on binarism and
 
because he considers binary opposition as representing a
 
rather primitive logic and "a historical process of
 
reification" (126) But in defense of binarism, Barthes
 
writes in Elements of Semiology (1965):
 
. . . the opposition is still in the a11-6r­
nothina category. We again find the principle of
 
difference which is the foundation of opposition:
 
it is this principle which must inspire ti^e
 
analysis of the associated sphere; for to deal
 
with the opposition can only mean to observe the
 
relations of similarity or difference which may
 
exist between the terms of the opposition. (74)
 
Saussurean linguistics, which has had a most profound
 
influence on the structuralists, is based on this notion of
 
difference; for example, the wdrds "gut" and "cut" are
 
distinguished from each other solely by the difference
 
between the minimal features of the voiced and unvoiced
 
consonants /g/ and /c/. And so it is precisely this
 
semiological and linguistic model—-the structuralist
 
enterprise—which Barthes employs in his essay.
 
But Maria Ruegg in her article "Metaphor and Metonymy:
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The Logic of Structuralist Rhetoric," argues convincinglY
 
that "structuralists, who pretend to make an abrupt break
 
with pre-scientific thought," are curiously drawn to
 
classical rhetoric. In their attempt to take up Saussure's
 
arguments, such structuralists as Roman Jakobson and Jacques
 
Lacan, and by extension, Barthes himself, force all of
 
language into two poles (metonymy/metaphor: Jakobson and
 
Lacan, syntagmatic/paradigmatic: Barthes), thereby reducing
 
"complex givens to the terms of simple binary
 
opposition . . ." and ignoring "logical inconsistencies
 
within the binary oppositions themselves" (141-57). Had she
 
known Barthes's "aide-mdmoire," she could have argued more
 
strongly for the structuralist's fascination with classical
 
rhetoric.
 
Metaphor and metonymy, terms which themselves come from
 
rhetoric, are one such binary opposition, taken up by
 
Jakobson in his work on poetics and by Lacan in his v;ork on
 
psychoanalysis. Lanaue (any individual's system of
 
language) and parole (the actual events of speech) ,
 
constitute the original Saussurean opposition. The
 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic are a third binary opposition,
 
seized upon by structural linguistics and in turn by
 
Barthes. '■ 
Now the syntagmatic axis of language, which 
characterizes "the ordered arrangement of phonemes, 
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inorpKeittes," words or parts of discourse,;;repre&^ a ; ■ 
horizontal movement which relates it to the diachronic 
aspect of languagei ' thht which corisiderS: phenomena as they 
occur or deve1op through time also a horizontal movement. 
And the paradigmatic axis of language, "the listing of all 
the phonemes," morphemes, words, figures and other "isolated 
elements" from which individual units are chosen> represents 
a vertical movement which relates it to the synchronic 
aspect of language, or the study of events of a particular 
time or era without consideration of historical data (Pei 
and Gaynor > 159 and 211).
 
And yet, as Derek Attridge stresses in Peculiar
 
Language. Saussure, from whom Barthes borrov;s his structure
 
based on binary oppositions, did not in fact oppose
 
diachrony to synchrony, but merely separated the tvjo in
 
order to develop a methodological approach to language based
 
on parole. Subsequent followers of Saussure—notably Emile
 
Benveniste and Roman Jakobson—mistakenly polarized the two ,
 
terms and linked lanaue with diachrony, and also placed the ;
 
paradigmatic on the same (vertical) axis as synchrony and
 
the syntagmatic on the same (horizontal) axis as diachrony
 
(94-95). This move reifies an opposition that is not really
 
an opposition, but nonetheless has had widespread effects on
 
structuralism. Whatever the case may be, these
 
polarizations have enjoyed much popular appeal, probably due
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to the graphic clarity and strategic usefulness of such
 
binary oppositiohstQ argue other:matters in the human
 
sciences-—Lacan in psychoanarysisV Levi-^Strauss in
 
anthropology, Jakobson in linguistics.
 
Barthes's essay on rhetoric—although it takes as its
 
very structure this bipolarization—seems to account for the
 
complexities of such distinctions. For example, Barthes
 
makes a "stop" at Gorgias, whose codification of prose gives
 
rhetoric a paradigmatic aspect. And Barthes actually
 
provides us with a paradigmatic diagram which designates the
 
differences between the Platonic "good rhetoric" (that of
 
dialectic) and "bad rhetoric" (that of the Sophists) (A.3.3.
 
of text). Likewise, under the general paradigmatic section
 
(B,0.4. of text), Barthes connects the syntagmatic of
 
discourse with the paradigmatic by making use of a tree-like
 
metaphor, one which evolves from his paradigmatic diagram.
 
At this point he abandons a strict binary opposition in
 
order to introduce the most important steps in the
 
rhetorical process: inventio. dispositio. elocutio. % In
 
Beautiful Theories. Elizabeth Bruss writes. "it is in the
 
Sade essay that he begins to use tree diagrams, rather than
 
compiling syntagms and paradigms" (438). Quite properly,
 
Bruss sees the tree diagram as a compromise with true
 
binarism. But what she has left out is Barthes's
 
transitional metaphor between the binary diagram and the
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i tree diagram. (See also S/Z. 129).
 
i In speaking ■ of Saussure (B/3 i 4^ of text)', Barthes asks
 
what can be made "of the stable combinations of words, of
 
: the fixed syntngfts which partake Of language^ speech, of
 
I structure and combination at the same time?" Clearly,;
 
rather than seeing the binary opposition between diachrony
 
i and synchrony as simple and straightforward, Barthes views
 
: structural linguistics as adding complexity to the system of
 
language. : As he writes in Criticism and Truth (1966):
 
i The work of linguistics is not to reduce the 
ambiguities of language, but to comprehend them 
and, so to speak, institute them . . . the 
■ / symbolic language to which literary works belong 
is bv its very structure a plural language whose 
code is constructed in such a way that every 
j utterance (every work) engendered by it has 
multiple meanings. (70-71) 
in all, 1 believe that Barthes's work on classical rhetoric
 
1 succeeds in delineating the complexities of language in
 
general and ancient rhetoric especially, even though the
 
historicist is likely to find his methods merely
 
distracting. But this may be Barthes's point exactly to
 
drive the historicist-academicians off, to destablize the
 
academicians'"rhetoric," their "language," their "system .
 
that historical and positivistic bias, without departing
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from classical texts.
 
Dividing his essay on rhetoric as he does, then, into
 
the diachronic Voyage (a descent through time) and the
 
synchronic Network (an exploration of the individual parts
 
of discourse), Barthes gives us an accessible account of the
 
important turns of classical rhetoric and its influence on
 
society. Section A, the Voyage, takes us on a journey
 
through history, with stops or "day trips" as he calls them,
 
at the most salient points in rhetoric's past, from its
 
origin in property disputes, through Gorgias and Plato, to
 
Aristotle, Cicero and Quintilian, and on to the "death" of
 
rhetoric.
 
Section B, the Network, examines the divisions of
 
classification of the parts of discourse by the metaphor of
 
a "huge creeper which descends level by level, now dividing
 
a generic element, now reuniting scattered parts" (B.C.4. of
 
text). Barthes, here, passes rhetoric through machines,
 
systems and grids, picking up content to fill the form of
 
Section A (content being associated with the paradigmatic
 
and form with the syntagmatic). In this section, we again
 
encounter names from the past, but now in more detail and
 
substance. We are dealing in this section with what
 
Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, etc., actually did with
 
rhetoric.
 
A note on Aristotle: the Aristotle in Barthes's essay
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is likely to seem unfainiliar to American readers; he is not
 
the elitist philosopher taught in American universities,
 
most notably among the University of Ghicagd Neo-

Aristotelians, who helped make their Aristotle authoritative
 
for their kind of literary criticism, as well as their
 
peculiarly American tradition of "Ideas and Methods
 
Instead, Barthes's Aristotle becomes a skillful trader in
 
the goods of mass culture', ^arthes's entire conception of
 
Aristotle hinges on the notion of verisimilitude, or that
 
which appears to be true. For Barthes's Aristotle, it is
 
important merely to convince an audience that something is
 
likely or probable—it doesn't matter whether it is factual
 
or even possible. This places him well beyond the Platonic
 
ideal of Truth arrived at through dialectic and almost into
 
the Sophist camp. Above all, Barthes's Aristotle would have
 
rhetoric appeal to the greatest number. It is a rhetoric of
 
the democracy, where popular appeal reigns supreme.
 
Although until recently critics and scholars have paid
 
little attention to Barthes's treatise on ancient rhetoric,
 
Barthes interest in rhetoric in general has a long and
 
steady history. As early as Writing Degree Zero (1953),
 
Barthes worries out the problems of how v/riters deal with
 
their literary and rhetorical inheritance and how many
 
modern writers attempt to achieve a "colorless" writing, a
 
kind of writing (always doomed to fail) that tries to
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abandon its rbetorical past.
 
And in Image/Music/Text. Barthes also extehds his
 
knowledge of rhetoric to discourse analysis./ (See
 
"Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narratives.")
 
Again in another article, "The Reality Effect" (1968),
 
Barthes writes that
 
Western culture, in one of its major currents, has
 
certainly not left description without a meaning,
 
but has in fact assigned to it an end perfectly
 
well recognized by the institution of literature.
 
The current is rhetoric, and the end is "beauty":
 
description has long had an aesthetic function.
 
(12)
 
The "aide-memoire," falling, as it does, squarely in
 
Barthes's "structuralist phase," bears a close resemblance
 
with other works of the same period. Many of Barthes's
 
commentators have admitted that there are problems in
 
classifying his works into discrete categories, and Bruss
 
notes that the Barthes the English-speakd ng world knows has
 
much to do with the order in which his works were translated
 
(366). But his interest in rhetoric and the structural 
approach it invites seem constant and long-lived. As Lavers 
writes; //■■; • ■' / 
Following Saussure's founding gesture as it does, 
it is appropriate that the headings in Elements 
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rOf Sem1o1oQV (1964)1 mos11y come from his famous
 
dichotomies: Language and Speech, Signifier and
 
Signified, Syhtagm and System (or Paradigm). The
 
dichotomy between Synchrony and Diachrony is found
 
in the chapter on language and speech in
 
connection with the notion of linguistic value and
 
also in the conclusion, in connection with
 
methodological hints about the formation of a
 
corpus for research. Each of these sections first
 
establishes why some particular linguistic
 
concepts and operations are suitable for extension
 
to semiology . . . (135-36)
 
In S/Z (1970) Barthes tells us that his five codes fall
 
into a network, "a kind of topos through which the entire
 
text passes (or rather, in passing, becomes text)" (20).
 
And later in the same work, we note that the rhetorical code
 
takes over as the organizing element, that it pushes the
 
sentence through a transformation into text by way of a tree
 
with "forks," "branches" and "joints" (128-29), echoing
 
through metaphor the tree diagrams developed a few years
 
earlier as an outgrowth of his work in the "aide-memoire."
 
Similarly in Sade/Fourier/Lovola (1971). Barthes treats the
 
"network" as a topic or grill.
 
a form pre-existent to any invention . . . a
 
tablature of cases through which the subject to be
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treated (the guaestio) is guided . . . . Thus the
 
topic contains all the wonders of an arsenal of
 
latent powers. (58)
 
As should be evident, the "aide-memoire" comes between
 
Barthes's studies in sociology and his fully formulated work
 
in semiology. Here, ancient rhetoric is examined by a
 
"structuralist" whose tools are supplied by linguistics and
 
sociology, leading to his own work in semiology. Throughout
 
much of his work, then, and over a long period of time,
 
Barthes applies rhetorical models and semiological methods
 
to the subject at hand. Lavers writes:
 
In the discourses of society, Barthes identifies
 
figures which he lists at the end as in a treatise
 
of rhetoric. This gives rise to the question, as
 
in the case of Marxism, why rhetoric, which
 
clearly corresponds to Barthes's spontaneous way
 
of looking at things is not presented as an
 
explicit model in "Myth Today." Actually the two
 
problems partly overlap: Marxism and its Hegelian
 
sources (for instance. The Phenomenology of Mind,
 
frequently used by Lacan) have often of late been
 
viewed as systems of figures. All of Barthes's
 
spontaneous objects of study, themes in Michelet,
 
myths in Mythologies. functions and patterns in On
 
Racine. and even the signifieds of the various
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fragments which make up so many of his works, are
 
all figures in the wider sense. His use of
 
figures as a category is therefore overdetermined.
 
'■(1231 f: . ;■ . ■ ■ ■; '■/.If; :: ■ ' 
Another of Barthes's abiding interests is the 
connection between language and class. Originally a 
sociologist, and continuously interested in Marx throughout 
his intellectual voyage, Barthes was keenly aware that how 
one speaks largely determines who one is. Although this may 
be a universal of language, or at least it holds in Western 
cultures, Barthes notes that it was and is especially true 
in France. From this awareness it is but a small step to an 
interest in the origins,of language and class. Language, 
when it is used publicly begins to function rhetorically. 
A.lthough Barthes shifted his theoretical positions and 
methods frequently and often abruptly, the major part of his 
work shows a sharp and persistent interest in the social 
institution of language—and that social institution is 
rhetoric. Elsewhere in his writings, Barthes also extends 
the notion of language as class to the priesthood of writers 
and critics, those v;ho establish power through language and 
control who may use it and how it is to be used—those 
guardians of present-day language. In his much publicized 
reply to the critic Raymond Picard, Criticism and Truth. 
Barthes views the language strictures of traditional 
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criticism as those of a special class. just as in the
 
present essay he claims that all Special language, i.e.,
 
rhetoric, stems from class needs. "French 'clarity,'" he
 
writes, "is a language whose origin is political" (47). And
 
again, "it [critical language] is universally appropriated
 
by the class of property owners" (49). Above all, "language
 
is never innocent."
 
Recognizing as we do that not every use of language is
 
rhetorical, we note that what is constant in almost all of
 
Barthes's writing on language is that language is an object
 
in itself and not an instrument. Language by itself need
 
not always be studied or used as a means to an end, it does
 
not always or necessarily expose or indicate external
 
reality (referents); but it is always for liim and, so he
 
claims, for all writers, a problem, an intensely complex
 
object of study and experimentation (Criticism and Truth.
 
64). Never is this more evident than in Barthes's own
 
writing.
 
Barthes's language is at once erudite and anti-

intellectual. He is the master of neologisms and archaisms,
 
and he has a special fondness for words with multiple
 
meanings. Clarity, as stated previously, is not Barthes's
 
long suit. He favors a language "full of uncertainties."
 
Again in Criticism and Truth. he writes
 
Still today they [the old critics] fight with
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 ridiculous passioii for tHeif /'Fre^^^
 
oracular chronicles; fuim against foreign
 
invasions, death sentences on certain supposedly ,
 
unwanted words. We must endlessiyelean, Scraps
 
i
 off, forbid, eliminate, preserve." (47)
 
This: is precisely; wh to do in his own ^
 
writing.
 
Compared with English, French syntax is somewhat loose,
 
and Barthes's syntax is loose even by French standards.
 
Throughout the body of the "aide-mdmoire," he keeps fairly
 
close to standard French, but in his peroration, he
 
unleashes his language, so that it tends to become
 
rhapsodic. This rhapsodic prose, one senses, is v/hat :
 
Barthes wishes to write all along, but under the constraints
 
of a scholarly study, he is unable to break loose. This is
 
typical for much of Barthes's writing; he is able to sneak
 
his exotic words into fairly straight discourse when .
 
necessary, but there is often this release, this plunge into
 
the delight of writing for its own sake.
 
Elizabeth Bruss writes in Beautiful Theories;
 
In Barthes's later writing, with what Culler calls
 
its "preference for loose and evasive appositional
 
syntax," the emphasis falls more heavily on the
 
individual word and especially on its shimmering
 
capacity to mean many different and inconsistent
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 , things at once, once syntax no longer constrains
 
it to a single value. Moreover Barthes always
 
played with and against the standards of
 
linguistic purity as determined by the French
 
Academy (an institutional commitment to the
 
national tongue that neither England nor America :
 
can match), and if the aura of each separate word
 
becomes greater, so too must the delicate
 
interplay between the common and the arcane, the
 
polite word and the vulgarism. (372)
 
The reference here is to Jonathan Culler's "The Ever-Moving
 
Finger," (934), Times Literary Supplement no.3782, (90
 
August 1974).
 
All of this makes translating Barthes's work a
 
difficult and at times impossible task. As Bruss notes:
 
with a writer as supple as Barthes and one as
 
intoxicated by enantiosemes (words with the same
 
form, but contradictbry meanings) and-amphibology
 
(phrases where the grammar allows two or more
 
distinct readings) as lie gradually became,
 
translation will always present problems. (371)
 
Barthes's punctuation is also strangely idiosyncratic, so
 
that, at times, it is impossible to track dovm the
 
antecedent of a particular pronoun. Lavers writes of
 
Barthes's punctuation that it is always a guide to something
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iinportant, soitietimes being "weirdly casual" in the :face of a
 
significant matter (57-58).
 
Beyond all this, there are the overwhelming problems^ ^^o
 
modern translation in general. Recent, work in trans.1 ation
 
has emphasized that an enterprise that sets out to give a
 
"faithful translation" is doomed to failure. By now it is
 
conventional wisdom that is not enough to hold close to the
 
text. The real goal of translation is not to reduce the
 
author's ideas or to replace one signifier with another, :
 
presumably equal signifier. The translator must realize
 
that a skilled "reading" is as close as he or she can come
 
to a fair rendition of the original.
 
As Barbara Johnson points out in her essay, "Taking
 
Fidelity Philosophically," "faithfulness to the text has r
 
meant faithfulness to the semantic tenor with as little
 
interf©rsncG as possible for th© constraints of th© v©hicl©.
 
Translation, in oth©r words, has always been the translation
 
of meaning" (145). But the deconstructionists have made
 
evident th© impossibility of this traditional approach to
 
translation. With words that ar© d©lib©rat©ly as polysemic
 
as possibl© and n©w conc©pts of t©xtuality, on© has th©
 
choic© of inv©nting a n©w and similar m©aning or retaining
 
the original language (144-46).
 
In my own trans1ation, I have attempted to give a close
 
and sensitive reading of Barthes's work, while at the same
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time preserving as much,of the indeterminacy as possible.
 
This has hot, I realize, always been successful. At times I
 
have opted for a decisive meaning, when to do otherwise
 
would have produced sheer nonsense. I have, above all,
 
tried to let Barthes's own language and style come through.
 
As Walter Benjamin writes in "The Task of the
 
Translator,"
 
a real translation is ttansparent; it does not
 
block its light, but allows the pure language, as
 
though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon
 
the original all the more fully. This may be
 
a.chieyed, above all, by a literal rendering of the
 
syntax which proves words rather than sentences to
 
be the primary element of the translator. (79)
 
If the syntax in my translation sometimes seems awkward, it
 
is largely for this reason. Finally, where Barthes's
 
vocabulary is especially difficult, I have provided
 
translator's notes to clarify the language as much as
 
possible.
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essays released in March 1988, includes a translation of ^ :

this essay, entitled "Old RhetqriG! an aide meinoire," hy
 
Richard Howard. My own translation was completed well
 
before this book came out, and at no time did I consult
 
Howard's translation for use in my own work. Howard does
 
not provide an introduction, nor does he include Barthes's
 
two appendices, his index, or table of contents, all of
 
which form a part of my thesis. •
 
Fof excLmple: of "new ■rhetoric" put "td, 
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Ancient Rhetoric
 
A Handbook^ : ■ :: 
By Roland Barthes 
The following is a transcription of a seminar given at
 
the ficole Pratique des Hautes fitudes in 1964-1965. At the
 
beginning--Or the horizon—-of this seminar ,i as always / there
 
was the modern text, that is: the text which does not vet
 
exist. One way to approach this new text is to know from
 
the outset the source from which and the background against
 
which it tries to understand itself, and then to cbmpare the
 
new semiotic of writing with the ancient practice of
 
literary language which has been called Rhetoric down
 
through the centuries. Hence the idea for a seminar on
 
ancient Rhetoric: ancient does not mean that there is a new
 
Rhetoric today; rather Ancient Rhetoric is set against the
 
new one which perhaps has not yet been achieved: the world
 
is incredibly full of ancient Rhetoric.
 
I would never have agreed to publish these working
 
notes if a manual, a notebook of some sort, v;hich presented
 
a chronological and systematic overview of that ancient and :
 
classical Rhetoric had already existed. Unfortunately, to
 
my knowledge, there is nothing of the sort (at least not in
 
French). I have therefore been obliged to put together this
 
knowledge myself, and it is the result of t^^^ personal ^
 
introduction (proPedeutic) which is presented here: here is
 
the handbook that I would have v/ished to find complete at
 
the time I began to ask myself about the death of Rhetoric.
 
Nothing more, then, than an elementary system of
 
information, the preliminary listing of a certain number of
 
terms and classifications—which is not to imply that in the
 
course of this work I was not frequently struck with
 
excitement and admiration by the force and subtlety of that
 
ancient rhetorical system, the modernity of some of its
 
propositions. .. .
 
Unfortunately, (for practical reasons) I am no longer
 
able to authenticate the references for this text of
 
knowledge: I have had to draft this manual in part from
 
memory. My excuse is that these are matters of common
 
knowledge: Rhetoric is poorly known, yet to know it does not
 
require one to be erudite; therefore everyone wi11 be able
 
to find easily the bibliographical references which are
 
missing here. What is assembled {at times, perhaps on its
 
own, in the form of involuntary citations) proceeds
 
essentially from: (1) treatises on the rhetoric of antiquity
 
and classicism, (2) scholarly introductions to the collected
 
works of Guillaume Bud^, (3) two fundamental books, one by
 
Curtius and the other by Baldwin, (4) some specialized
 
 articles, notably tfe with the Middle Ages, (5)
 
.some Customary sources^^^ ^S Morier's dictionary of
 
Rhetoric, F. Brunot's history of the French language, and a
 
book by R. Bray on the development of classical doctrine in
 
France, and (6) some related readihgs, themselves
 
;fragmeritary an(i cohtingerit iKojeve:,'Jaeger 1 1
 
'0;i. THE RHETORIGAL PRACTICE
 
The rhetoric which will be examined here is that meta
 
language (whose language-object was "discourse") which
 
ptevai in the western wdrid from the fifth centuty;(B.G1}
 
until the nineteenth century. We will not be cohcerned with
 
more remote experiences (india, i;siam),^ ^:^^^^^^^^^^ are the
 
proper concern of the Orient, and of the western material we
 
will restrict ourselves to Athens, Rome, and France. This
 
meta-language (discourse on discourse) allowed for various
 
practices in "Rhetoric" which were present simultaneously or
 
successively according to the period:
 
1• A technique, that is, an "art" in the classical
 
sense of the word: the art of persuasion, a set of rules and
 
formulas which, when put into operation, allows the audience
 
of a discourse (and much later, the reader of a work) to be
 
convinced, even if he must be persuaded of something which
 
is "false."
 
/ . 2. An academic discipline:: the art of rhetnrir, at
 
first transmitted by interpersonal means (a rhetor and his
 
disciples, iiis clients), rapldlY worked its way into those
 
institutions of learning; in the schools it has formed the
 
core of what one would; toddy call the second stage of
 
secondary and advanced education; it has transformed itself
 
into examination material (exercises, lessons, tests)v
 
3. A science. or in any case, a proto-science; that
 
is; (a) an autonomous field of Study, delimiting certain
 
homogeneous phenomena, in order to uhderstand the "effects"
 
of language, (b) a classification of these phenomena (whose
 
best-known mark is the list'of rhetorical."figures"), (c) an.
 
"Operation" in the Hjelmslevian sense, in other words, a
 
meta-language, the set of treatises on rhetoric, the
 
subject—or signified—-of which is a language-object
 
(argumentative language and "figurative" language).
 
4. An ethic: as a system of "rules," rhetoric is
 
permeated with the ambiguity of the word: it is at one and
 
the same time a manual of formulas, driven by a practical
 
finality, and a Code, a body of moral prescriptions which
 
function to monitor (that is, to permit and restrain) the
 
"deviance" of emotional language,
 
5. A social Practice: Rhetoric is that privileged
 
technique (since one must pay to acquire it) which allows
 
the ruling classes to assure themselves of fhe propriety of
 
their speech. Language being a privilege or a power, they
 
have proclaimed selective rules of access to that power by
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making it into a pseudo-science,,eipsed to "those who do not
 
know how to speak," dependent upon a costly initiation: born
 
2,500 years ago of property disputes, rhetoric wore out and
 
died when the ''rhetoricai:" clasa,d when tke bourgeois ;
 
culture was first established.
 
ft' a iiidic practice; AiL these practices constitute a
 
powerful (today one would say ''repressiye'') .institutional:
 
system; it Was inevitabl^^^^ it should Spread: to include a
 
mock rhetoric, a ''bieok'' rhetoric (accusations, insults,
 
ironies); play, parody, erotic or obscene allusions,
 
college jokes, all those :sehoolboy pranks (which ^
 
incidentaliy remain to be e^PiOred and classified according
 
to cultural codes).
 
, 0.2. THE EMPIRE OF RHETORIC-^i : V
 
All these practices attest to the breadth Of the
 
achievement of rhetoric—an achievement which nevertheless
 
has not yet given rise to any important synthesis or :
 
historical interpretation. Perhaps it is because rhetoric
 
Cbeyond the taboo which weighs.upon language), a veritable
 
: e^ipi^s / uaster and more tenacious than any political einOire,
 
by its dimensions, by its endurance, frustrates,;the very y .
 
limits of science and historical reflection, to the point of
 
implicating history itseif at least as we are accustomed to
 
imagine and manage it, and compellihg us to invent what
 
otherwise might be called a monumental history. The
 
scientific contempt attached to rhetoric would partake then,
 
of that general refusal to recognize multiplicity,
 
pverdetermination. Let one dream, nevertheless, that
 
rhetoric—whatever might be the internal variations of the
 
system—has reigned in the west for two and a half millenia,
 
from Gorgias to Napoleon III; let one dream of all that
 
which, immutable, impassible, and almost immortal, it has
 
seen born, pass and disappear, without itself moving or
 
altering: the Athenian democracy, the Egyptian dynasties,
 
the Roman Republic, the Roman Empire, the great invasions,
 
the feudal system, the Renaissance, the monarchy, the
 
Revolution; it has withstood regimes, religions,
 
civilizations; moribund since the Renaissance, it takes
 
three centuries to die, and it is still not absolutely dead.
 
Rhetoric gives rise to what must indeed be called a super-

civilization: the historical and geographic Occident: it was
 
the only system (along with grammar, born after it) that
 
permitted our society to recognize language and its
 
supremacy (kurosis. as Gorgias puts it), which was also a
 
form of social superiority; the classification system it
 
imposed is the only truly common feature of successive and
 
varying historical groupings, as if an ideology of form
 
existed beyond ideologies of content and the determinacy of
 
history, as if—a principle anticipated by Durkheim and
 
Mauss and confirmed by Levi—Strauss a taxonomic—identity
 
existed for each society, a socio-logic that makes it
 
possible to define another history, another social order,
 
without destroying those which are recognized at other
 
levels.
 
0.3. THE VOYAGE TdSID THE NETWORK
 
This vast territory will here be explored (in the loose
 
and casual sense of the term) in two directions: a
 
diachronic direction and a systematic direction. We cannot
 
reconstruct a history of rhetoric with absolute certainty;
 
we will have to content ourselves with isolating a few
 
significant moments; we will tour two thousand years of
 
rhetoric, stopping off at some points of interest which will
 
be like "day trips" (these "day trips" may be a bit uneven
 
in duration). In this extended diachrony, there will be
 
seven stages in all, seven "day trips," whose value will be
 
essentially didactic. Then we will reassemble the
 
classifications of the rhetors in order to form a unique
 
network, a sort of artifact allowing us to imagine the art
 
of rhetoric as a finely adjusted machine, a system of
 
operations, a "program" intended to produce discourse.
 
A. THE VOYAGE
 
A.1. THE BIRTH OF RHETORIC
 
A.1.1. Rhetoric and property.
 
Rhetoric (as meta-language) was born of property
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disputes. Around 485 B.C., two Sicilian tyrants, Gelon and ,
 
Hieron, conducted deportations, pdpulation transfers and
 
exprppriations, in order to populate Syracuse and to
 
distribute mercenaries. When they were overthrown by a
 
popular revolt and the people wished to return to the ante
 
QUO. there were innumerable law suits, because property
 
rights had been obscured. These suits were of a new type:
 
they mobilized popular grand juries, and in order to
 
convince them, the speaker now had to be "eloquent." This
 
eloquence/ partaking at the same time of democracy and
 
demagoguery, the judicial and the political (later called
 
the deliberativeV. caught on raoidlv as a subject to be
 
taught. The first professors of the new discipline were
 
Empedocles of Agrigento, Corax, his student from Syracuse
 
(the first to pay for his lessons), and Tisias. This
 
teaching spread just as quickly in Athens (after the Median
 
wars), owning to disputes by merchants who pleaded jointly
 
in Syracuse and in Athens: rhetoric is already, in part,
 
Athenian by the middle of the fifth century B.C.
 
A.1.2. A great svntaamatic.
 
What is proto-rhetoric, this Coraxian rhetoric? A
 
rhetoric of the syntagm, of discourse, and not of tricks and
 
figures. Corax already sets forth the five major parts of
 
the oratio. which over the centuries have formed the
 
"blueprint" of oratory discourse: (1) the exordium, (2) the
 
.^ ■ A: ■ ■ V 8 " • ■A ■" ■: ■ ^ ^ 
narration or action (an account of the facts), (3) the
 
argument or proof, (4) the digression, (5) the epilogue. It
 
is easy to verify that in the shift from judicial discourse
 
to the scholarly dissertation, the blueprint has retained
 
its principal orgahization: ah introduction, a demonstrative
 
body, a conclusion. That first rhetoric is, in effCcb, a
 
great syntagmatic. ^
 
A.1.3. Deceptive speech.
 
It is tantalizing to note that the art Of speech is
 
originally bound up with property claims, as if language,
 
insofar as it is an object of transformation, the rules
 
governing a practice, were determined not to proceed from
 
subtle, ideological mediation (as had occurred with so many
 
art forms), but from the most naked social interaction,
 
confirmed in its fundamental brutality, that of the
 
possession of land: we began to reflect upon language as a
 
way of defending our own goods. It is that spirit of social
 
conflict that gave birth to the first theoretical sketch of
 
deceptive speech (different from fictive speech, the speech
 
of poets: Poetry was the only literature at the time, prose
 
did not attain that status until much later).
 
A.2. GORGIAS, OR PROSE AS LITERATURE
 
Gorgias of Leontium (today's Lentini, to the north of
 
Syracuse) came to Athens in 427; he had been Thucydides'
 
master and is Socrates' Sophist dnterldeutpr in:the Gornia?^.
 
The codification of pro.qp
 
Gorgias' chief interest for lis is that he brought prose
 
under the ;rhetoricai; code;, certifying it as learned
 
discourse, an aesthetic object, "sovereign language,"
 
ancestor of ''liters-turev" How? The fhherai eiogies
 
(threnodies), composed at first in verse> passed into prose
 
and were entrusted to men of state; they were, if not
 
actually written (in the current sense of the wbrdj, at
 
least learned in a certain fixed manner. Thus was born a
 
third genre :(after the judicial and the deliberative), the
 
epideietic: this iS the advent of ornamehtai prose, of
 
prose-spectacle. In the.transition from verse to prose, the
 
meter arid music were lost. Gorgias seeks to replace these
 
with a code more appropriate;t (although borrbwed ?
 
from poetry): words of like consonance, symmetry of phrases,
 
reinforcement of antitheses by assonance, metaphor,
 
alliteration.' • ' '
 
A.2.2. The advent of elocutio.
 
Why make a stop at Gorgias along our voyage? There are
 
roughly, in the complete art of rhetoric (that of
 
Quintilian, for example), two poles: the order of the parts
 
of discourse, the taxis or dispositio: and a paradigmatic
 
pole: the figures of rhetoric, the lexis or elocutio. We
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have seen that Corax launched a purely syntagmatic rhetoric.
 
Gorgias, in demanding that dne work the 'Vfigures /'V gives it
 
a paradigmatic aspect: it opens prose to rhetoric and
 
rhetoric to sylistics.
 
A.3. PLATO
 
Plata's dia:iogues which deal directly with -rhetoric . ■ 
are: the Goraias and the Phaedrus. 
ArS.l. The two rhetorics. . r ' v-. ­
Plato treats of two rhetorics, one evil and the,other
 
good. I. The rhetoric of fact is constituted by the :
 
lOQoaraphv. an activity which consists of writing any
 
discourse (it is not only a matter of judicial rhetoric; the
 
totality of the notion is important); its object is
 
verisimilitude, illusion; this is the rhetoric of the i
 
rhetors, of the schools, of Gorgias, of the Sophists. II.
 
The rhetoric of the right is the true rhetoric; ; ,
 
philosophical rhetoric or dialectic. Its object is truth;
 
Plato calls it a psvchoaogv (the training of the soul
 
through speech). :The opposition of good and evil rhetoric,
 
Platonic and sophistic rhetoric, forms part of a very large
 
paradigm: on the one hand, flattery, servile activity, the
 
perversion of truth; on the other, the rejection of all
 
complacency or coarseness; on the one hand, controls and
 
routines, on the other hand, art: the activities of pleasure
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are a contemptible counterfeit Of the arts of the Good:
 
rhetoric is the counterfeit of justice, sophistry of
 
legislation, quackery of medicine, cosmetology of physical
 
fitness; rhetoric (that of the logdgraphers, the rhetors,
 
the sophists) is therefore not ah art.
 
A.3.2. Eroticized rhetoric.
 
True rhetoric is a psychogogy; it demands a total
 
knowledge, impartial, common (this will become a topos with
 
Cicero and Quintilian, but the notion will be insipid: one
 
demands of the orator a good "general education"). The
 
object of this "synoptic" knowledge is the correspondence or
 
interaction between species of souls and the types of
 
discourse. Platonic rhetoric renounces writing and turns
 
instead to interpersonal conversation. the adhominatio: the
 
fundamental mode of discourse is the dialogue between master
 
and pupil, united by inspired love. To think in common.
 
this might be the motto of the dialectic. Rhetoric is a
 
dialogue of love.
 
A.3.3 The division, the mark.
 
The dialecticians (those who live that eroticized
 
rhetoric) conduct two interdependent processes: one part, a
 
gathering/rising movement toward an unconditional term
 
(Socrates, reproving Lysias in the Phaedrus. defines love in
 
its totality, its unity); the other part, a descending
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movement, a division of the unity according to its natural
 
clefts, according to species, until reaching the indivisible
 
unit. This "descent" proceeds by a climbing motion: with
 
each stop, each step, one encounters the two terms; it is,,
 
necessary to choose one over the other in order to increase
 
the descent and accede to a new binary split, from whence
 
one sets out afresh; such is the progressive definition of
 
the sophist:
 
G2\ME HUNTING
 
Land
 
WiId 	 Tame
 
(man).
 
by force	 by persuasion
 
in public'	 in private
 
with gifts ,'
 -ith^^gr^t
 
,fOr for money:
 
subsistence:
 
Flatterers The Sophists
 
this segmented rhetoric—which sets itself apart from the
 
syllogistic rhetoric of Aristotle—closely resembles a
 
digital computer program: each choice determines the
 
alternative that follows; moreover according to the
 
paradigmatic structure of language, each binary segment
 
consists of a marked term and an unmarked term: here the
 
marked term raises the alternative play. But how does the
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mark occur in the first place? Where does it come from?
 
And here one rediscovers the eroticized rhetoric of Plato: .
 
within the Pratonic dialogue, the mark is generated by a
 
concession of the respondent (the pupil). Plato's rhetoric
 
implies two interlocutors, one of whom admits defeat: that
 
is the necessary condition for mpyement. Thus all these,
 
particles of agreement which we encounter in Plato's
 
dialogues, and which often make us smile at their silliness
 
and their obvious triviality (when they do not bore us), are
 
really structural "marks," rhetorical acts.
 
A.4. ARISTOTELIAN RHETORIC
 
A.4.1. Rhetoric and Poetics. ,
 
Isn't all rhetoric (if we exclude Plato) Aristotelian?
 
Yes, no doubt: all of the didactic elements which feed the
 
classical handbooks come from Aristotle. Nevertheless, a
 
system does not define itself by its elements alone, but
 
also, and above all, by the opposition in which it finds
 
itself caught. Aristotle wrote two treatises on discourse,
 
and the two are distinct: the Techne Rhetorike deals with
 
the art of everyday communication, with public discourse;
 
the Techne Poietike deals with the art of the inspired
 
imagination. In the first case, it is important to control
 
the progression of the discourse from idea to idea; in the
 
second case, the flow of the work from image to image. For
 
Aristotle, these are two independent thought processes, two
 
aUtohomous is the oppbsitipri of these two v
 
SYStems, the rhetorical and the poetic, which in fact
 
defines Aristdteh . All authors whp acknowledge
 
this opposition can be placed in Aristotelian rhetoric; this
 
will cease when the opposition is neutralized, when Rhetoric
 
and Poetics merge, when rhetoric becdmes a poetic
 
techne '(a creative enterprise): this occurs during the
 
reigh of Augustus (with Ovid, Horace) and a bit later
 
(PlUtarcii, Tacitus)--aithaugh Quinti1ian sti11 practieps
 
%ristdtelian rhetoric fueIdri bf Rhetoric and Toetids
 
is sanctioned by the vocabulary of the Middle Ages, a period
 
when the poetic arts are the rhetorical arts, when the great
 
rhetoricians are poets. This fusion is paramount because it
 
is of the same origin as the idea of literature:
 
Aristotelian rhetoric places its emphasis on reasoning; the
 
elocutio (or the division of figures) is not even a part of
 
it (it has low priority with Aristotle). Afterwards the
 
contrary is the case: rhetoric concerns itself with
 
problems; not with "evidence," but with composition and
 
style: literature (the act of writing in its fullest scope)
 
defines itself by the well-written. We must therefore
 
include in our voyage, under the general heading of
 
Aristotelian rhetoric, the earlier rhetoric of a dominant
 
poetics. We will take our theory of Aristotelian rhetoric
 
from Aristotle himself, the practice we will get from
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Cicero, the pedagogy from Quintillah, the transformation (by
 
generalization) from fiionysius Of Halicafnassus, Plutarch,
 
and the anonymous author of On the Sub1ime.
 
A.4.2. Aristotle's Rhetoric.
 
Aristotle defines rhetoric as "the art of extracting
 
from each subject whatever degree of persuasion it can
 
sustain," or as "the faculty of discovering hypothetically
 
that which in any given case is most likely to be
 
persuasive." What is perhaps more important than such
 
definitions is the fact that rhetoric is a techne (it is
 
not an empirical datum), that is: rhetoric is the means Of
 
producing something that mav either be or not be. whose
 
origin is in the creative agent, not in the created object:
 
there is no techne of things which are either natural or
 
necessary, and discourse is neither of these. Aristotle
 
considers discourse (the oratio) to be a message and
 
relegates it to a branch of information systems. Book I of
 
the Rhetoric is the book of the transmitter of the message,
 
it is the book of the orator: it mainly deals with the
 
conception of arguments, inasmuch as these depend on the
 
skill of the orator, on his ability to adapt his matei^ial
 
and himself to the audience, this according to the three
 
recognized genres of discourse (judicial, deliberative,
 
epideictic). Bookll is the book of the receiver of the
 
message, the book of the public: here the subject is the
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emotions and, again, arguments; but this time the author
 
fqcuses on their reception (and not, as before, on their
 
formulation). Book III is the book of the message itself:
 
it deals with the lexis or elocutio, in other words, with,
 
"fiaures." and with taxis or dispositio. or the order of the
 
parts of discourse.
 
A.4,3. The Probable.
 
Aristotle's Rhetoric is, above all, a rhetoric of
 
argument, of reaspnihg, of the elliptical syllogism (the
 
enthymeme); it is a voluntarily diminished logic, adapted to
 
the standards of the public, that is, to common sense, to
 
current opinion. Extended to literary productions (where it
 
does not properly apply), it favors an aesthetic of the
 
public rather than an aesthetic of the v;ork. That is why,
 
mutatis mutandis and all (historical) allowances being made,
 
it is well suited to our so-called mass culture, ruled by
 
Aristotelian "verisimilitude" or what the public believe is
 
possible. How many films, magazines, commercials exploit
 
the Aristotelian principle: "Better a probable impossibility
 
than an improbable possibility"; it is better to tell what
 
the public believes is possible, even if it is
 
scientifically impossible, than to tell the public what is
 
in reality possible if it is likely to reject it by the
 
censure of collective current opinion. Of course it is ■ 
tempting to make a connection between this mass rhetoric and
 
Aristotle's politics; it was, to be sure, a politics of the
 
"golden mean," which favored a balanced democracy situated
 
in the middle class and charged with easing tensions between
 
rich and poor, majority and minority; hence a rhetoric of
 
good sensej voluntarily subject of the "psychology" of the
 
publie.
 
A.4.4. The Rhetorica of Cicero.
 
In the second century (B.C.), Greek rhetors flee to
 
Rome> schools of rhetoric are founded; functioning by age
 
group, the schools practice two kinds of exercises: the
 
suasoriae■ "persuasive" sorts of dissertations (primarily in 
the deliberative genre) for children, and the controversiae 
(in the judicial genre) for older students. The oldest 
Latin tract is the Rhetorica ad Herennium. attributed 
sometimes to Cornificius and sometimes to Cicero: this [the 
attribution to Cicero] is what the Middle Ages did; along 
with Cicero's De Inventione. they never stopped copying this 
manuscript. Which became fundamental in the art of writing. 
Cicero is an orator who speaks of the art of oratory, whence 
a certain practical application of Ariatotelian theory (thus 
little really new with regard to that theory) . Ciceronian 
rhetorics include: (1) (assuming that he wrote it) the 
Rhetorica ad Herennium. a sort of digest of Aristotelian 
rhetoric; the classifying of "questions," however, replaces 
in importance the theory of the enthymeme: rhetoric becomes 
T& 
professionalized. At this point the theory of the three
 
styles (the low, the high, and the middle) emerges. (2) De
 
Inventione Oratoria. a youthful (and incomplete) work, ,
 
purely judiciary, devoted to the epicheireme, an expanded ^
 
syllogism in which one of the premises or both are followed
 
by their proofs: it is the "good argument." (3) De Oratore.
 
a work held in high regard up to the nineteenth century ("a
 
masterpiece of good sense," "of right and sound reason," "of
 
noble and lofty thought," "the most original of the
 
treatises on rhetoric"): as if recalling Plato, Gicero
 
moralizes rhetoric and reacts against teaching it in the
 
schools: it is the Claim of a well-rounded man against
 
specialization. The work takes the form of a dialogue
 
(Crassus, Antonius, Mucius Scaevoia, Rufus, Cotta): it
 
defines the orator (who must have a general education) and
 
briefly reviews the traditional parts Of Rhetoric (Inventio,
 
nisonsitto. Elocutio). (4) Brutus. a history of the art of
 
oratory in Rome. (5) Orator. an ideal portrait of the
 
orator; the second part is more didactic (it will be amply
 
annotated by Peter Ramus): specific attention is given to
 
the theory of the oratorical "number," later revived by
 
Quintilian. (6) The Topoi; this is a digest, done from
 
memory in eight days while traveling by boat to Greece after
 
Mark Sintony seized control of Rome, of the TopOi of
 
Aristotle; of greatest interest to us is the structural
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network of the ouaestio (of. in B.1.25). (7) The Partitio:
 
a little manual of questions and answers in the form of a
 
dialogue between Cicero the father and Cicero the son, and
 
the most dry and least moralistic of Cicero's treatises (and
 
consequently the one I like best): this is a complete
 
elementary rhetoric, a kind of catechism with the added
 
advantage of providing within its scope the classifications
 
of rhetoric (this is the meaning of partitio: systematic
 
overlay).
 
A.4.5. Ciceronian Rhetoric.
 
Ciceronian rhetoric is marked by the following
 
characteristics: (a) dread of the "system"; Cicero is
 
completely indebted to Aristotle, but he disintellec­
tualizes him, he tries to put some "taste" and "naturalness"
 
into his theory; this de-structuration will reach its
 
extreme in the Rhetorica sacra of St. Augustine (Book IV of
 
On Christian Doctrine): these are not rules for eloquence,
 
which the Christian orator needs nonetheless: here he must
 
merely be clear (that is an act of charity), he must stick
 
to the truth more closely than to the terms, etc.: this
 
pseudo-naturalistic rhetoric triumphs again in the
 
Scholastic conception of style; (b) the nationalization of
 
rhetoric: Cicero attempts to Romanize it (this is the
 
significance of Brutus). "Romanness" emerges as a concept;
 
(c) the mythical collusion of professional empiricism
 
20
 
(Cicero is an attorneY immersed in political life) and the
 
appeal of the great cultures; that collusion is heir to an
 
immense fortune: the culture becomes the political arena;
 
(d) the elevation of style: Ciceronian rhetoric inaugurates
 
the development of the elocutio.
 
A.4.6. 	The Works of Ouintilian. ■ 
There is a certain pleasure in reading Quintilian: he 
is a fine professor, not a fine phrase-maker, not too
 
moraiizing; his mind was at the same time discriminating and
 
perceptive (a combination which always appears amazing to
 
the world). The epitaph which M. Teste dreamed for himself,
 
Transiit classificando. might well be applied to Quintilian.
 
He was an official rhetor, appointed by the state; his
 
reputation, extraordinary during his own lifetime, suffered
 
an eclipse after his death, but glittered anew from the
 
fourth century on. Luther preferred him above all others;
 
Erasmus, Bayle, La Fontaine, Racine, Rollih held him in high
 
esteem. In twelve books, De institutione oratoria outlines
 
the education of the orator from childhood on: it is a
 
Complete pedagogical plan (and in that sense an institutio).
 
Book I deals with jprimary education, regular instruction
 
with the grammarian, then with the rhetor; Book II defines
 
rhetoric and its functions, Books III through VII deal with
 
the Inventio and the Dispositio. Books VIII through X with
 
the Elocutio (Book X gives practical advice for "writing"),
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Book XI treats of the minor elements of rhetoric: the Action
 
(bringing the discourse into play) and the Memory, Book XII
 
sets forth the moral qualities required of the orator and
 
establishes the advantage of a general, liberal arts
 
education.
 
A.4.7. Instruction in rhetoric.
 
Education consists of three phases (today we speak of
 
three stages): (1) apprenticeship in language: speaking
 
errors are not to be permitted in nurses (Chrysippe would
 
have them schooled in philosophy), in slaves, nor in
 
teachers. Parents should be as well—educated as possible.
 
The child begins, in Greek, to learn to read and write;
 
students are no longer beaten; (2) the grammaticus (the
 
meaning is more comprehensive that than of our word
 
"grajnmar": it is, if you will, the whole of grammar); the
 
child probably keeps its company from about the age of seven
 
on; he attends courses in poetry and reads aloud (lectio);
 
he writes compositions (narrating fables, paraphrasing
 
poetry, expounding on maxims), he receives lessons in acting
 
(animated recitations); (3) with the rhetor; he must begin
 
instruction in rhetoric at an early age, probably around
 
fourteen years, at puberty; the master must incessantly
 
provide examples by way of extravagant performances, (but
 
the students must refrain from rising up to applaud him).
 
The two principal exercises are: (a) narrations. summaries
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 and analyses o'f narrative arguments, historical events, ,
 
elementary panegyrics, comparisons, explorations of
 
commonplaces (theses), discourse according to an outline
 
(preformata materia); (b) declamations. or discourse on
 
hypothetical cases; these are in effect exercises in the
 
rational fiction (therefore, the declamatio is already very
 
Close, to the work). The extent to which this pedagogy
 
forces speech is obvious: the latter, surrounded on all
 
sides, is forced Out of the pupi1, as if there were an
 
innate inhibition against speaking, as if a single
 
technique, a single type of education, was necessary to put
 
an end to silence, and as if this speech once grasped,
 
conquered at last, represented a good "objective"
 
reTationship with the world, a firm command of the world, of
 
others.,
 
A.4.8. Writing.
 
In his treatment of tropes and figures (Books VIII
 
through X), Quintilian establishes an original theory of
 
"writing." BoOk X is addressed to those who would write.
 
How does one obtain the "well-founded facility" (firma
 
facilitas), that is, how ■ does one overcome that innate 
sterility, the terror of the blank page (facilitas), and 
how, at the same time does one manage to say something, 
without getting carried away by prattle, wordiness, 
logorrhea (firma)? Quintilian drafts a propedeutic for the 
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writer: one must read and write a great deal, imitate models
 
(do pastiches), revise extensively, but after having let it
 
"rest," and one must know when to stop. Quintiliah notes
 
that the hand is slow, the pace of thought is different from
 
that Of writing (this is a surrealist problem: how to
 
achieve a writing as fast . • • as itself?); biit the hand)S
 
slowness is beneficial: one must hot dictate, writing should
 
remain attached, not to the voice, but to the hand, to the
 
muscle: it Should settle into the slowness of the hand: no
 
quick rough drafts.
 
A.4.q. unified rhetoric.
 
The final venture of Aristotelian rhetoric: its
 
dilution by syncretism: Rhetoric no longer opposes itself to
 
Poetics, and this advances the transcendent notion which
 
today we call "Literature"; no longer merely constituting an
 
object of instruction, it becomes an art (in the modern
 
sense); from this time on it is a theory of writing and a
 
treasury of literary forms. This transition can be summed
 
up in five points: (1) Ovid is often credited by medieval
 
writers with having postulated the relationship betv;een
 
poetry and the art of oratory; this connection is likewise
 
affirmed by Horace in his Ars Poetica. v/here the subject is
 
often rhetoric (theory of style); (2) Dionysius of
 
Halicarnassus, a Greek and a contemporary of Augustus, in
 
his De compositione verborum. abandons the principal element
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of Aristotelian rhetoric (the enthymeme) in order to
 
concentrate on a new value: the arrangement of phrases;
 
hence the autonomous notion of style: style is no longer
 
based in logic (the subject precedes the predicate as the
 
substans precede the accidens); the order of words is
 
variable, guided solely by the valueslof rh^
 
Moralia of Plutarch includes a short treatise, "Quomodo
 
adulescens poetas audire debeat." (how to read the poets to
 
young folks), which moralizes on the nurturing of literary
 
aestheticsv of Plato, Plutarch attempts;tp^^^
 
lift the'indictment which Plato brought against poets. How?
 
Precisely by connecting Poetry and Rhetoric; rhetoric
 
provides a way of distinguishing imitated (often
 
reprehensible) action from the (often admirable) art which
 
imitates; only v;hen one is able to read poetry aesthetically
 
can one read it morally; (4) On the Sub1ime (Peri Hypsous),
 
an anonymous treatise written in the first century
 
(erroneously attributed to Longinus and translated by
 
Boileau) ,| is a sort of "transcendental" rhetoric; the
 
sublimitas is, in effect, the "height" of style; it is the
 
same style as in the expression "to have style"; it is
 
literariness defended in a passionate, inspired tone: the
 
myth of "creativity" begins to appear. (5) In the Diaiogue
 
of Orators (whose authenticity is occasionally questioned),
 
Tacitus politicizes the causes of the decadence of
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eloquence: the cause is not the "poor taste" qf the era^ but
 
rather the tyranny of DOmitian, which imposes :silence upon
 
the Forum and leads to an uncommitted art, pOe:tty; but by
 
itself, eloquence tends toward "Literature," it penetrates
 
and constitutes it (eloquentia comes to signify literature).
 
A.5 NEO-RHETORIC
 
A.5.1. A literary aesthetic.
 
We call the literary aesthetic (Rhetoric, Poetics, and
 
Criticism) which dominated the Greco-Roman world fiom the
 
second to the fourth century A.D. neo^rhetoric;or the second
 
sophistic. This is a period of peace, of conwierce, of
 
trade, favorable to a leisure class, particulatly in the
 
Near East (Middle East). Neq-rhetoric was truiy ecumenical:
 
the same figures were treated by St. Augustine,in African
 
Latin, by the pagan Libanius, by St. Gregory of Nazianzus in
 
eastern Greece. That literary empire constructed itself
 
under a double reference: (1) the sophistic: the orators of
 
Asia Minor, without political connection, want to revive the
 
name of the Sophists, with no pejorative connotation, whom
 
they think to imitate (Gorgias); these orators of pure pomp
 
enjoy great glory; (2) the rhetorical: it encompasses
 
everything; no longer entering into opposition with another
 
related notion, it absorbs all speech; it is no longer a
 
(special) techne. but a general field of knowledge, and even
 
more: a national education (on the order of the schools of
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Asia Minor). The sophistes is a school superintendent,
 
appointed by the emperor for one city; the master who is.
 
his subordinate is the rhetor. in this collective
 
institution not a single naine can be cited; there is a
 
sprinkling of authors, a movement known only through
 
Philostratus' Life of the Sophists. Of what does this
 
education in speech consist? One must once more distinguish
 
the syntagmatic rhetoric (the parts of discourse) from the
 
paradigmatic rhetoric (the figures).
 
A.5.2. The declamatio. the ekphrasis.
 
At the syntagmatic level, one practice is predominant:
 
the declamatio (melete). It is an improvisation governed
 
by a theme: for example, Xenophon refuses to survive
 
Socrates, the Cretans claim to possess the tomb of Zeus, a
 
man is in love with a statue, etc. The improvisation
 
relegates the order of the parts of discourse (disputatio)
 
to a secondary level; being pointlessly persuasive but
 
purely ostentatious, the discourse de-structures itself,
 
atomizes itself irt the careless pursuit of brilliant
 
passages arranged according to a rhapsodic model. The
 
principle of these pieces (it had the advantage of very wide
 
appeal) was the descriptio,:or ekphrasis. The ekphrasis is
 
an anthologized fragment, transferrable from one discourse
 
to another. This is an organized description of places
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and/or, personages (the origin of the topoi of the Middle
 
Ages). Thus a new syntagmatic unit, the piece, appears.
 
Less extensive and narrower in scope than the traditional
 
parts of discourse, greater than the periodic sentence, this
 
unit (landscape, portrait) departs from oratorical discourse
 
(juridical, political) and easily adapts itself to narration
 
and the sustained romance. Once again rhetoric "eats" into
 
the literary.
 
A.5.3. At.t.icism/Asianism.
 
At the paradigmatic level, the new rhetoric establishes
 
the value of "style"; it thoroughly valorizes the following
 
ornaments: the archaism, the loaded metaphor, the
 
antithesis, the rhythmic clause. Invoking its opposite,
 
this baroquism enters into a conflict between two schools:
 
(1) Atticism, upheld chiefly by the grammarians, guardians
 
of the pure vocabulary (moral castrators for the sake of
 
purity who still exist today); (2) Asianism returns, in Asia
 
Minor, to the development of a style exuberant to the point
 
of being strange, based, like mannerism, upon surprise
 
effects; here the "figures" play an essential role.
 
Clearly, Asianism has been condemned (and continues to be by
 
all of classical aesthetics, the heir of Atticism).
 
A.6. THE TRIVIUM
 
A.6.1. The agonistic str\icture of—education.
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In antiquity, the pillars of education were essentially
 
oral instruction and whatever transcriptions it gave rise to 
(acroematlaue^ treatises and the technai of the speech ^  
writers). From the beginning of the eighth century, 
teaching takes an agonistic turh,, reflecting an intense,it 
competitive situation. The,independeht schools (in contrast 
to the monastic or episcopal schools) are left to tke; ■ t , 
initiative of a master--Often very young i(20 years); all of 
them inhpired by the success of ?d)elard > a gifted student ■ 
who "defeats" his master, steals his paying public and ^ 
founds a school:; the fihancial circumstances are tightly ; 
bound to the battle of ideas: the same Tlbelard obliges his 
master Guillaume de Campeaux to renounce realism: he :i
 
liquidates it from all points of view; the agonistic
 
structure coincides with the commercial structure: the
 
scholasticos (professor, student or former student) is a
 
combatant of ideas and a professional rival There are two
 
school exercises: (1) the lesson, the reading and ;
 
explication of a fixed text (Aristotle, the Bible),
 
includes; (a) the expositio. which is an interpretation
 
according to a subdividing method (a sort of analytic
 
mania), (b) the auaestiones. which are the propositions pfv
 
the text that can be argued for or against: one debates and
 
ends in refuting; each reason must be presented in the form
 
of a complete syllogism; the lesson fell gradually into
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 neglect because of its tedium. (2) The debate is a ;
 
ceremony, a dialectical joust conducted under the
 
supervision of a master. After several days, the master
 
determines the solution. What matters on the whole is the
 
sporting culture: one trains athletes of speech: speech is
 
the object of an established prestige and power;
 
aggressiveness is encoded.
 
A.6.2. Writing.
 
As for writing, it is not subject, as it is today, to
 
the value of originality; that which we call the author does
 
not exist. There are different dutieS: attending the
 
classical text, the only text studied and in some sense
 
managed, like renewable capital: (1) the scriptor recopies
 
purely and simply; (2) the compilater adds to that which he
 
copies but never anything bf his own; (3) the commentator
 
often intrudes into the recopied text but only in order to
 
make it intelligible; (4) and finally, the auctor presents
 
his own ideas but always based on other authorities. These
 
duties are not sharply defined in a hierarchy: the
 
commehtator, for example, could have the prestige which a
 
great writer enjoys today (such was the case in the twelfth
 
century with Peter Helias, nicknamed "the commentator").
 
What anachronistically we would call the writer, therefore,
 
is in the Middle Ages essentially: (1) a transmitter: he
 
preserves an absolute content which is the classical
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treasure, the source of authority; (2) a controller; he has
 
the right to "break up" the works of the past by unbridled
 
analysis and to recompose them (if they had had such an idea
 
in the Middle Ages, "creation," a modern notion, would have
 
been sacrificed to the profit of structure).
 
A.6.3. The Septennium.
 
In the Middle Ages "culture" is taxonomy, a functional
 
network of "arts," that is obedient to the rules of language
 
(the etymology of that period compared art to arctus. v/hich
 
means articulated), and these "arts" are called "liberal"
 
because they do not lead to profit (in contrast to the
 
mechanical arts and manual activities): they are general,
 
sumptuous languages. These liberal arts take the place of
 
that "general education" which Plato rejected in the name
 
and in favor of the true philosophy, but which were finally
 
reclaimed (by Isocrates and Seneca) as propadeutic to
 
philosophy. In the Middle Ages, philosophy is diminished
 
and passes into the general education as one art among many
 
(Dialectica). It is no longer philosophy that the general
 
education prepares its students for, it is theology which
 
stands supreme above the seven arts, the Septennium. Why
 
are there seven? Already in Varro one finds a theory of
 
liberal arts: at this point there are nine (our own with the
 
addition of medicine and architecture; this structure is
 
revived and codified during the fifth and sixth centuries by
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Martianus Gape11a, an African pagan who established the
 
hierarchy of the Septennium in an allegory, The Marriage of
 
Mercury and Philology. Here, philology designates total
 
knowledge: Philology, the learned yirgin, is betrothed to
 
Mercury; she receiyes as a wedding gift the seyen liberal
 
arts, each presented with its symbols, its costume, its
 
language; for example, Grammatica iS an oId woman who has
 
suryiyed Athens and wears Roman garments; in a small iyory
 
box, she holds a knife and a file for correcting the errors
 
of children; Rhetorica is a beautiful woman, whose clothes
 
are adorned with all the figures; she carries weapons
 
destined to harm her adyersaries (the coexistence of
 
persuasiye rhetoric and ornamental rhetoric). These
 
allegories of Martianus Capella were widely known; one finds
 
them erected on the facades of Notre Dame and the Cathedral
 
of Chartres, and portrayed in the works of Botticelli.
 
Boethius and Cassiodorus (sixth century) elaborated the
 
theory of the Septennium. first by incorporating Aristotle's
 
Organon into Dialectica, and second by postulating that the
 
liberal arts are inscribed for all eternity in the diyine
 
wisdom and in the Scriptures (the Psalms are full of
 
"figures"): rhetoric receiyes the Christian sanction (enjoys
 
the protection of Christianity; it can legally emigrate from
 
Antiquity to Christendom and thence into the modern era).
 
This priyilege will be confirmed by Bede during the
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Carolingian era. Of what does the Septennium consist? It
 
must first summon that which it opposes: on the one hand
 
technology (the "sciences" as impartial languages, form part
 
of the Septennium) and on the other theology; the Septennium
 
organizes human nature in its humanity: that nature can only
 
be overturned by the Incarnation which, if it is applied to
 
a classification, takes the form of a subversion of
 
language: the Creator becomes the creature, the Virgin
 
conceives, etc.: in hac verbi copula stupet omnis regula.
 
The Seven Arts are divided into two unequal groups, which
 
correspond to the two paths (viae) of wisdom: the Trivium
 
includes Grammatica. Dialectica and Rhetorica; the
 
Ouadrivium includes Musica. Arithmetica. Geometria,
 
Astronomia (medicine would be added much later). The
 
opposition between the Trivium and the Ouadrivium is not
 
that of letters and sciences; it is rather that of the
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secrets of speech and the secrets of nature.
 
A.6.4. The diachronic plav of the Trivium.
 
The Trivium (which is our only concern here) is a
 
taxonomy of speech; it attests to the persistent effort of
 
the Middle Ages to fix the place of speech in man, in nature
 
and in creation. Speech is not at the time, as it has since
 
become, a vehicle, an instrument, the means to "something
 
else" (soul, thought, passion); it consumes everything
 
mental: not actual experiences, not psychology: speech is
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not expression but instant construction. What is of
 
interest in the Trivium. therefore, is less the continuum of
 
each discipline than the play of these three disciplines
 
among themselves, throughout the ten centuries: from the
 
fifth to the fifteenth century, the leadership of one art
 
over the other emerged in such a way that each period of the
 
Middle Ages was placed under the domination of one of these
 
arts: by turns, it is Rhetorica (fifth through seventh
 
centuries), then Grammatica (eighth through tenth
 
centuries), then Loaica (eleventh through fifteenth
 
centuries) which dominates its sisters and reduces them to
 
the level of poor relations.
 
RHETORICA
 
A.6.5. Rhetorica as supplement.
 
Ancient Rhetoric has survived in the traditions of some
 
of the Roman schools of Gaul and with some Gallic
 
rhetoricians such as Ausonius (310-393), arammaticus and
 
rhetor of Bordeaux; and Sidonius Apollinaris (430-484),
 
bishop of Auvergne. Charlemagne inscribes the rhetorical
 
figures in his scholastic reform, after the Venerable Bede
 
(673-735) had completely Christianized the rhetoric (a task
 
initiated by Augustine and Cassiodorus) by showing that the
 
Bible itself is full of "figures." Rhetoric did not
 
dominate for long; it was very quickly "stuck" between
 
Grammatica and Loaica: Rhetoric becomes the poor parent of
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the Trivium. destined only for a beautiful resurrection at
 
the time when it becomes possible for it to be reborn
 
through "Poesie" and, in the most general fashion, under the
 
name of Belles-lettres. This weakness of Rhetoric—
 
diminished by the triumph of emasculated languages, grammar
 
(remember the file and knife of Martianus Capella) and
 
logic—is perhaps due to the fact that it is entirely
 
carried away with ornament, that is toward the reputedly
 
inessential, with regard to truth and fact (the first
 
apparition of the referential spectre):^ it appears then as
 
"what comes later. This medieval rhetoric sustains itself
 
essentially on the treatises of Cicero (Rhetorica ad
 
Herennium and De Inventione) and Quintilian (better known by
 
teachers than by students), but itself produced primarily
 
related treatises on ornament, figures, "color" (colores
 
rhetorici), and afterwards, poetic arts (artes
 
versificatoriae): the dispositio did not approach the
 
"commencement" of a discourse (ordo artificialis. ordo
 
naturalis); the designated figures are above all
 
amplification and abbreviation; style is ascribed to the
 
three genres of the wheel of Virgil:^® gravis. humilis.
 
mediocrus. and to the two ornaments: facile and difficile.
 
A.6.6. Sermons. dictamen, poetic arts.
 
The domain of Rhetorica encompasses three canons of
 
order (three formal rules), three artes. I. Artes
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serntQGinandi: these are the oratory arts ih general (the
 
object of rhetoric properly speaking), that is then,
 
essentially, sermons or parentici^^ discourse (exhorting to
 
virtue); the sermons may be written in two languages:
 
sermones ad poPulum (for the people of the parish), written
 
in the vernacular, and sermones ad clerum (for the Synods,
 
the schools, the monasteries), written in Latin;
 
nevertheless, everything is prepared in Latin; the
 
vernacular is merely a translation. 11. Artes dictandi, ars
 
dictaminis. epistolary art; the development of
 
administration since Charlemagne carried with it the theory
 
of administrative correspondence: the dictamen (the practice
 
of dictating letters), the "dictator" is a recognized
 
profession which is taught; the model is the dictamen of the
 
papal chancellery: the stylus romanus surpasses everything,
 
a stylistic notion takes hold, the cursus, the flowing
 
together of a text, filled with the criteria of rhythm and
 
accentuation. III. Artes poeticae: poetry at first
 
comprised part of the dictamen (the opposition of
 
prose/poetry has long been hazy); then the artes poeticae
 
take charge of the rhvthmicum. borrow Latin verse from
 
Grammatica. and begin to aim at the "literature" of
 
imagination. A structural reshaping begins, which, at the
 
end of the fifteenth century, sets the First Rhetoric (or
 
general rhetoric) against the Second Rhetoric (or poetic
 
36
 
 rhetoric), from which the Poetic Arts such as those of
 
Ronsard proceed.
 
GRAMMATICAL
 
A.6,7. Donatus and Prician.
 
After the Invasions, the cultural leaders are the
 
Celts, the English and the Franks; they had to learn Latin
 
grammar at the famous schools of Fulda, Saint Gall and
 
Tours; grajtunar is introduced into general education through
 
poetry, liturgy and Scripture; it includes, along with
 
grammar in the strict sense, poetry, prosody ahd,some
 
figures. The two great grammatical authorities of the
 
Middle Ages are Donatus and Priseian. I. Donatus (circa
 
350) produces an abridged grammar (ars minor) which deals
 
with the eight parts of the sentence in the form of
 
questions and responses, and an expanded grammar (ars
 
major). Donatus' success is enormous; Dante places him in
 
heaven (the opposite of Priscian); some of this v;ritings
 
would be among the first ever printed, along with the
 
Scriptures; he has given his name to some elementary
 
treatises on grammar, the Donats. II. Priscian (late fifth
 
century, early sixth century) was a Mauritanian, a professor
 
of Latin in Byzantium, nurtured on Greek theory and in
 
particular the grammatical doctrine of the Stoics. His
 
Institutio qrammatica is a normative grammar (arammatica
 
reaulans), neither philosophical nor "scientific"; it falls
 
L ■ , ■ 37 );■ : ..7- ..L ■ .
 
into two abridgements: tbe Priscianus minor deals with
 
construction, the Priscianus major deals with morphology.
 
Priscian leaves numerous examples borrowed from the Greek
 
Pantheon: the man is Christian, but the rhetor is pagan (one
 
sees the advantage of this dichotomy). Dante dispatches him
 
to hell, in the seventh circle, that of the Sodomites:
 
apostate, drunk, madman, but reputedly a great genius.
 
Donatus and Priscian represent absolute law—except when
 
they do not agree with the Vulgate: grammar is therefore
 
unable to be so normative, since one believes that the
 
"rules" of locution have been invented by the grammarians;
 
they have been distributed largely by Commentatores (such as
 
Peter Helias) and by grammars in verse (a very big fashion).
 
By the end of the twelfth century, Grammatica includes
 
grammar and poetry, it deals with "precision" and
 
"imagination," with letters, with syllables, with the
 
phrase, with the complete sentence, with figures, with
 
prosody; it relinquishes very little to Rhetorica: some
 
figures. It is a fundamental science, linked to ethica
 
(part of the common wisdom, expressed through the text,
 
outside of theology): "the science of speaking well and
 
writing well," "the cradle of all philosophy," "the first
 
nurse of all literary studies."
 
A.6.8. The Modistae.
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In the twelfth century Grammatica again becomes
 
speculative (as it had been with the Stoics). That which
 
one calls Speculative Grammar is the work of a group of
 
grammarians called Modistae. because they wrote the
 
treatises titled "De modis significandi"; many came from the
 
monastic provinces in Scandinavia, then called Dacia. and
 
more precisely from Denmark. The Modists were denounced by
 
Erasmus for having written a barbaric Latin, for the
 
confusion of their definitions, for the excessive subtlety
 
of their distinctions; in fact, they had produced the
 
foundations of grammar for two centuries, and we even owe to
 
them certain speculative terms (for example, instance). The
 
treatises of the Modists take two forms; the modi minores.
 
in which the subject is presented modo positive, that is,
 
without critical discussion, in a brief, clear and very
 
didactic manner; and the modi maiores. presented in the form
 
of auestio disputata. that is, with pros and cons, with more
 
and more specialized questions. Each treatise contains two
 
parts, in the manner of Priscian: Ethvmologia (morphology)-­
spelling errors are common to this period and correspond to
 
a false etymology for the word Etymology—and Diasynthetica
 
(syntax), but the treatise is prefaced by a theoretical
 
introduction bearing on the connections between the modi
 
essendi (being and its properties), the modi intelligendi
 
(taking possession of being under its aspects), and the modi
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siqnifieandi {level of language). The modi significandi
 
themselves comprise twO strata: (1) the 
COrresponds with the■ modi signandi: its elements are: vox . 
the; aLCcoustic sighif ret:, arid dictio .; word-concept, generic t ; 
semanteme ( in dolor. doled / itvis the idea of sorrow) ; the 
modi signandi do not vet come within thO: scppe of the 
grammarian: vox. the phonic signifier >- h 
Philosophus-naturalis (to theiphonetician, an we wonld say) , ; 
and dictio. referring bac3c to an inert state of the wond, 
which is not yet animated in any respect, escapes the 
logician of language (it comes under what we would now call 
lexicograpliy) ; (2) the level of the modi signifieandi is 
attained when it: attaches an international meaning to tire 
designation:. : ;At "t word,v;chec]<;ed in :the 
dictio:. is quiterproducfcive p it ns:perceived in so far as fit 
is;^ "construGtihTe":Jfit - fits " into' the superior unity Of the ■ , /, 
:sentence; it restores a great deal then to the speculative 
grammarian and the logician of language. Also, far from 
blaming the Modists, as sometimes happened, for having 
reduced language to nomenclature, we should congratulate 
them for having done everything to the contrary: for them, 
language does not begin with tlie dictio and the 
significatum. that is , with t)ie word-sign, but with the 
cons jgnificatum or const.ructible . that is, the connection or 
the inter-sign: a privileged status is accorded to syntax, 
to inflection, to order—and not to semantics--in a word, to
 
structure, which would perhaps he the hest way to tts^^slate
 
mndns sianificandi. There is then a definite relationship
 
between the Modists and some of the modern structuralists
 
(Hjelmslev's glossematics, Ghomsky's competence): language
 
is a structure, and that structure is, as it were,
 
"guaranteed" by the structure of being (modi essendi) and by
 
that of the mind (modi intelliaendi): there is a grammatica
 
universalis: this will be something nev7, as it is commonly
 
believed that there are as many grammars as there ere
 
languages: Grammatica una et eadem est secuhdum substantiam
 
in omnibus linauis. licet accidentaliter varietur. Non ergo
 
arammaticns sed philosophus proprias naturas rerum
 
diliaenter considerans . . . arammaticam invenit. (Grammar
 
is one and the same in all languages, as far as substance is
 
concerned, although it can vary by accident. Therefore it
 
is not the grammarian but: the philosopher who, by examining
 
the nature of things, discovers grammar.)
 
LOGICA (OR DIALECTICA)
 
A.6,9. Studium and Sacerdotium.
 
Loaica dominates in the twelfth and thirteenth
 
centuries: it pushes Rhetorica aside and absorbs Grammatica.
 
This struggle took the form of a conflict between schools.
 
In the first half of the twelfth century, the schools of
 
Chartres develop particularly the teaching of Grammatica (in
 
the broadest sense of the word): this is the studium, which
 
is of literary orientation; on the contrary, the school of
 
Paris develops theological philosophy: this is the
 
.<^acerdotiuin. Paris is victorious over Chartres, the
 
.q^cerdotiuin over the studium: nrammatica is absorbed into
 
Loaica. and this brings with it a revival of folk
 
literature, a taste for the vernacular, a retreat of
 
humanism, a movement toward the professional disciplines
 
(medicine, law). Previously, Dialectica was preserved in
 
the Topics of Cicero and the work of Boethius, the first
 
interpreter of Aristotle; then, in the twelfth and
 
thirteenth centuries, after the second (massive) infusion of
 
Aristotle, it was preserved in all the Aristotelian logic
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which dealt with the dialectic syllogism.
 
A.6.10. The disputatio.
 
Dialectica is the art of lively discourse, discourse
 
between two people. This dialogue is in no way Platonic; it
 
is not a question of principally subjecting the beloved to
 
the master; here, the dialogue is aggressive; it is
 
undertaken in order to enjoy a victory which is not
 
predetermined: this is a battle of syllogisms, Aristotle
 
staged by two partners. Also, Dialectica becomes confused
 
with an exercise, a mode of expression, a ceremony, a sport,
 
the disputatio (what one might call a symposium of
 
adversaries). The procedure (or protocol) is that of Sic et.
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Non. One collects contradiGtory-eyidence on a given
 
question. The exercise is presented to ah opponent and a
 
respondent; the respondent is ord.inarily the candidate: he
 
responds to the objections presented by the opponent; as in
 
the Conservatory competitions, the opponent is on call: he
 
is a friend or he is appointed; one poses the thesis, the
 
opponent poses the argument (sed contra) the candidate
 
rpc;pnnds (respondeo): the conclusion is presented by the
 
master who presides. The disputatio invades everytbing;
 
it is a sport: the masters dispute among themseives, in
 
front of the students, once a week; the students dispute for
 
examinations. One gestures to the head—master for
 
permission to debate (there is a parodic echo of these
 
gestures in Rabelais). All of this is codified, ritualized
 
in a treatise which governs the disputatio meticulously in
 
order to prevent any deviation from the discussiont uhe Ars
 
obligatoria (fifteenth century). The thematic material of
 
the disputatio comes from the argumentative part of
 
Aristotelian Rhetoric (by way of the Topics); it allows
 
insolubilia. propositions which are very difficult to prove;
 
impossibilia. propositions which seem impossible to
 
everyone; sophismata. cliches and paralogisms, which serve
 
ag the hnit of disputationes.
 
11 ■ The neurotic sense of the disputatio. 
If one wishes to evaluate the neurotic aspect of such
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an exercise, ;he must of course retrace the mache of the
 
GreeKs, that; sort of conflictual sensibility which makes any
 
contradiction between the subject and himself intolerable to
 
the Greek (and later to the West in general): driving a
 
partner to contradict himseif is enough to reduce him, to
 
eliminate him, to annul him: Callicles (in the Gorgias)
 
chooses not to respond rather than to contradict himself.
 
The syllogism is the same weapon which permits that
 
liquidation. it is the knife which cuts but is itself
 
indestructible. The two disputants are two torturers who
 
try to mutilate each other (whence the mythical episode of
 
Abelard, the castrated castrator). So volatile was"the
 
neurotic explosion that it had to be codified, the
 
narcissistic injury limited. They turned logic to sport
 
(just as today we turn soccer into everyone's conflictual
 
outlet, especially the underprivileged or the oppressed): it
 
is the eristic. Pascal saw the problem: he wanted to avoid
 
being in such a conflict with another; he wanted to
 
"reprove" him without mortally wounding him, to rise to his
 
level (to complement him) when it was necessary only to
 
"complete" him (and not to conquer him). The disputatio had
 
vanished, but the problem of rules (ludic, ceremonial) of
 
verbal play remains: how do we dispute today in our writing,
 
in our colloquia, in our meetings, in our conversations and,
 
to a certain extent, in the "scenes" of our private lives?
 
HavG wG SGttled. our scotg with thG syllogism (or morGly
 
concGalGd it)? Only an analysis of intGllGCtual discoursG
 
will somGday be ablG to answGr this prGcisGly.-*"^
 
A.6.12. Restructuring of thG Trivium.
 
Wg saw that thG thrGG liberal arts were waging a battle
 
of prGCGllence^^ among themselves (to the final advantage of
 
Loaica): it is truly the symbol of the Trivium, in all its
 
fluctuations, that is significant. Its contemporaries had
 
been aware of this: some of them had tried to restructure in
 
their own way the entire spoken culture. Hugh de Saint-

Victor (1095-1141) opposes the theoretical, practical and
 
mechanical sciences to the logical sciences: Logica recovers
 
the Trivium in its entirety: it is all the science of
 
language. St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) tries to discipline
 
all knowledge by submitting it to Theology; in particular
 
Loaica. or the science of IntGrpretation, includes
 
Grammatica (expression), Dialectica (education), and
 
Rhetorica (persuasion); once more, even if it is for the
 
sake of opposing it to nature and to grace, language absorbs
 
all that is mental. But above all, (because it anticipates
 
the future), as far back as the twelfth century something
 
that must be called letters separates itself from
 
philosophy; for John of Salisbury, Dialectica operates in
 
all disciplines where the outcome is abstract. Rhetorica,
 
on the Other hand, picks up whatever Dialectica doesn't
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want, it is the field of the hypothesis I in anr^i ont rhetoric
 
the hypothesis opposes itself to the thesis as the
 
contingent to the general, see below B.1.25.), that is to
 
say, all that which involves concrete circumstances (Who?
 
What? When? Why? How?); in this way an opposition appears
 
which will have great mythical success (it still exists):
 
that of the concrete and the abstraGt: the letters (stemming
 
from Rhetorica) will be concrete, philosophy (stemming from
 
Dialectica) will be abstract.
 
A.7. THE DEATH OF RHETORIC
 
The third introduction of Aristotle: the Poetics.
 
We have seen that Aristotle had entered the West twice:
 
once in the sixth century through Boethius, and once in the
 
seventh century from the Arabs. He came in a third time
 
through his Poetics. This Poetics is little known in the
 
Middle Ages, except through distorted abridgments.; But in
 
1498, the first Latin translation from the priginal was
 
published in Venice; in 1503, the first Greek edition
 
appeared; in 1550, Aristotle's Poetic is translated and
 
commented upon by a group of erudite Italians (Castelvetro,
 
Scaliger—of Italian origin—the bishop of Veda). In
 
France, the text itself is little known. It is through
 
Italianism that it enupts in seventeenth century France.
 
The generation of 1630 brings together Aristotle's
 
disciples; the Poetics lent to French classicism its
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principife eiement--a theory of verisimilitude^ It iSy the 
code of the literary "creation," of which theoreticians are y 
the authors, the critics. Rhetoric, wliicli took as its ■ S' 
principal object "writirig well," style, is restricted to 
education, where in fact it triumphs. It is the domain of 
the professors (the Jesuits). 
A.7.2. Triumphant and moribund.
 
Rhetoric is triumphant; it reigns over education.
 
Rhetoric is moribund; limited to this area, it falls little
 
by little into serious intellectual discredit. This
 
discredit \g ushered in by the promotion of a new value—­
evidence (fact, ideas, feelings) which is sufficient unto .y
 
itself and is independent from language (or is believed to
 
be independent), or at least pretends to use language as
 
nothing more than an instrument, a medium, a means of
 
expression. From the sixteenth century on, "evidence" takes
 
three directions: personal evidence (in Protestantism),
 
rational evidence (in Cartesianism), and the evidence of the
 
senses (in empiricism). Rhetoric, when it is tolerated at ;
 
all (in Jesuit education), is no longer a complete logic but
 
merely a color. an ornament that one keeps a close v;atch on
 
in the name of "realism." There had undoubtedly been some
 
postulation of this new spirit in Pascal, since it is to him
 
that one credits the Tuiti-Rhetoric of modern humanism. What
 
Pascal calls for is a rhetoric (a "persuasive art") that is
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mentalistic, sensitive, instinctual, partaking of the
 
complexity of things (of "subtlety"); eloquence consists not
 
in applying an external code to discourse, but in gaining
 
awareness of the thought which is inherent in us, a way of
 
being able to reproduGe that tempo which we use when we
 
speak to one another, bringing out the truth, as if one had
 
discovered it oneself, by oneself. The system of discourse
 
does not have intrinsic characteristics (clarity or
 
symmetry), but depends on the nature of thought, which, in
 
order to be "right," must conform itself to language.
 
A.7.3. The Jesuit teaching of Rhetoric.
 
Late in the Middle Ages, we have seen, the teaching of
 
rhetoric was sacrificed somev/hat; it subsisted, however, in
 
some colleges in England and Germany. In the sixteenth
 
century, this heritage organizes itself, takes a stable
 
form, at first at the gymnasium of St. Jerome, maintained at
 
Liege by the Jesuits. This college is imitated at
 
Strasbourg and at Nimes. The form of education in France
 
for three centuries is established. Very quickly, forty
 
colleges follow the Jesuit model. The education given here
 
is codified in 1586 by a group of six Jesuits: this is the
 
Ratio Studiorum, adopted in 1600 by the University of Paris.
 
This Ratio devotes itself primarily to the "humanities" and
 
to Latin rhetoric; it invades all of Europe, but its
 
greatest success is in France. The force of the new Ratio
 
undoubtedly becomes identified--in the ideologogy whicb it
 
legitimizes-^with a scholarly discipline, a discipline of
 
thought and a discipline of language. Ih this humanistic
 
education, Rhetoric itself is the noble subject; it
 
dominates everything, The only scholarly prizes are the
 
values of Rhetoric, of transTation and of memory, but the
 
value of Rhetoric, assigned to the conclusion of a special
 
examination, desighates the top student, who is called from
 
that time on the imperator or the tribun (we should not
 
forget that speech is power—and even a political power).
 
Up to around 1750, beside the sciences, eloquence
 
constitutes the only prestige; in this epoch of the decline
 
of the Jesuits, rhetoric is revived somewhat by the
 
Freemasonry, f. ■­
A.7.4. Treatises and Manuals. 
The codes of rhetoric are innumerable, at least up to 
the eighteenth century. Many (in the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries) are written in Latin; these are 
scholarly manuals drafted by the Jesuits, notably P. Nunez, 
Susius and Soarez. The "Institution" of P. Nunez, for 
example, comprises five volumes: the preparatory exercises, 
the three principal parts of rhetoric (invention, 
arrangement and style) and a moral section (the "wisdom") . 
Meanwhile, rhetorics in the vernacular flourish (here we 
will cite only those in French) . At the end of the 
fifteenth century the rhetorics are chiefly poetics (the art
 
of writing poetry or the minor arts of the Second Rhetoric);
 
it is necessary to cite: Pierre Fabri, "The Great and True
 
Art of Complete Rhetoric" (six editions from 1521 to 1544)
 
and Ahtoine Foclin (Foquelin), "French Rhetoric" (1555)
 
which includes a clear and complete classification of
 
figures. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, up to
 
about 1830, the Treatises of Rhetoric dominate; these
 
treatises present in general: (1) the paradigmatic rhetoric
 
(the figures), (2) the syntagmatic rhetoric (the "oratory
 
structure"); these two facts are felt to be necessary and
 
complementary to such an extent that in 1806 a trade journal
 
brings the two most famous rhetoricians together: the
 
Figures, by Du Marsais, and the oratory construction by Du
 
Batteux. We will cite the best known of the treatises. For
 
the seventeenth century, it is undoubtedly the Rhetoric of
 
Pi Bernard Lamy (1675): this is a complete treatise on
 
speech, useful "not only in the schools, but also in every
 
phase of 1ife: when vou buv. when vou sell": evidently it
 
rests upon the principle of the exteriority of language and
 
thought. One has a "picture" in the mind, one tries to
 
"reproduce" it with words For the eighteenth century, the
 
most celebrated treatise (and moreover the most intelligent)
 
is that of Du Marsais. (Treatise of Tropes. 1730); Poor and
 
unsuccessful during his lifetime, Du Marsais frequented the
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anti-religious circle of Holbach and worked as an
 
encyclopedist; more than a rhetoric, his work is a
 
linguistics of the transformation of meaning. At the end of
 
the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth
 
centuries, many treatises, absolutely oblivious to the
 
revoluntionary change happening at the time, were published
 
(Blair, 1783; Gaillard, 1807--The Rhetoric for Young Ladies
 
—Fontanier, 1827—recently republished with an introduction
 
by G. Gennette). In the nineteenth century, rhetoric
 
survives only artificially, under the protection of official
 
regulations; even the titles of the tracts and manuals
 
change in a significant way: 1881, F. de Caussade: Rhetoric
 
and Literary Genres: 1889, Prat: Elements of Rhetoric and
 
Literature. Literature once more "carries" rhetoric before
 
choking it completely; but in its final gasp, classical
 
rhetoric completely; but in its final gasp, classical
 
rhetoric competes with the "psychology of style."
 
A.7.5. The end of Rhetoric.
 
Nevertheless, to say in a comprehensive way that
 
Rhetoric is dead, it should be possible to specify what
 
replaced it, because—we have seen this a good deal through
 
this diachronic survey—rhetoric must always be read within
 
the structural play of its neighbors (Grammar, Logic,
 
Poetics, Philosophy): it is the play of the system, not each
 
of its parts individually, that is historically significant.
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We will follow this problem through in order to finish some 
lines of inquiry: I.iwe would have to trace thdvpresent 
lexicology of tlie word; what happens to it? It sometimes 
recaptures its original contents, personal interpretations 
coming from writers, not from rhetors (Baudelaire and the 
cojivplete rhetoric! Valefy, Poulhanl; but■ above all, we would 
have to reorganize the actual fieid of its connotations: 
■Peiorative herei^^iarialytic there,^^:reevaluated i ' 
elsewhere so as to putline the ideological prPcess of 
ancient rhetoric. II. In education, the end of the 
rhetorical treatises is difficult to date, as it always is 
in such cases; once more, in 1926, a Jesuit from Beirut 
writes a textbook on Rhetoric in Arabic; again, in 1938, a 
Belgian, M.J. Vuillaume, publishes a manual of rhetoric; and 
the classes in Rhetoric and advanced Rhetoric disappeared 
only a very short time ago. Ill. To exactly what extent and 
under what circumstances has the science of language taken 
charge of the field of ancient rhetoric? At first there had 
been a transition to a psyclio-stylistic (or stylistic of 
expressivity) but today where is linguistic mentalism 
pursued? From all of rhetoric, Jakobson has retained only 
two figures, metaphor and metonymy, making them the symbol 
for the two axes of language; for some the formidable work 
of classification carried out by ancient rhetoric still 
seems useful, especially if one applies it to the marginal 
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field of communication or of the signification of the
 
advertising image where it is not yst used up. In any
 
case, tliese contradictory evaluations clearly show the
 
present ambiguity of the rhetorical phenomenon: prestigious
 
object Of intelligence and insight; awesome system which an
 
entire civilization developed to an extreme in order to
 
classify, that is, in order to think its language;
 
instrument of power; scene of historic conflicts whose
 
reading is compelling if one puts precisely that object back
 
into a manifold history where it expands; but also an
 
ideological object, pushed into ideQlogy by the advance of
 
that "other thing" which replaced it and today forces an
 
indispensable critical distance.
 
B. THE NETWORK ■ 
B.0.1. The demand for classification.
 
All the treatises of antiquity, particularly the post-

Aristotelian, demonstrate an obsession for classifying (the
 
, term oratory Eartitio:^ itself gives huch evidence): rhetoric
 
openly lend.s itself to that sort of classification
 
(materials, rules'^ divisions,: genres,tstyles).
 
ClasSificatioh itself is th® object of discourse: the
 
announcement of the outline of the treatise, an intense
 
. discussion: of the classifications proposed by predecessors.
 
The passion for classifying always seems pointless to those
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not participating: wliy argu© so bitterly over tlie placement
 
the ptoposi116,: sonteti nies put at the end of the exordiuiTi
 
and sometimes at the beginning of the narratio? Yet most of
 
the time--and this is normal—the taxonomic choice implies
 
an ideological choice: there is always something at stake in
 
the placement of things: tell itie how voii classify. I'11 tell
 
you who you are. One cannot then adopt, as we will here for
 
didactic purposes, a canonical classification which will
 
voluntarily "forget" bhenuAeroUsyariatibns
 
that have taken the plan of the techne rhetorike as their
 
object, without first saying a word about these
 
fluctuations.
 
B.0.2. The divisions of clessification.
 
irhe account of Rhetoric itself is made essentially
 
according to three different divisions (here I am
 
simplifying). I. For Aristotle, the starting point is the
 
techne ( a speculative institution with the ability to
 
determine that which can and cannot be); the techne
 
(rhetorike) gives rise to four types of operations, which
 
are the parts of the rhetorical art (ahd not in the least
 
the parts of discburse, of the oratio): (1) Pisteis, the
 
working out of "proofs" (invent10). (2) Taxis. the placing
 
Of these proofs thrbughout the discourse and in a certain
 
order (dispositio), (3) Lexis, putting arguments into verbal
 
form (at the level of the sentence) (elocutio), (4)
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Hypocrisis, the performance of the total discourse by an
 
orator who must make himself a comedian {actio). These four
 
operatiohs are examihed three times (the means of which are
 
the: concern of the inventio): frCm the poiht of view of the
 
trahsmitter of the message/ from the point of view of the
 
recipient, and froni the point of view of the message itself
 
(A.4.2Vi. In accordahce notion of
 
the techne (this is a skill), the Aristotelian division
 
places the process of structurina a discourse in fhp
 
foreground: iactiye operation) and; relegates its structure ­
(discourse as product) to;the backgrbun^l IIv For Cicero,
 
the;starting point is thP doctrina dicendii that is ^ no
 
longer a speculative techne; but an acquired knowledge with
 
practical applications; from the taxonomic point of view,
 
the doctrina dicendi gives rise toi (1) a jforce, a work, vis,
 
oratoris, which depends upon the specified Atistote1ian:
 
operatidns; (2y:a product, ot if you Pill, a form, the
 
oratio, by which it is connected to the extended parts that
 
comprise it; (3) a subject, content (a type of content), the
 
auaestio, which depends upon the genres of discourse. ' Thus
 
begins a certain autonomy of the work v/ith regard to the
 
labor that produced it III. A conciliator and pedagogue,
 
Quintilian combines Aristotle and Cicero; his
 
starting point is indeed the techne. but it is practical
 
and pedagogical techne. not a speculative one; it aligns:
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(1) the operations (de arte)—which are those of Aristotle
 
and Cicero, (2) the pperator (de artifice), >('3) the work
 
itself (he_oEere) (these last two themes are annotated, but
 
not subdivided).
 
B.0.3. The stake Of classificatibh: the site of the plan.
 
One is able to stake but the location of these 
taxonomic fluctuations with precision (even if they do seem 
infinitesimal): it is the place of the place, the 
dispositio ■ the order of the parts of discourse. What is it 
connected to, this dispositio? There are two possible 
options: either one considers the "plan" as a "putting in 
order" (and not as a ready-made order), as a creative act of 
distributing material—in a word, a task, a 
structuring——and thus one connects it with the preparation 
of a discourse. Or one takes the plan in its state of
 
production, the structure fixed, and thus connects it with
 
the work, the ofatio. If is either a dispatching of
 
material, a distribution, or it is a grid, a stereotyped
 
form. In short, is the order active, creative, or passive,
 
created? Each option has had its proponents who have pushed
 
it to its. limit: some cohnect the dispositio with the
 
probatio (the discovery of proofs); others have connected it
 
with the eloGutio: this is a simple verbal method. We know
 
the extfeines to which this problem has been carried up to
 
the threshold of modern times: in the sixteenth century,
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Ramus, violently anti-Aristotelian (the techne is an
 
affectation contrary to nature), radically separates the
 
dispositio from the inventio: order is independent from the
 
discovery of arguments: first the research of arguments,
 
then their organization, called method. In the seventeenth
 
century, the decisive blows against a declining rhetoric
 
were leveled precisely at the reification of the scheme, the
 
dispositio. which had ended in conceiving a rhetoric of the
 
product (and not of the process). Descartes discovers the
 
coincidence of invention and order not among the rhetors,
 
but among the mathematicians; and for Pascal, order is a
 
creative value, sufficient to begin something new (it cannot
 
be a ready-made grid, exterior and prior). "So thev can't
 
say that I have said nothing new: the disposition of
 
material is new." The connection between the order of
 
invention (dispositio) and the order of presentation (ordo)
 
and notably the deviation and the orientation
 
(contradiction, inversion) of two parallel orders,
 
therefore, always has a theoretical range: this is entirely
 
a conception of literature, which is always in play, as
 
witnessed by the exemplary analysis which Foe gave his own
 
poem, "The Raven": in order to write the work, he started
 
from What appears to be the last thing the reader grasps (as
 
an "ornament"), knowing the melancholy effect of the
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nevermore (e/o). and thus raising the narrative and metric
 
form to the level of invention.
 
B.0.4. The rhetoric machine.
 
If, ignoring these stakes, or at least opting
 
resolutely for the Aristotelian diyision, we superimpose the
 
sub-classifications of ancient rhetoric in some way, we
 
obtain a canonical distribution of the different parts of
 
the techne. a network. a tree, or better yet, a huge
 
creeper which descends level by level, now dividing a
 
generic element, now reuniting scattered parts. This
 
network is a linking up. One thinks of Diderot and the
 
stocking machine. "One can regard it as a singular and
 
unique faculty of which the fabrication of the work is the
 
outcome . . ." In Diderot's machine, what one feeds in at
 
the entrance is textile material, what one takes out at the
 
exit are the stockings. In the rhetoric "machine," what one
 
puts in at the start, barely emerging from a native aphasia,
 
are the raw materials of reasoning—facts, a subject; what
 
one finds at the end is a complete, structured discourse,
 
fitted out for persuasion.
 
B.0.5. The five parts of the techne rhetorike.
 
Our starting line, then, will be constituted by the
 
different operations-matrices of the techne (it is
 
understood from the preceding that we connect the order of
 
58
 
 parts, the dispositio. with the techne and not with the
 
oratio: that is what happened with Aristotle). In its
 
/ /
 
fullest extension, the techne rhetorike includes five
 
principal operations; we must stress the active, transitive,
 
programmatic, operative nature of these divisions. It is
 
not the elements of a structure that matter, but the acts of
 
progressive structuring, as the verbal form (with verbs) of
 
definition amply demonstrates:
 
1. INVENTIO
 
invinire quid dicas to find what
 
Euresis to say
 
2. DISPOSITIO
 
inventa disponere to organize that
 
Taxis which one has found
 
3. ELOCUTIO
 
onare verbis to add ornament of
 
Lexis words and figures
 
4. 	 ACTIO
 
opere et pronuntiare to perform the
 
Hypocrisis	 discourse as an
 
actor: gestures and
 
diction
 
5. MEMORIA
 
memoria mandare to call upon memory
 
Mneme
 
The first three operations are the most important (Inventio.
 
Dispositio. Elocutio); each supports an ample network of
 
subtle notions, and all three have sustained rhetoric since
 
antiquity (especially Elocutio). The last two (Actio and
 
Memoria) were quickly sacrificed, since rhetoric is not only
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carried on through the spoken discourse (declainatipn) Of
 
lawyers or politicians, or "conferenceers" (epideictic
 
genre), but also later, more or less exclusively, tiirough
 
"works" (writihgS)V Little wonder, though : that these two
 
parts do not hold much interest. The first (actio) because
 
it refers to a dramaturgy of the speech (that is, to a
 
hysteria and a ritual) ; the second because - it postualfes a.
 
standard level of stereotypes, a fixed inter-text,
 
mechanically transmitted. But since these last two
 
operations are absent from the written work (as opposed to
 
the oratio) and since, as with the ancients, they did not
 
call for any classifications (but only brief commentaries),
 
they can be eliminated here from the rhetoric machine. Our
 
tree, then, includes only three trunks (1) INVENTIO, (2) ,
 
DISPOSITIO, (3) ELOCUTIO. Let US specify, however, that
 
between the concept of techne and these three parts yet
 
another level intervenes: that of the "substantial"
 
materials of discourse: Res et verba. I do not think that
 
this ought to be translated simply as Things and Words.
 
Res, says Quintilian, are auae sianificantur. and Verba.
 
auae significant; in short, at the level of discourse, the
 
signifieds and signifiers. Res. that which is already
 
destined for meaning, constituted from the outset by'^:^ ;
 
signification material; verbum, which is the form already in
 
search of meaning to fuifill it. it is the res/verba
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paradigm that counts, the relatiohship, the complementarity,
 
the exchange, and hot the definition of each term. Since
 
the n1spositio turns on the contents (tes) and on the
 
(jtscursive form (verba) at one and the same time, the first
 
division of our tree, the first diagram of our machine, must
 
inscribe itself like this:
 
Techne rhetorike
 
Verba
 
Res
 
3. ELOCUTIO
2. DISPOSITIO
1. INVENTIO
 
B.l. THE INVENTIO
 
n 1■ 1 ■ ni scoverv and not invention. 
inventio refers less to invention (arguments) than 
to discovery: overything exists already; it needs only to be 
rediscovered: it is more an "extractive" than a 'creative 
notion. This is corroborated by the designation of a 
"place" (the Topic) , from which one can extract the 
arguments and to which one must return them: the inventio is 
a prnrPSs tvi 3 araumentorum) . This idea of inventio implies 
two feelings: on the one hand a very secure conf idence in 
the power of the method, of the track: if one casts the net 
of argumentative forms over the material with a good 
technique, one is sure to haul in the contents of an 
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excellent discourse; on the other hand, the conviction that
 
the spontaneous, the unmethodical, brings in nothing: the
 
nothingness of the original speech corresponds to the power
 
of the ultimate speech; man cannot speak without being
 
delivered of his speech, and for that delivery there is a
 
particular techne, the inventio.
 
B.1.2. To convince/to move.
 
TWO majob tracks,bran^ out fromthe^ invent rs : ;
 
logic, the other is psychology: to convince and to move. To
 
ronvince (fidem facere) demands a display of logic or
 
pseudo-logic which is called roughly the Probatio (the
 
, 	 d6maih.of ::.Wrbbrs";)v:;;:acfcbr^^
 
matter of doing righteous violence to the spirit of the
 
budience, whose cliarabter or ^ psychoiogic^l disposrbipa, a
 
then, has nothing to do with it: the proofs carry their own
 
force. TO impellere). on the contrary,
 
cohSisbs in thinkingVaf a message which,is;
 
■ftseif, but in its rnbended purpose^./tne:^ vf: ■ 
should inspire, mobilizing subjective or moral proofs. To 
begin with, we descend along the track of the probatio (to 
convince) , to return later to the second term of the 
dichotomy (bbCmove) . All these "descei^ts^' wi11 he 
^ larepresehted graphiealiy^:i 
6 2 
 B.1.3. T^rtinical prnnfR and proofs external to_tlie
 
tRchnigue.
 
Plstela, the proofs? One habitually watches out foi
 
this word, but for us it has a scientific connotation whose
 
absence Itself defines the rhetorical EisielS. It would be
 
better to say: convincing explanations, ways of persuasion,
 
means of influence, mediators of confidence (fidas). The
 
binary division of the Eisteis is well-bnown: there are the
 
arguments that are outside of the t££hll4 (Ejsteis atechnoi)
 
and the arguments that are part of the techne (pisteis
 
entechnoil. In Latin: prohationo° inartificialos/.
 
,vtifiriales: in French (B. Lamy): evtrinseques/
 
intrinseaues. This opposition is not difficult to grasp if
 
"	 f
 
we keep reminding ourselves that it is a techne; a
 
speculative institution, a means of producing that which is
 
probable or improbable; in other words, that which is
 
neither scientific (necessary) nor natural. The proofs
 
nf the techn4, then, are those that escape to the
 
freedom of creating the contingent subject; they are found
 
outside the orator (the operator of the techne); they are
 
the subject's inherent arguments. On the other hand, the
 
proofs within the techn4 depend upon the orator's ability
 
to argue.
 
I
 
B.I.A. 	Proofs oiitsif^p the techne.
 
What can the orator do with the atechnoi proofs? He
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 cannot direct them, because they are in themselves inert; he
 
can only arrange them, assert them through a methodical
 
placement. What areVthey? They are fragments reality
 
that pass directly^ into this dispositio by a simple
 
development, not by transforraatioh. Or better yet, they are
 
elements of the "dossier," which one cannot invent; (deduce)
 
and which are furnished by the;case itself, by the client
 
ifor the time being, we: are in thd purely judicial). These
 
Atechnoi are classified;in;the following way: (1)
 
■hhp praeiuducia. previous arrests, jurisprudence (the 
problem is to destroy them without attacking them head-on) ; 
( 2 )' the rurnores , public t^estimony,.the consensus of an 
entire community; : (3) rnnfessions uhder torture (tormenta, 
guaesita): any mbrai: cdnviction:, ;but;especially- a social 
donviction with, regard to torture: antiquity ackiiowledged 
the right to torture slaves: but. ;not free men; (4) documents 
ftahiilae) : contracts , agreements , transactions between 
individuals, up to and including forced relations (theft, 
premeditated murder, robbery, insult) ; (5) the oath 
Y^uaiurandum):,it is the element which relies most heavily 
on: a game of combinations, taetics, language: one can agree 
or refuse to swear, one accepts or refuses the path of 
another , etc.; 16): testimonies (testimonia) : these are 
;	 essentially bigh-minded:testimonies, at least for Aristotle, 
ihey issue eitherifrom the ancient poets (Solon citing Homer 
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in order to support Athens' claims to Salamine), or from
 
proverbs, or from notable contemporaries; these are, then,
 
if anything, "citations."
 
The meaning of the atechnoi.
 
The "extrinsic" proofs belong to the judiciary (the
 
rumores and the testimon^a can serve deliberative and
 
epideictic purposes); but one can imagine that they might
 
also be useful in private life, to judge an action, to know
 
what to praise, etc. This is what happened to Lamy. For
 
him, the extrinsic proofs could support fictive
 
representations (novels, theater); one must take care,
 
however, that they are not factors which themselves make up
 
part of the argument; they are simply elements of the
 
dossier that come from the outside, from an
 
institutionalized reality; in literature, these proofs would
 
serve to compose the novel-dossiers (it happened
 
that . . .), which would renounce all bound writing, all
 
prolonged representation, would give only fragments of a
 
reality already constituted in language by the society.
 
This is indeed the sense of atechnoi: they are elements
 
constitute by social language which pass directly into th^
 
discourse without being transformed by any technical
 
operation of the orator, the author.
 
'
 
B.1.6. Proofs within the techne.
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The arannients which depend entirely upon the ability of
 
the orator ^r^ieteis entechnoi) oppose themselves to these
 
fragments of social language which are conveyed directly, to
 
the crude state (except the development of an arrangement),
 
indeed, the Enteclinos means: that which revives the oratory
 
practice, because the material is transformed in a
 
persuasive way by a logical operation. This operation, in
 
all strictness, is double: induction and deduction. The
 
pntechnoi. then, is divided into two types: (1) the
 
axemplum (induction), (2) the euthymeme (deduction). It is
 
not a question of scientific induction and deduction, but
 
simply a "public" induction and deduction. These two ways
 
are compulsory: All orators, in order to persuade,
 
ao^nnctr^te uy ^v;.mples or enthymemes; there-js no other way
 
to do it (Aristotle). Yet a sort of quasi-aesthetic
 
difference, a difference in style, creeps in between the
 
example and the euthymeme: the exemplum produces a gentler
 
persuasion, more highly valued than the vulgar one; it is an
 
illuminating force, gratifying the pleasure inherent in all
 
\ comparison; the enthymeme—which is stronger, more vigorous
 
-produces a violent, turbulent force and profits from the
 
(energy of the syllogism; it works a veritable abduction; it
 
Us the proof in all the force of its purity, its essence.
 
B.1.7. The exemplum.
 
The oxemolurn (parMMsma) is rhetorical induction: one
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i 
 procssds from one part,icu.1ar to another particular, to the
 
general, by an implicit chain* from an Object, one infers a
 
"■ ' ■ * ■ ■ ' 'Z'Z
class, then to this class one adds a new object. The 
exemplum can have no; other dimension; it may be a word, a 
fact, a set of facts or an account of these facts. Tt is 
persuasive similarity, an argriment;by analogy: one finds the 
right exemPla if one has; the gift pf recpgnizing analogies— 
and also, of course, their opposites. As its Greek name 
indicates, it tends toward the paradigmatic, the metaphoric. 
As far back as Aristotle, the exemplum has been subdivided 
into the parable and the fable; the real covers historical 
examples, but also mythplpgical examples, being opposed not 
to the imaginary but to that which one inyents oneself. The 
parable is a bi^iuf ^ ^ comparison; the fgble ilogos) a 
collectiPn of actions.i These indicate the narrative nature 
of the exemplum. which is going to flower historically * 
B.1.8. The exemplary fiaure: the imago. 
At the beginning of the first century A.D. , a new form 
of the exemplum appears: the exemplary personage (eikon, 
imago) . investing a figure with the incarnation of a virtue* 
Gato iila virtutem viva imagpr (Gicero) . , A repertoire of 
these;"imagoes" is established for use in the schools of the 
Rhetors (Valerius Maximus, under Tiberius: Factorum ac 
dictorum memorabilium libri novemi. followed much later by a 
version in verse; ; This coilfectiPn bf fig^ enjoys immense 
V 'j t- • ■." 't'' ■V'" . 61: , 
success in the Middle Ages; erudite poetry sets forth the
 
definitive cafion of these ;pcrsphag;es a:yeritahle Olympus of :
 
archetypes^ which God has placediahto the cour history;
 
the imago virtutis occasionally: seizes upon people of very
 
minor importance who are destined for great fame, such as
 
Amyclas, the ferryman who will carry "Caesar and his
 
fortune" from EpiruS, : to Brindisi in a Storm (poverty gnd^^^ ^ ^;
 
sobriety); there are numerous "imagoes" in the works of
 
Dante. The very fact that one could put together a
 
repertoire of exemola emphasizes well what one might call
 
the structural inclination of the exemplum; it is a
 
detachab1e piece which expressly carries with,it a meaning
 
(heroic portrait, hagiographic narrative); clearly,
 
therefore, one can trace its development from fragmented and
 
allegorical writing to today's major presses: Churchill,
 
John XXIII are "imagoes," examples destined to persuade us
 
that we must be courageous, that we must be good.
 
B.1.9. Arguments. , 'l .
 
Opposite the exemplum. the mode of persuasion by
 
induction, there is a group of deductive modes, the
 
aroumenta. The ambiguity of the word argumentum is
 
significant here. The most common ancient meaning is: the
 
subject of a scenic fable (the argument of a comedy by
 
Plautus), or rather: articulated action (in contrast to
 
muthos. a collection of actions). For Cicero, it is at the
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same time "a flctive thing that could happen" (the :
 
plausible), and "a conceivable idea employed to convince,"
 
whose logical scope Quintiliah makes even more clear: "the
 
way to prove one thing or another, to confirm that which is
 
;in doubt by that which is not." Thus an important duplicity
 
becomes evident: that of "reasohing" ("all forms of public
 
reasoning," says a rhetor), tainted, easily dramatizable,
 
which participates in the intellectual and the fictional,
 
the logical and the narrative, at one and t)^e same time
 
(donvt we recapture this ambiguity in a good number of
 
modern "essays"?)- The appearance of the argumenta, which
 
begins here and will go on to consume all of the probatao
 
right up to its end, opens on a masterpiece, the tabernacle
 
of the deductive proof, the enthvmeme. which is sometiines
 
called commentum. commentatio. the literal translation of
 
the Greok enthumema (all reflection of consciousness), but
 
jnore dften by a significant synecdoche: argumentum.
 
B.1.10. The enthvmeme.
 
The enthymeme received two successive significations
 
(which are not contradictory). I. Fot the Aristotelians, it
 
is d syllogism based on a the simiiarity Of signs and not on
 
the true and immediate (as is the case with the scientific
 
syllogism); the enthymeme is a rhetorical svllogism,
 
developed uniquely at the public level (as one says: to get
 
down to someone's level), to set out from the probable, that
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is, to set out from what the public thinks; it is a
 
deduction whose value is concrete, posed with a view to its
 
presentation (it is a sort of acceptable spectacle), in
 
opposition to the abstract deduction carried out solely for
 
analysis; it is a public reasoning, handled easily by
 
uneducated men. By virtue of its origin, the enthymeme
 
achieves persuasion, not demonstration. For Aristotle, the
 
enthymeme is sufficiently defined by the probable character
 
of its premises (the probable admits of contraries): whence
 
the necessity to define and classify the premises of the
 
enthymeme. (See below: B.1.13, 14, 15, 15.). II. A new
 
definition prevails from Quintilian on and is completely
 
victorious during the Middle Ages (since Boethius): the
 
enthymeme is defined not by the contents of its premises,
 
but by the elliptical character of its articulation: it is
 
an incomplete syllogism, a shortened syllogism: its parts
 
are "neither as many nor as distinct as the parts of the
 
philosophic syllogism": one can omit one of the two
 
premises or the conclusion; therefore it is a syllogism
 
truncated by the suppression (in the expression) of a
 
proposition whose reality seems incontestable to man and
 
which is, for that reason, simply "preserved in the spirit"
 
(en thumo). If one applies this definition of the master
 
syllogism to all of culture (in a peculiar way, it repeats
 
to us our own death)—^and although its premise is not simply
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probable, it cannot be an entliymeme in the strictest sense- ■ 
one may have the following emthymemes: man is mortal. '
 
therefore Socrates is mortal: Socrates is mortal because all
 
men are; Socrates is a man and therefore mortal; etc. One
 
might prefer the more factual example of this funereal model
 
proposed by Port-Royal: "a11 bddies which reflect light on
 
all sides are uneven; the moon reflects liaht on all sides;
 
therefore the moon is an uneven bodv." and all the
 
enthymemic combinations that can be extracted from it (the
 
moon is uneven because it reflects light on all sides,
 
etc.). In effect, this second definition of the enthymeme
 
is chiefly that of Port-Roval Logic. and one clearly sees
 
why (or how): classical man believes that the syllogism is
 
developed wholly in the mind: ("the number of the three
 
propositions is in good proportion with the breadth of the
 
mind"): if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it can
 
be so only at the level of language (which is not that of
 
the "mind"): it is a perfect syllogism in the mind, but it
 
is imperfect in its expression; in short, it is an accident
 
of language,,a lapse..
 
B.1.rl. Metamorphoses of the enthymeme.
 
Here are some variables of the rhetorical syllogism:
 
(1) the prosvlloqism. a series of syllogisms in which the
 
conclusion of one becomes the premise of the following; (2)
 
the sorite (soros. the heap), an accumulation of premises or
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 succession of truncated sy.l logisms; (3) the eplcheireine.
 
(often cornmented upon in antiquity), or developed syllogism,
 
each premise being accompanied by its proof; the ,
 
epicheirematic structure may extend to all five parts of the
 
discourse: the proposition, the major argument, the
 
assumption or minor argument, the lesser proofs, the
 
disposition or conclusion: A . .. . because . . . Now B . . .
 
because . . . therefore (4) the apparent enthvmeme. or
 
an argument based on a confidence game, a play of words;
 
• • • t \
 
(5) the maxim. (gnome, sententia): a very elliptical,
 
monodic form, it is a fragment of an enthymeme, the rest of
 
which is potential: "one must not give one's children too
 
much knowledge (because they will reap the envy of their
 
fellows). A significant revolution, the sententia
 
migrates from the inventio (from reasoning, from the
 
syntagmatic rhetoric) to the elocutio. to style (figures of
 
amplification or diminution); in the Middle Ages, it blooms,
 
contributing to form a treasury of citations on all subjects
 
of wisdom: phrases; gnomic verse learned by heart;
 
collections classified in alphabetical order.
 
B.1.12. The Pleasure of the enthvmeme. ,
 
Since the rhetorical enthymeme is made for the publie
 
(and does not come under the scrutiny of science), the
 
psychological considerations are pertinent, and Aristotle
 
insists on them. The enthymeme has the charm of a
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promenade, a voyage. One sets out from the point that does
 
not need to be proved and proceeds toward another point that
 
does need to be proved. One has the agreeable feeling (the
 
same feeling that arises from vitality) of discovering
 
Something new by a sort df natural contagion or capillary
 
attraction which extends the known (the opinabie or
 
assentable) toward the unknown. Nevertheless, in order to
 
give all its pleasure, the process must be supervised:
 
reasoning should not be carried too far, and it must not run
 
the full course of its stages to come to a conclusion: this
 
taxes the patience (the epichiereme should be used only on
 
great occasions), because one must reckon with the ignorance
 
of the 1isteners (ignorance is precisely that incapacity to
 
infer by numerous stages and to follow an argument for a
 
long time); or rather: one must exploit this ignorance and
 
give the listener the feeling that he himself has put a stop
 
to it by his own mental effort. The enthymeme is not a
 
truncated syllogism by default or dissipation, but because
 
it must allow the listener the pleasure of doing all he can
 
in the construction of the argijment: it is part of the
 
pleasure one gets from working out a given grid oneself
 
(cryptograms, games, crossword puzzles). Port-Royal,
 
although always judging language faulty compared to the
 
mind—and the enthymeme is a linguistic syllogism—
 
recognizes this pleasure in incomplete reasoning. "This
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suppression of part of the syllogism flatters the vanity of
 
those to whom one speaks. By leaving some things to their
 
intelligence and by cutting the discourse short, one makes
 
it stronger and more lively"; therefore, one sees the
 
moral transformation in comparison with Aristotle: the
 
pleasure of the enthymeme is attributed less to a creative
 
autonomy of the listener than to an excellence stemming from
 
concession. given triumphantly as the sign of a surplus of
 
thought over language (thought supersedes language in terms
 
of length): " . . . one of the chief beauties of a discourse
 
is to be full of meaning and to give the mind occasion to
 
form a thought more extended than its expression . . ."
 
R.I.13. The enthvmematic premises.
 
The place from which we leave to take the pleasant
 
route of the enthymeme is the premise. This place is known,
 
certain, but not with a scientific certainty: it is our
 
human certainty. What do we hold, then, as certain? (1)
 
that which falls under the senses, that which we see
 
and understand: reliable indicators, tekmeria; (2) that
 
which falls under sense, that which people are in general
 
agreement on, that which is established by law, that which
 
has passed into usage ("it is handed down from the gods,"
 
"thou Shalt honor thy father and thy mother," etc.): these
 
are the probabilities, elkota. or generically, the probable
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 (eikos): (3) between these two types of human
 
"certainities Aristotle puts a looser,category: the
 
seraeia, the sign (a thing which serves to make another
 
thing understood, per quod alia res intelliaitur). ;
 
B.1.14. The tekmerion■ the reliable indicator. 
The te3cmerion is the reliable indicator , the necessary 
sign, or even "the indestructible sign," that which is what 
it is and which cannot be otherwise. A woman has given 
birth: this is a reliable indieatbr (te3merion) that she 
has had relations with a man. This premise comes very close 
to the one that inaugurates the scientific syllogism, 
although it rests only on a universality of experience. As 
always, when one exhumes this old logical material (of 
rhetoric) , one is amazed to see it function perfectly well 
in the works of the culture of mass appeai--to the point 
that asks oneself; if Aristotle isn't the philosopher of this 
culture and consequently doesn't found the critique which 
holds sway over it; in effect, these works easily mobilize 
"physical evidence" which serves as an origin for implicit 
arguments, for a certain rational perception of the 
development of an anecdote. In Goldfinger. there is an 
electrocution by.water: this is familiar and doesn't need 
to be explained; it is a "natural" premise, a tekmerion: 
elsewhere (in the same film) a woman dies because someone 
has painted her body with gold; here one has to know that 
. 15 
the gold paint prevents the skin from breathing and
 
therefore causes asphyxiation: this, being rare, needs to be
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explained; therefore it is not a tekmerion. or at least it
 
is "disconnected" from an antecedent certitude (the
 
asphyxiation causes death). It goes without saying that
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the tekmeria don't historically have the beautiful
 
stability that Aristotle gives them: public "certainty"
 
depends on public "knowledge," and that varies with time and
 
society. In order to recover Quintilian's example (and to
 
refute it), I must be assured that certain populations don't
 
establish the connection between the birth and the sexual
 
union (the child sleeps in the mother; God awakens it).
 
B.1.15. The eikos, the probable.
 
The second type of (human, non-scientific) "certitude"
 
which can serve as the premise of the enthymeme is the
 
probable, a capital notion in the eyes of Aristotle. It is
 
a general idea resting on the judgment which men develop by
 
experience and imperfect deduction. (Perelman proposes that
 
it be called the preferable). In the Aristotelian probable,
 
are there two nuclei: (1) the idea of the general. and its
 
opposite, the universal: the universal is necessary (it is
 
an attribute of science); the general is not necessary (it
 
is a human "general," determined on the whole statistically,
 
by the opinion of the majority); (2) the possibility of
 
contrariness: certainly the enthymeme is received by the
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 public as a kind of syllogism; it seems to start from an
 
opinion in which one believes, "strong as iron"; but
 
according to science, the probable admits the contrary:
 
within the limits of human experience and morai life, which
 
are those of the eikos, the contrary is never impossible:
 
one cannot predict with (scientific) certainty the
 
potentials of a free being: "he who is in good health will
 
live to see another day," "a father loves his children," "a
 
burglary committed without forceful entry must have been
 
done by someone known to the household," etc.: very well,
 
but the contrary is always possible; the analyst, the
 
rhetbrician, feels keenly the force of these opinions, but
 
in all objectivity, he holds them at a distance, introducing
 
them by an esto (it may be) vjhich dilutes its force in the
 
eyes of science, where the contrary is never possible.
 
i f
 
8,1.16. The semeion. the sian.
 
t t
 
The semeion. the third possible division of the
 
enthymeme, is a more ambiguous factor, less sure than the
 
tekmerion. Traces of blood imply a murder, but this is not
 
certain; the blood may be the result of a nosebleed, or of a
 
sacrifice. In order for the sign to be conclusive, there
 
must be other concomitant signs; or better yet, in order to
 
stop the sign from being polysemic (the semeion is in
 
effect the polysemic sign), it must have recourse to a total
 
context. Atalanta was not a virgin, since she ran the woods
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with boys: for Quiiitiliah, it is yet to be proved; the
 
proposition itself is so:Uhcerbaih that it throws the
 
semeion out of the techne of the orator, who cannot seize
 
upon the semeion in order to transform it, by enthymematic
 
inference, into a certainty.
 
B.1.17. Practice of the enthvmeme.
 
Insofar as the enthymeme is a "public" reasoning, it is
 
permissible to extend its practice out of the judiciary, and
 
it is possible to retrieve it from rhetoric (and from
 
antiquity). Aristotle himself studied the practical
 
syllogism, or enthvmeme which coneludes with a determinate
 
act. The major premise is concerned with a current maxim
 
(eikos); in the minor premise, the agent (for example, I
 
myself) verifies what happens in the situation covered by
 
the major premise; it concludes with a behavioral decision.
 
How does it happen, then, that so often the conclusion
 
contradicts the major premise and that the orator resists
 
that knowledge? It is because, very often, there is a
 
deviation between the major and the minor premises: "To
 
drink alcohol is harmful to a man; I am a man; therefore, 1
 
should not drink." And yet, in spite of this nice
 
enthymeme, I drink. It is because I am "discreetly"
 
reminded of another major premise: the sparkling, icy,
 
thirst-quenching drink that does one good (a major premise
 
well-known to advertising and bistro conversation). Another
 
possible extension of the enthymenie: in "cool" and rational
 
language,; both distant and public at the saree time, such :
 
ilistitutiona1 languages as public d i plomacy, for oxsimple:
 
Chinese students, having demonstrated in front of the
 
American embassy in;Moscow (March 1965), the de^
 
having been put down by the Russian police, and the Chinese
 
government having protested against the suppression, a
 
Soviet memo responds to the Chinese protest with a fine
 
epicheireme, worthy of Cicero (see above B.1.11.): (1) Major
 
premise: eikos. genera1 opinion: Diplomatic standards exist
 
which all nations respect; (2) Proof of the major premise:
 
the Chinese themselves respect these standards of courtesv
 
in their ov/n country; (3) Minor premise: Now. the Chinese
 
students in Moscov; have violated these standards; (4) Proof
 
of the minor premise: this is an account of the
 
demonstration (insults.'acts of violence and other deeds
 
falling within the provisions of the penal code); (5) the
 
conclusion is not stated (this is an enthymeme), but it is
 
clear: it is the memorandum itself as a rejection of the
 
Chinese protest: the adversary has been placed in a bind
 
between the eikos and himself.
 
B.1.18. The Place, topos, locus.
 
The classes of enthymematic premises having been
 
determined, they must still be filled and premises be found:
 
one has the principal methods, but how to invent the
 
contents? It is always the Same agonizing question that
 
Rhetoric poses and that Rhetoric tries to answer: what to
 
say? From whence the importance of the reply, as witnessed
 
by the scope and the success of that part of the Inventio
 
which is charged with furnishing the contents of the
 
argument and which begins henceforth: the Topic. The
 
premises may indeed be drawn from certain Places. What is a
 
place? Aristotle says it is where a multiplicity of
 
oratorical arguments coincide. The places, says Port-Royal,
 
are "certain general authorities from which one can rettieye
 
all the proofs which one makes use of in the diverse
 
material that one deals with"; or even (Lamy): "general
 
opinions which remind those who consult them of all the
 
aspects from which one can consider a subject." However,
 
the metaphoric approach to place is more significant than
 
its abstract definition. One is presented with many
 
metaphors for identifying the place. To begin with, why
 
Place? Because, says Aristotle, in order to remember
 
things, it helps to recollect the place where they are found
 
(the place, therefore, is an element of the association of
 
ideas, of a package, of a discipline, of a mnemonic; the
 
places, therefore, are not the arguments themselves but the
 
compartments in which they are stored. Thence the whole
 
image uniting the idea with a space and that which it
 
reserves, with a locality and a quarrying: a region (where
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one can find argumentsl, the vein.of sdme ore. a circle, a
 
sphere■ a source. a pit. an arsenal. a treasury. and even a 
pigeon hole (W. D. Ross) ; "The places, Du Marsais sa:ys, are 
the Cells where everyone can go to take, as it were, the 
material of a discourse and arguments on all sorts of 
subjects." A scholastic logician, exploiting the domestic 
nature of the place, compares it to a tag which indicates 
the contents of a receptacle (pvxidum indices) ; for Cicero, 
the arguments coming from places, will come forth by 
themselves for the purpose of debate just as the "letters 
for making words" will fall into place: the places, then, 
form that very particular reserve that constitutes the 
alphabet: a body of forms deprived of meaning in themselves, 
but, by selection, combining to make meaning, arrangement, 
actualization. With regard to place, what is the Topic? It 
seems that one can distinguish three successive definitions 
or at least three aspects of the word. The Topic is—or has 
been--(1) a method, (2) a grid of empty forms, (3) a store 
of occupied forms. 
B.1.19. The Topic: a method. 
Originally (according to the Topica of Aristotle, 
anterior to his Rhetoric) . the Topic was a collection of 
commonplaces of the dialectic, that is, of the syllogism 
founded on the probable (intermediate between the scientific 
and the possible) ; then Aristotle made a method of it, more 
•' i' - ' 81 ' 
practical than tne dialectic: that which "we put in order,
 
on every proposed subject, to furnish conclusions extracted
 
from plausible reasons." This methodical sense has lasted
 
or at least reappeared throughout the history of rhetoric:
 
it is, then, the art (knowledge organized with an eye to
 
teaching: dlsciplina) of finding arguments (Isidore), or
 
even: an ensemble of "quick and easy ways to find material
 
to discourse on subjects which are entirely unfcimiliar"
 
(Lamy)—-one can appreciate the philosophic misgivings
 
regarding such a method.
 
B.1.20. The Topic: a arid.
 
The second meaning is that of a network of forms, that
 
of a quasi-cybernetic circuit to which one submits the
 
material which one wants to transform into a persuasive
 
discourse. One must resist things like this: a subject
 
(auaestio) is given to the orator; in order to find
 
arguments, the orator "runs" his subject through a grid of
 
empty forms: from the contact of the subject with each
 
compartment (each "place") on the grid (on the Topic) a
 
possible idea, an enthymematic premise, arises. In
 
antiquity a pedagogical version of this process had existed:
 
the chrie (chreia). or "helpful" exercise, was a test of
 
virtuosity, given to students, which consisted of making
 
them pass through a series of places: guis? quid? ubi?
 
quibus auxiliis? cur? quomodo? quando? Taking his
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Irispiration from ancient topics > Lamy proposes the fo1lowing
 
grid in the seventeenth century: the genre, the difference,
 
the definitionv hhe enumeration,of parts, the etymoLogy, the
 
relationships (this is the associative range of the /root),
 
the comparison, the aversion, the effects, the canses, etc.
 
Let ns suppose that we have to prepare a discourse on
 
literature: we are "stumped" (for good reason), but
 
fortunately we have Lamy's topics: we may at least be able
 
to ask ourselves questions and attempt to answer them: to
 
what genre do we connect literature? art? discourse?
 
cultural production? If it is an art how is it different
 
from other arts? How many parts are assigned to it and what
 
are they? What does the etymology of the word suggest to
 
us? its connections with its morphological cousins
 
(literary. literal. letters, literate)? to what does
 
literature have an aversion? money? the Truth? etc.
 
The conjunction of the grid and the auaestio resembles that
 
of the theme and the predicates, the subject and its
 
attributes: the "attributive topic" has its apogee in the
 
tables of the Lu11ists (ars brevis):: the general attributes
 
are a kind of place. One can see what the range of the
 
topical grid is: the metaphors that allude to the place
 
(topos) make it obvious enough to us: the arguments are
 
hidden. and are nestled in regions, depths, strata from
 
which one must ca11 them, awaken them: the Topic is the
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midwife of the latent: it is a fofm that articulates ■ 
contents and in this way produces fragments of meaning, 
intelligible units. 
B.1.21. The Topic: a reserve..
 
The places are principally empty forms; but these forms
 
have had a very strong tendency to be filled in the same
 
manner, to carry off contents, at first contingent, and then
 
repeated, reified. The Topic has become a stockpile of
 
stereotypes, of established, time-honored themes, of
 
complete "pieces" which one uses almost obligatorily in the
 
treatment of each subject. Hence the historical ambiguity
 
of fhp expression commonplaces (topoi koinoi. loci communi):
 
(1) they are empty forms, common to every argument (the less
 
they contain, the more common they are, see B.1.23. below);
 
(2) they are stereotypes, propositions used time and again.
 
The Topic, a full stockpile: its meaning is not in the least
 
that of Aristotle, but already that of the Sophists: they
 
had felt the necessity of having a catalog of things about
 
which one commonly speaks and on which one need not "get
 
stuck." This reification of the Topic is systematically
 
pursued from Aristotle through the Latin authors; it had
 
triumphed in the neo-rhetoric and was absolutely standard in
 
the Middle Ages. Curtius gave an inventory of these
 
indispensable themes accompanied by their fixed treatments.
 
Here are a few of these reified places (from the Middle
 
Ages): (1) topQS of affected raodestY: every orator must
 
declare that he is overwhelmed by his subject, that he is
 
incompetent, that there is assuredly no affectation in
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saying this, etc. (excusatio propter infirmitatem). (2)
 
topos of the puer senilis: this is the magical theme of the
 
adolescent endowed with perfect wisdom or the old man
 
equipped with the beauty and grace of youth; (3) topos of
 
the locus ajnoenus: the ideal landscape; Elysium or Paradise
 
(trees, shrubbery, springs and meadows) has furnished a good
 
number of literary "descriptions" (see the ebphrasis. A.5.2.
 
above); but its origin is judiciary: every demonstrative
 
connection of a cause demands the araumentiam a loco: one
 
ought to base the proofs on the nature of the place where-

the action transpired; topography then invaded literature
 
(from Virgil to Barres); once reified, the topos has fixed
 
contents, independent of the context: olives and lions are
 
placed in Nordic regions: the landscape is detached from
 
Place■ because its function is to constitute a universal 
sign—that of Nature: the landscape is the cultural sign of 
Nature; (4) the advnaton (impossibilia) : the topos described 
as roughly compatible with contrary phenomena, objects and 
beings, this paradoxical conversion functions as the 
disturbing sign of a world turned upside-down: the wolf 
flees from the sheep (Virgil) ; this topos flourishes during 
the Middle Ages, where it allows criticism of the epoch: it 
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is the ■disagheeable old theme of "lldw I'ye seen; eyerything," 
or again: of "the last: straw. " A31 of these topoi, even 
before the Middle Ages, are detachableypieceS (proof of 
their strong reification) , mobile, transportable: they are 
the elements of a combinatory syntagmatlc; their location 
was ■ subject to only one limitation: they could not be put 
into the Peroratio (peroration) , which is entirely 
contingent, because it must summarize the oratio. 
Nevertheless, from then on and even today, how many 
stereotyped conclusions! 
B.1. 22. Some Topics ' ; , : 1 ■ 
Let us return to our Topic-grid, since it is that which 
allows us to recapture our rhetoric tree, for which it is a 
great distributing or dispatching place. Antiquity and 
classicism ■ have produced numerous topics,:defined by 
affinitive grouping according to either,place or subject. 
In the first case, one can cite the General Topic of Port-
Royal, inspired by the German logician Clauberg (165 4) ; the 
topic of Lamy, which has already been cited and sketched 
out: there are the grammatical places (etymology, 
coniuaata) , logical places (genres, characteristics, 
irregularities, specifications, differences, definitions, 
divisions) , metaphysical places (final cause, efficient 
cause, effeet, totality, parts, .opposing terms) ; this is 
obviously an Aristotelian place. In the second case, that 
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of topics by subject, one can point to the following Topics:
 
(1) the oratorical Topic. properly speaking; in fact, it
 
comprises three topics: a rational topic, a moral
 
/
 
topic (ethe: practical intelligence, virtue, affection,
 
t
 
dedication), and a topic of passion (pathe: anger, love,
 
fear, shame and their contraries); (2) a topic of the
 
laughable, a part of a possible rhetoric of the comic;
 
Cicero and Quintilian have enirmerated some of the laughable
 
places: physical defects, spiritual defects, incidents,
 
appearances, etc.; (3) a theological topic: it includes the
 
different sources from which the theologians can derive
 
their arguments: Scriptures, Popes, Synods, etc.; (4) a
 
topic of the senses or topic of the imagination: one finds
 
it sketched out in Vico: "the founders of civilization [an
 
allusion to the anteriority of Poetry] engage in a topic of
 
the senses in which they combine the properties, the
 
qualities or the connections of individuals or species and
 
employ all of them concretely to form their poetric genre";
 
Vico speaks elsewhere of "universals of imagination"; in
 
this topic of the senses one can see the ancestor of
 
thematic criticism, that which proceeds by categories, not
 
by authors: that of Bachelard, in short: the soaring, the
 
cavernous, the torrential, the shimmering, the dormant,
 
etc., are the "places" to which one submits the "images" of
 
poetry.
 
B.1.23. The commonplaces.
 
The Topic strictly speaking (the oratorical,
 
Aristotelian topic), that which depends upon the pisteis
 
entechnoi. as opposed to the topic of characters and that of
 
passions, comprises two parts, two sub-topics: (1) a general
 
topic, that of commonplaces, (2) an applied topic, that of
 
special places. The commonplaces (topoi koinoi. loci
 
communisimi) have a different sense for Aristotle than that
 
which we attribute to the expression (under the influence of
 
the third meaning of the word Topic. B.1.21). The
 
commonplaces are not loaded stereotypes, but on the
 
contrary, precise places: being general (the general is
 
suited to the probable), they are common to all subjects.
 
For Aristotle, these commonplaces are, in all, only three in
 
number: (1) the possible/impossible: combined with time
 
(past, future), these terms produce a topic question: can
 
the thing have been done or not, could it be or not? This
 
place can be applied to opposing relationships: if it is
 
possible for a thing to begin, it is possible for it to end,
 
etc.; (2) existent/nonexistent (or real/not real); like the
 
preceding, the place can be compared with the time: if a
 
thing which is unlikely to occur has nonetheless occurred,
 
that which is more likely has certainly occurred (past);
 
building materials are assembled here: it is probable that
 
one will build a house here (future); (3) more/less: this is
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the place of magnitude and smallness; whcit triggers it is
 
the "all the more reason": there is a greater chance that X
 
may have hit his neighbors considering that he even hits his
 
own father. Although by definition the commonplaces may be
 
without special features, each is best suited to one of the
 
three oratory genres: the possible/impossible is well suited
 
to the deliverative (is it possible to do this?), the
 
real/not real to the judiciary (has the crime taken place?),
 
the more/less to the epideictic (praise or blame).
 
B.1.24. The special Places. /
 
The special places (eide. idia) are the places proper
 
to determined subjects; these are particular truths, special
 
propositions accepted by everyone; these are the
 
experimental truths attached to politics, to law, to
 
finance, to the sea, to war, etc. However, since these
 
blend in with the practice of disciplines, genres,
 
particular subjects, one cannot enumerate them. The
 
theoretical problem must nonetheless be posed. The course
 
of our tree, then, comes to consist in comparing the
 
inventio. such as we know it up to here, and the speciality
 
of the content. That comparison is the auaestio.
 
B.1.25. The thesis and the hvpothesis; causa.
 
The auaestio is the form of the discursive specialty.
 
Into all the operations ideally set by the rhetoric
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"machine/"one introduces a new variable (which is, to tell
 
the truth, wheh it is d matter of majcijig. the discourse, tj^g
 
variable of division): the content, the point of debate, in
 
short, the referential. By definition contingent, this
 
referential can nonetheless be classified in two broad forms
 
which constitute the two major types of auaestio: (1) the
 
position or thesis (thesis. proPositum); this is a general
 
question, "abstract" as we would now say, but though
 
specified, referred (otherwise it would not bring the
 
special places into relief), yet without (and here is its ;
 
mark) any parameter of place or time (for example: is it
 
necessary to get married?); (2) the hypothesis (hypothesis):
 
this is a particular question, implying facts,
 
circumstances, persons, in short, a time and a place (for
 
example: must X get married?)—one sees that in rhetoric the
 
vords thesis and hypothesis have a meaning completely
 
different from the one to which we are accustomed. Now the
 
hypothesis, this temporalized and localized point of debate,
 
has another, former, great name: the hypothesis is the
 
causa. Causa is a negotium. a concern, a combination of
 
various contingencies; a problematic point where the
 
contingent, and most particularly time, is engaged. Just as
 
there are three "times" (past, present, future), one will
 
then have three types of causa, and each type will
 
correspond to one of the three oratory genres that we
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already know: so here they are, then, structurally grounded,
 
placed in our rhetoric tree. One can give them the
 
following attributes:
 
B.1.26. Status causae.
 
Of these three genres, it is the judiciary which has
 
been commented upon most in antiquity; the rhetoric tree
 
extends beyond its neighbors. The special places of the
 
judiciary are called the status causae. The status causae
 
are the heart of the questio (whence the words: stasis.
 
status). The status causae greatly excited the taxonomic
 
passion of antiquity. The simplest classification
 
enumerates three status causae (it is always a matter of
 
forms which the contingent can take): (1) the conjecture:
 
has this taken place or not (an sit)? This is the first
 
place because it is the immediate result of an initial
 
conflict of assertions: fecisti/non feci.: an fecerit? is it
 
you who did this/no.: it is not I: is it he? (2) the
 
definition (quid sit?) what is the legal definition of the
 
act, under what (juridical) name does it fall? is it a
 
crime? a sacrilege? (3) the qualitv (quaie sit?): is the
 
act permitted, useful, excusable? This is the order of
 
extenuating circumstances. To these three places, one
 
occasionally adds a fourth place, the order of quibbling:
 
this is the state (status) of objection (the domain of the
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Genres	 Audience Adaptation Object Time Reasoning (a) Commonplaces
 
1. DELIB members to advise/ useful/ future exempla possible/
 
ERATIVE	 of an to advise harmful Impossible
 
assembly against
 
2. JUDI Judges to accuse/ Just/ past enthymeme real/not
 
CIARY to defend unjust real
 
3. EPI- spec to praise/ beauti present exaggerated more/less
 
DEIGTIG	 tators, to blame ful/ comparison
 
public ugly (b)
 
lO
 
ro
 
(a) This 	Is a question of a dominant characteristic.
 
(b) This 	Is a variety of Induction, an exemplum oriented towards the
 
exaltation of the person praised (by Implicit comparisons).
 
Abrogation). The status banciap^ gpi- ^ the orobatio is
 
exhausted; one proceeds from the theoretical elaboration of
 
discourse (rhetoric is a tecline, a speculative practice:) to
 
the discourse itself; one comes to the point where the
 
"machine" of the orator, of the egoy must link itself to the
 
machine of the adversarY, which, for its part, win have
 
made the same effort, done the same work. This linking,
 
this engagement of gears, is clearly cohfIietnair dt is the
 
disceptatio, the point of friction of the tv/o parties.
 
B.1.27. The subiective or moral Proofs, i
 
The entire probatio (the set of logical proofs, subject
 
to the firia1ity of conviction) having been examined, we must
 
return to the original dichotomy which opened the field of
 
the Inventio and go back to the subjective and moral proofs,
 
those "which depend:on emOtiOh: This is the province of
 
psychological Rhetoric. Uhdoubtedly two;names dominate it:
 
Plato (one must find types of discourse adapted to types of
 
souls) and Pascal (one must recover the interior movement of
 
the thought of the other). As for Aristotle, he fully
 
tecoghized a psychological rhetoric, but as he persisted in
 
making it depend on a techne. it is a "prpjected"
 
psychology: psychology such as everyone imagines it: not
 
"that which goes on in the head" of the publie, but what the
 
public believes goes on in other people's heads: this is an
 
endpxon, a verisimilar psychology, opposed to the "true"
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(dGiTioiistrat.ivG) syllogism. Before Aristotle, teclinograplis
 
reconunended taking into accdiint psychological states such as
 
pity (compassion); but Aristotle dDroke new ground by
 
carefully classifying the passions, hot jaccording to
 
they are, but accordihg to what one believes them to be: he
 
did not describe them scientifically, but sought the
 
arguments that one could use in terms of ideas of the public
 
regarding the pasSiohsV The passions are expressly :
 
premises, placesn the rhetprical "psychology" of Aristotle
 
is a description of the eikos. of what is plausible 
according to the passions. the psychological proofs are 
divided into two broad groups: ethe (the characters, the 
tones, the airs) and pathe (the passions, the sentiments, 
the affects). ■t-, , I'V: 
B.1. 28 . F.the . the characters . the tones. 
Ethe are the attributes of the orator (and not those 
.of the public, pathe) : these are the character traits that 
the orator must display to tlie audience (his sincerity 
matters little) to make a good impression: these are his 
airs. It is not, then a question of an expressive 
psychology, but of an imaginary psychology (in the psycho 
analytical sense ) : Imust signify that which I want to be 
for the other. This is why—in the perspective of that 
theatrical psychology—it is worth more to speak of tones 
than of characters: tone: in the musical and ethical sense 
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 that the word has in Greek music. Ethos:in the proper sense
 
is a connotation: the orator makes a statement and at the
 
same time he says: I am thiSy T am hot that. For Aristotle,
 
there are three "airs,'V which together cdnstitute the
 
personal quality of the orator: ill ohrohesis: this is
 
the quality of those who deliberate well, those who weigh
 
the pros and cons well: it is an objective wisdom, a
 
displayed common sense; (2) arete: this is the show of a
 
candor which does not fear its consequences and expresses
 
itself with the help of direct purposes, impressions of a
 
theatrical honesty; (3) eunoia: this is a matter of not
 
shocking, not provoking, of being sympathetic (and perhaps
 
even: svmoa). of entering into an obliging complicity with
 
respect to the audience. In short, while he speaks and
 
unfolds the protocol of logical proofs, the orator must
 
likewise say incessantly: follow me
 
(phronesis). admire me (arete) and love me (eunoia).
 
B.1.29. Pathe. the sentiments. |
 
Pathe are the affects of the one who listens (and not
 
of the orator), such, at least, as he imagines them.
 
Aristotle did not take them up in his account within the
 
perspective of a techne, that is, as protases of
 
argumentative chains: the distance which he marks with the
 
esto^^ (let us admit that) which precedes the description of
 
each passion and which, as we have seen, is the operator of
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the "plausible." Each passion is picked out in its habitus
 
(the general dispositiphs which favor it), according to :its:
 
Object (for which one experiences it) and according to the
 
circumstances which give rise to the "crystallization"
 
(anger/composure, hatred/friendliness, fear/confidence,
 
desire/rivaIry, ingratitude/obiigingness, etc.). We must
 
stress this, because this is the mark of Aristotle's
 
profound modernity, and in fact, the master dreamed of a
 
sociology of the so-called mass culture: all these passions
 
are intentionally taken in their banality: anger is what
 
everyone thinks of as anger, the passion[is; only what one
 
says of it: it is the pure intertextual, it is the
 
"citation": (this is the way Paolo and Francesca understood
 
it; they were in love with each other only for having read ­
of Lancelot's loves). Rhetorical psychology is therefore
 
completely contrary to a reductionist psychology, which
 
attempts to see what is behind what people say and which :
 
claims to reduce the anger, for example, to another thing,
 
more deeply concealed. For Aristotle, public opinion is the
 
first and ultimate given. For him, there isn't any
 
hermeneutic (to be decoded) idea; for him, the passions are
 
fully developed pieces of language that the orator must
 
simply know well; hence the idea of a grid of passions, not
 
as a collection of essences but as a framework of opinions.
 
For the reductionist psychology (which prevails today).
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'Aristo11e subs11tutes (in advaince) a classifying psycboiogy,
 
which characterizes; languages." It itiay seem yery trite
 
(and no doubt untrue) to say that young pebple get angry
 
more easily than older pebple; but this platitude (and this
 
error) becomes interesting if we understand that such a
 
proposition is only one element in this general language of
 
other people which Aristotle reconstructs/perhaps according
 
to the mystery of Aristotelian philosophy: "universal
 
opinion is the measure of the being" (Nicomachean Ethics,
 
X.2.1173, a 1).
 
B.1.30. Semina probationum.
 
Thus ends the field or network of the Inventio. the
 
heuriStic preparation of the materials of discourse. We
 
must now tackle the Oratio itself: the ordering of its parts
 
(Dispositio) and its setting in words (Elocutio). What are
 
the "programmatic" connections of the Inventio and the
 
Oratio? Quintilian said it in a word (an image): he
 
recommends arranging the "germs of proof" (semina quae, dam
 
probationum sparaere) as early as the narratio (that is
 
before the argumentative part properly speaking). From the
 
Inventio to the Oratio, then, there is a. swarm of
 
connections: one must scatter, then suppress, recapture,
 
; 	explode further. In other words, the materials of the
 
Inventio are already pieces of language, set down in a state
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of reversibility, which one must now put into a fatally
 
irreversible order--that of discourse. Hence the
 
f
 
second major operation of the techne; the Dispositio or
 
treatment of the constraints of succession.
 
B.2. 	 THE DISPOSITIO
 
We have seen that the position of the Dispositio
 
/
 
(taxis.) in the techne constitutes an important stake.
 
Without returning to the problem, one would define the
 
dispositio as the arrangement (either in the active sense,
 
operative, or in the passive sense, reified) of the major
 
parts of discourse. The best translation is perhaps:
 
composition. bearing in mind that the compositio in Latin is
 
something else: it refers uniquely to the arrangement of
 
words within the phrase; as for the conlocatio. it
 
designates the distribution of material within each part.
 
According to an incremental syntagmatic, one has, then: the
 
structure of the phrase (compositio), the structure of the
 
part (conlocatio). the structure of the discourse
 
(dispositio). The major parts of discourse were set down
 
quite early by Corax (A.1.2), and their distribution has
 
hardly varied since then. Quintilian named five parts (he
 
split the third part into confirmatio and refutatio),
 
Aristotle four: it is this division that we will adopt here.
 
B.2.1. The egressio.
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Before enumerating these fixed parts, we must draw
 
attention to the optional existence of a movable part: the
 
eqressio or digressio: it is a display piece, off the
 
subject or connected to it by a very loose thread, and its
 
function is to make the drator shine; more often than not,
 
it is a eulogy to places or men (for example), the eulogy to
 
Sicily in Cicero's Verres). This movable unit, beyond
 
classification and, as it were, fluttering about—the origin
 
of the ekphrasis in neo-rhetoric—is a vehicle for the
 
spectacular, a sort of hallmark. Of the signature of the
 
"sovereign language" (the kurosis of Gorgias, the "poetics"
 
of Jakobson). However, just as a painting is always sighed
 
in the same place, so likewise the ddgressio ends by taking
 
its. place fairly regularly between the narratio and the
 
confirmatio.
 
B.2..2 The paradigmatic structure of the four parts.
 
The Dispositio proceeds from a dichotomy which was
 
previously, in other terms, that of the Inventio: animos
 
impeilere (to excite)/rem docere (to inform, to convince).
 
The first term (the;appeal to the sentiments) covers the
 
exordium and :the epilogue. in other words, the two extreme
 
parts of the discourse. The second term (the appeal to
 
facts, to reason) covers the.narratio (relationship of
 
facts) and the confirmatio (establishment, of proofs or means
 
of persuasion), in other words, the two median parts of the
 
99
 
 discourse. The syntagmatic order, therefore, does not
 
follow the paradigmatic order, and we are dealing with a
 
chiastic construction: two sections pertaining to the
 
"passions" frame a demonstrative block:
 
demonstrative
 
12 3 
1 narratio confirmatio 4 
exordium epilogue 
emotional
 
We will treat the four parts according to the
 
paradigmatic order: exordium/epilogue, narration/
 
confirmation.
 
B.2.3. The beginning and the end.
 
The solemnization of beginnings and endings, of
 
inaugurations and conclusions, is a problem which transcends
 
rhetoric (rites, ceremonies, liturgies). The opposition of
 
the exordium and the epilogue, under well-organized forms,
 
is no doubt somewhat archaic; also, in developing itself, in
 
secularizing itself, the rhetorical code has been induced to
 
allow discourse without exordium (in the deliberative
 
genre), according to the rule in medias res. and even to
 
advise abrupt endings (Isocrates for example). In its
 
canonical form, the opposition beoinnina/end allows for an
 
unevenness: in the exordium, the orator must engage himself
 
with prudence, reserve, moderation; in the epilogue, he no
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 rpriger. has to. control;hirnself,>h himself with 1
 
depth, he puts into play all the resources of a great,
 
toUchihg performance [ieu1. 1
 
B.2.4. The proem.
 
1 V In archaic poetry, that of: the aedes, the prodimon
 
(proem) is that which preceded the song [chant] (oime): it
 
is the prelude of the lyre pl%ers; who
 
competition Fconcoursel. loosen their fingers and thereby
 
take advantage:of the Qpp;ortunify to gaf^^ favor; with ithe :
 
jury in advance:(there are vestiges of this in Wagneris Die
 
Meistersinoer). ; The oime is an oId epic bailad: the
 
narrator would begin to tell the story from a tota]ly
 
arbitrary moment: he would just as well have been abie to
 
"catch" it earlier or later (the story is "infinite"); the
 
wofdiS cut the potential thread of a narrative without
 
origin. This arbitrariness of the beginning was marked by
 
the words ex ou (from what); I begin from here! i-Ue aede of ^
 
the Odyssey asks the Muse to sing of U3ysses' return from
 
v/hatever moment it pleases her " The function of the proem
 
is thus, in a way, to exorcize the arbitrariness of the very
 
beginning. Why begin with this rather than that? 7 Why cut: ;
 
in with the speech that Ponge (the author of the Proems)
 
calls the analogical, unrefined magma? What is necessary at
 
this knife edge is a softening, at this anarchy a formal
 
decision: this is the Prooimon. Its apparent role is to
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tame, as if beginning to speak, encountering language, were
 
risking the unknown, the scandal, the monster. In each of
 
us there is a terrifying solemnity in "breaking" silence
 
(the other language)—except among certain blabbermouths who
 
fling themselves into speech like Gribouille and "grab" it
 
by force, no matter where: it is this which we will call
 
"spontaneity." Such perhaps is the base from which the
 
exordium of rhetoric, the regulated inauguration of
 
discourse, proceeds.
 
B.2.5. The exordium.
 
Canonically, the exordium comprises two moments—I. The
 
captatio benevolentiae, or the enterprise of the seduction
 
of the listener, which is a matter of Immediately gaining
 
his good will by a proof of complicity. The captatio was
 
one of the most stable elements of the rhetorical system (it
 
is already flourishing in the Middle Ages and remains the
 
same into our own time); it follows a very elaborate model
 
coded according to the classification of cases: the means of
 
seduction varies depending upon the connection between the
 
case and the doxa, or current standard of opinion: (a) if
 
the case is identified with the doxa. it is a matter of a
 
"natural" case, of good form, it is of no use to submit the
 
judge to each seduction, each pressure; this is the genre of
 
the endoxon, the honestum: (b) if the case is in some way
 
neutral with regard to the doxa. a positive action is
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necessary to vancjuish the inertia of the judgOy^ t
 
his curiosity, to make him attentive (attentum); this is the
 
genre of the adoxon. the humile• (c V if the case is
 
ambiguous, for oxampre if two dox^ enter into conflict, it
 
is necessary to obtain the favor of the judge, to make him
 
benevolum, to make him lean to one side; this is the genre
 
of the■ amphidoxoh. the dubium r (d1 if the case is 
complicated, : obscure, it is necessary to lead the jucige to 
follow you as he would a guide, a scout, to make him 
docilem, receptive, malleable; this is the genre of 
dysparakoloutheton, the obscurum: {3) finally, if the case 
is extraordinary, if it arouses astonishment in situating 
itself very far from the dpxa (for example: pleading against 
a father, an old man, a child, a biind man, going against 
the human touch) , a vague action (of connotatidn) toward the 
judge is no longer sufficient, a true remedy is necessary, 
but it must nonetheless be an indirect remedy, because it is 
not necessary to offend or overtly shock the judge: this is 
the insinuatio. an autonomous fragment (and no longer a 
simple tone) which places itself after the beginning. For 
example: pretending to be impressed by the adversary. Such 
are the modes of the captitio benevolentiae. II. The 
partitio, the second stage of the exordium, announces the 
divisions that one comes to adopt, the plan that one comes 
to follow (one can multiply the partitiones bv putting one 
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at the beginning of each part); the advantage, says
 
Quintilian, is that once one has the ending, the story never
 
seems too long.
 
B.2.6. The epilogue.
 
How to tell when a discourse is finished? This is also
 
as arbitrary as the beginning. A sign of the end, of the
 
closure, is therefore necessary (so in certain manuscripts:
 
ci fait qeste que Turoldus declinet). This sign was
 
rationalized under the alibi of pleasure (that which shows
 
the degree to which the ancients would be conscious of the
 
"ennui" of their discourse!). Aristotle indicated it, not
 
in connection with the epilogue, but in connection v;ith the
 
periodic sentence: the sentence is a "pleasing" phrase,
 
because it is the opposite of that which is unfinished. It
 
is unpleasant, on the other hand, not to know what's coming,
 
not to see the end of something. The epilogue (peroratio.
 
conclusio. cumulus, climax) allows for two levels: (1) the
 
level of "things" (posita in rebus): this is a matter of
 
recapitulating and summing up (enumeratio. rerum repetitio):
 
(2) the level of "sentiments" (posita in affectibus): this
 
moving, maudlin conclusion was little used in Greece, where
 
an usher would impose silence upon an orator who went too
 
far or tugged at the heartstrings for too long; but in Rome,
 
the epilogue was the occasion for great theatrics, for the
 
advocate's gesture: revealing the accused surrounded by his
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parents and children, producing a blood-stained dagger,
 
bones pulled from the wound. Quintilian examined all these
 
special effects.
 
B.2.7. The narratio.
 
The narratio (dienesis) is of course the narration of
 
the facts involved in the case (since causa is the auaestio
 
in that which is penetrated by the contingent), but this
 
narration is conceived uniquely from the point of view of
 
the proof, it is "the persuasive exposition of some fact or
 
alleged fact." The narration, then, is not a narrative (in
 
the romantic sense and as detached from the term), but an
 
argumentative protasis. Consequently, it has two inevitable
 
characteristics: (1) its nakedness: no digression, no
 
prosopopoeia, no direct argumentation: there is no
 
techne 
'
appropriate to the narratio: it must only be clear.
 
credible. brief: (2) its functionalism: it is a preparation
 
for the argumentation; the best preparation is that in which
 
the meaning is hidden, in which the proofs are disseminated
 
in imperceptible seeds (semina probationum). The narratio
 
includes two types of elements: the facts and the
 
descriptions.
 
B.2.8. Ordo naturalis/ordo artificialis.
 
In classical rhetoric the exposition of facts is
 
subject to a single structural rule: that the connections be
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plausiblev But much later, during the Middle Ages, when
 
Rhetoric was completely detached from the judiciary, the
 
narratio became an autonomous genre and the arrangement of
 
its parts (ordo) became a theoretical problem: this is the
 
opposition pf the ordo naturalis and the ordo artificialis.
 
I'All order," says a contemporairy of AlGhin, "is either
 
natural or artificial. The order is natural if one can
 
recount the facts in the same order as they occurred: the
 
order is artificial if one starts not from the beginning of
 
what has happened, but in the middle." This is the problem
 
of the flashback. The ordo artificialis forces a violent
 
cutting up of the sequence of facts, since it relies on ■ 
movable, reversible units; it implies or produces a distinct
 
particular, boldly displayed, since it destroys the
 
(mythical) "nature" of linear time. The opposition of the
 
two "orders" rests not on the facts but on the parts of
 
discourse themselves: the ordo naturalis. therefore, is tliat
 
which respects the traditional norm (exordiUiti. narratio.
 
confirmatio. epilogue), the ordo artificialis is that which
 
upsets that order according to circumstances; paradoxically,
 
(and this paradox is no doubt frequent), naturalis therefore
 
means cultural, and artificialis means spontaneous,
 
continaent. natural.
 
B.2.9. The descriptions.
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 Beside the strictly Ghronological---or diachronic, or
 
diegetic--aj<iis, the narratio permits an axis of aspect or _
 
duration, formed by a flowing sequence of states: the
 
descriPtions. These descriptions wefe - strongly coded.,
 
There were primarily: the topographies. or descriptions of
 
place: the Chronographies. or descriptions of time, periods,
 
ages; the prosopographies. or portraits. We know the fate
 
of these "pieces" in our literature, outside of the
 
judiciary. After all, in order to finish the narratio. one
 
must point out that discourse can at times allow for a
 
second narration: the first having been very brief, one
 
takes it up again in detail, ("Here is how, in detail, what
 
I have come to say happened"): this is the epidiegesis. the
 
repetita narratio.
 
B.2.10. The confirmatio.
 
From the narratio. or account of the facts, follows the
 
confirmatio. or account of the arguments: it is there that
 
the "proofs" elaborated in the course of the inventio are
 
stated. The confirmatio (apodeixis) can include three
 
elements: (1) the propositio (prothesis): this is a
 
definition brought in for the case, for the point of debate;
 
it can be simple or complex depending on the charges.
 
("Socrates was accused of corrupting the youth and
 
introducing new superstitions"); (2) the argumentatio. which
 
is the account of convincing evidence; no particular
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structure is recommenaeca: except must,:begin wltb: : ■ 
strong evidence, continue with weak proofs and end with very 
strong proofs; (3) at times, at the end of the confirmdtin D 
the:sustained discourse loratio continnar ic -■ r.^^t-rurtcd: by 
a very .lively dialogue with the opposing advocate or a 
witness: the other interrupts tJ^e monbiogue* this is the " 
aitercatio. This oratbry episode was unknown to the Greeks; 
It as connected with the genre of the Rogatib. or arrnc;;,:i-rvr-y 
interrogfation (Ouousque tandem. Cati iirrp : ­
B.2.11. Other slices of discourse 
The very strong coding of the Disposif.in (of which a 
deep furrow remains in the pedagogy; of the "plan") ; amply ■ 
attests that humanism, in its thinking on language, is 
greatly concerned with the problem of syntagmatic units. : : ' 
The Dispositio is one slice among others. Here are some of 
these slices, starting with the largest units: I, The 
discourse as a whole can form a unit, if one opposes it to 
other discourses; this is the case of classification by 
genres or by styles; this is also the case of figures of 
subiect, the fourth type of figures after the tropes, the 
figures of speech and the figures of thought: the figures of 
subiect seized all of the oratio; Dionysius of Halicarnassus 
distinguished three of them: (i) the direct (say what you 
mean to say) , (2) the oblique (circuitous discourse: Bossuet 
advising the king, under the pretext, of religion) , (3) the 
contrary (antiphrasis, irony); II. the parts of the
 
Dispositio (we know what tliey are); III. the piece, the
 
fragment. the ekphrasis or descriptio (we know this as
 
well); IV. i the atriculus is a dev^lpping
 
unit: in a comprehensive work, a colicction of Disputationes
 
or Summa. one gives a suiranary of the disputed question
 
;(introduced bv utrum); V> the periodic sentence is a
 
sentence structured according to an organic model (with a
 
beginning and an end); it has no less than two members
 
(elevation:and abasement. tasis and apotasis) and no more
 
than four Immediately under (and truly, from tlie periodic
 
sentence on) begins the sentence, the object of the '
 
compositio. the technical operation whicli calls fortli the
 
Elocutio.
 
B.3.i ■ THE ELOCUTIO)■ 'i-
The arguments having been found and divided into the
 
parts of discourse by large blocks, it remains to "put them
 
into words": this is the function of that third part of the
 
techne rhetorike which is called 1exis or:e1ocutio. to
 
which one has the habit of abusively reducing rhetoric,
 
because of the interest given in modern times to tlie figures
 
of rhetoric, a part (but only part) of the Elocutio.
 
B.3.1. The evolution of the Elocutio.
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In effect, the elocutio has evolved greatly since the
 
origin of RUfetoric. Absent from COf^ s classificationsi,;ft 
made its appearance when Gorgias.decided to apply aestbetic 
criteria (coming frdmiRoetry) to prpse| Aristdtle dealt with 
it less' fnlly,than :tbe;:rest, of rhetoric it^ dpyeloped ■ 
chiefly with the Romans (Cicero, Quintilian), it blossomed 
into spirituality with Dionysius of Ralicarnassus and the
 
anonymous author of Peri Hvpsous and ended by absorbing all
 
of Rhetoric, identified under the single species of the
 
"figures." However, in its canonical state, the elocutio
 
defines a field which bears upon all language: it includes
 
at one and the same time our grammar (up to the heart of the
 
Middle Ages) and that which we call diction. the theater of
 
the voice. The best translation for elocutio is perhaps not
 
elocution (which is too limited), but enunciation, or if
 
need be locution (locutory activity). , . ,
 
•R:i ■ 7 ■ -The network. . 
The internal classifications of the elocutio were
 
numerous undoubtedly for two reasons: first because this
 
techne had to pass through different idioms (Greek, Latin,
 
the Romance languages) by v/hich each of them could bend the
 
nature of the "figures"; next because the increasing
 
promotion of that part of rhetoric was subject to
 
terminological reinventions (made obvious by the delirious
 
naming of figures). Here we will simplify this network.
 
 The matrix opposition is that of the paradigniatic and the
 
syntagmatiG: (1) choose the words (electlp, eclogue), (2)
 
assembTe them (synthesis:, compositio).
 
B.3.3 The "colors."
 
The electio implies that one can substitute one term in
 
the lahguage for another: the eJLeGt_ijp is possible because
 
synonymy is part of the system of language (Quintilian).
 
The speaker Tlocuteurl can substitute one signifier for
 
another a:nd he can even produce a second meaning
 
(connotaton) in that substitution. All kinds of
 
substitutions, some of them being the volume and the.manner,
 
are of the Tropes ("conversions"), but the meaning of the
 
word is ordinarily restricted so that it can be opposed to
 
the "Figures." The truly general terms which
 
^^'S.iscrimin.ately tnke in all classes of substitutions are
 
"ornaments" and "colors." By their own connotations, these
 
two words demon$trate well how the ancients conceived of
 
language: (1) there is a naked base, a natural level, a
 
normal state of communication, starting from which one can
 
elaborate a very complicated, ornate expression, marked by a
 
greater or lesser distance with regard to the original
 
ground level. This postulate is decisive, because it seems
 
that even today it determines all attempts to revitalize
 
rhetoric. Recovering rhetoric: this is fatally believing in
 
the existence of a gap between two states of language;
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 conversely, condemning rhetoric is always done in the name
 
of a denial of the hierarchy of languages, among which one
 
admits only of a "fluctuating hierarchy" and not a fixed
 
one, founded in nature; (2) the second layer (rhetoric) has
 
a function of animation: the "natural" state of language is
 
inert, the second state is "lively": colors, lights, flowers
 
(COlores > lumina. flores); the ornaments tend toward the
 
feelings, the body; they make speech pleasurable; there is a
 
venustas of language (Cicero); (3) at times the colors are :
 
used "to spare modesty the difficulty of a statement which
 
is too naked," Quintilian); to put it another way, as a
 
possible euphemism, the "color" indexes a taboo, that.of the
 
"nudity" of the language: like the rouge which tints the
 
face, color exposes the desire to hide the object(this is
 
the same dialectic as clothing (schema means costume. figura
 
appearance).
 
B.3.4. The taxonomic rage.
 
That which we call by the generic term the figures Qf
 
rhetoricj in all historical rigor and for the purpose of
 
avoiding the ambiguity between the Tropes and the Figures.
 
it would be better to call ornaments. Throughout the
 
centuries they were and still are today the object of a
 
veritable taxonomic rage, indifferent to the mockery which
 
very soon sprang up nonetheless. It.seems that one can dp
 
nothing with these figures of rhetoric other than name them
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 and classify them: from certain terms, to either very banal
 
forms (epithet. reticence) of very barbaric forms
 
(anantapodoton. epanadiplose. taoinose. etc.) to dozens of
 
groupings. Why this fury for cuttirig apart, for name-

giving, this sort of intoxicated activity by the language on
 
the language? Undoubtedly (this is at least a structural
 
explication) because rhetoric tries to codify speech (and ^ ^
 
not just language either), that is to say the very space
 
where, in principal, the code stops. Saussure encountered
 
this problem: what to make pt the stable combinations of
 
words, of the fixed syntagms which partake of language and
 
speech, of structure and combination at the same time? It
 
is to this extent that Rhetoric prefigured a linguistics of
 
speech (other than statistics), a contradiction in terms,
 
that which lost its breath trying to keep the "manners of
 
speech" within a more and more Gomplex network, wanting to
 
control the uncontrollablei: the mirage itself.
 
B.3.5. Classification Of ornaments.
 
All these ornaments (hundreds of them) have been
 
divided for al] time according to several binary groups: ,
 
tropes/fiqures. grammatical tropes/rhetorical tropes.
 
figures of grammar/figures of rhetoric, figures of speech/
 
figures of thought, tropes, figures of diction. From one
 
author to another, the classifications are contradictory:
 
here the tropes are opposed to the figures. there they form
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part of them; for Lamy hyperbole is a trope, for Cicero it
 
is a figure of thought, etc. A word on the three most
 
frequent oppositions: I. Tropes/Figures. This is/the most
 
ancient of the distinctions, that of antiquity; in the
 
Trope, the conversion of meaning turns on a unity, on a word
 
(for example. catachresis: the wing of a windmill, the arm
 
of a chair), in the Figure, the conversion requires several
 
words, all together a little syntagm (for example, the
 
periphrasis: the comforts of conversation). This opposition
 
would correspond roughly with that of the system and the
 
syntagm. II. Grammar/Rhetoric. The grammatical tropes are
 
conversions of meaning that have passed into current usage
 
to the extent that one no longer "senses" the ornament:
 
electricity (a metonym for electric light), a cheerful house
 
(a trivialized metaphor), even when the rhetorical tropes
 
are felt to be extraordinary: nature's wash, for the Flood
 
(Tertullian), the show of the kevboard. etc. This
 
opposition would correspond roughly to that of denotation .
 
and connotation. III. Speech/Thought. The opposition of
 
figures of speech and figures of thought is the most common;
 
figures of speech exist where the figure would disappear if
 
one were to change the words (such as the anacoluthon, which
 
is contained only in the order of the words: The nose of
 
Cleopatra, if it had been shorter, the face of the world . .
 
.); the figures of thought always subsist, whatever words
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one decides to use (such as the antithesis: I am the wound
 
and the knife, etc.); this third opposition is mentalistic;
 
it brings together the signifieds and the signifiers, the
 
one being able to exist without the other. It is still
 
possible to conceive of new classes of figures, and indeed
 
one can assert that any one engaged in rhetoric would be
 
tempted to classify the figures in his turn and in his way.
 
However, we are still lacking (but perhaps it is important
 
to produce) a purely operative classification of the
 
principal figures: the dictionaries of rhetoric in effect
 
allow us to know easily what a chleuasmus. an epanalepsis, a.
 
paralipsis is, to look up the often very obscure name, for
 
example; but no book permits us to take an inverse path, to
 
get from the sentence (found in a text) to the name of the
 
figure; if I read "so much marble trembling over so much
 
shadow," what book win tell me that this is a hvpallaae if
 
I don't already know it? We lack an inductive instrument
 
useful for analyzing classical texts according to their own
 
meta-langauge.
 
B.3.6. Recalling some figures.
 
There is clearly no need to furnish a list of the
 
"ornaments" recognized by ancient rhetoric under the general
 
name of "figures": there are dictionaries of rhetoric.
 
Nonetheless I think it useful to recall the definition of
 
ten or so figures taken at random so as to give a concrete
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perspective to these few remarks on the electio. l.
 
Alliteration is a closeiy related repetition of consonants
 
in a short svntaam (Le zele de Lazare); when the tones are
 
repeated, it is apophonia (II pleure dans mon coeur comme il
 
pleut sur la ville).-^-' It has been suggested that
 
alliteration is often less intentional than critics and
 
stylists tend to believe: Skinner has shown that in
 
Shakespeare's sonnets a]literation does not exceed what one
 
can expect in a normal frequency of letters and groups of
 
letters. (2) Anacoluthon is an occasionally faulty rupture
 
in construction (Beyond the sight of a great, well-ordered
 
army, the Macedonians, were astonished when . . .). (3)
 
Catechresis takes place when language, having no "proper"
 
term at its disposal, one must use a "figure" (the wings of
 
a windmill). (4) Ellipsis consists of omitting syntactic
 
elements up to the point where Intelligibility can be
 
affected (I loved vou fickle, what would I have done
 
faithful?); ellipsis was often reputed to represent a
 
"natural" state of language: this would be the "normal" mode
 
of speech in pronunciation, in syntax, in the dream, in
 
children's language. (5) Hyperbole consists of
 
exaggerating: either in augmentation (auxesis; to go faster
 
than the wind), or in diminution (tapinose; slower than a
 
tortoise). (6) Ironv or Antiphrasis,consists of implying
 
something other than what one says (this is a connotation);
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as F. de Neufchateau says: "There is a tenderness in the
 
words she chooses/but another meaning in the tone she uses."
 
(7) Pheriphrasis arises from a detour of language that one
 
makes to avoid a taboo expression. If the periphrasis is
 
understated, one calls it perissoloav. (8) Reticence or
 
aposiopesis marks an interruption of discourse due to an
 
abrupt change in feeling (the Virgilian Ouos eao). (9)
 
Suspension delays the text, by adding incidental clauses
 
before the resolution: this is a suspense at the level of
 
the sentence.
 
B.3.7. The Literal and the Figurative.
 
As we have seen, the entire structure of the "figures"
 
rests upon the idea that there are two languages, one
 
literal and one figurative, and that consequently. Rhetoric,
 
in its elocutionary part, is a table of the deviations of
 
language. From antiquity on, the meta-rhetorical
 
expressions which attest to this belief are innumrable: in
 
the elocutio (the field of figures), the words are
 
"transported." "diverted." "removed" from their normal,
 
familiar environment. Aristotle sees in this a taste for
 
disorientation: one must "keep a distance from common
 
expressions . . . : ih this respect, we experience the same
 
impressions as in thejpresence of strangers: style must be
 
given a foreign air, liecause what comes from afar excites
 
admiration." There is accordingly a relationship of
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strangeness between the "current words," which we^all use
 
(but who is the "we"?), and the "distinctive (strange)
 
words" in daily usage: "barbarisms" (the words of strange
 
people), neologisms, metaphors, etc. For Aristotle, a
 
mixture of the two terminologies is necessary, for if one
 
makes use only of current words, one produces a vulgar
 
discourse, and if one makes use only of distinctive words,
 
one has an enigmatic discourse. From the domestic/foreign
 
and the normal/strange. the opposition has slid to the
 
literal/figurative. What is the literal meaning? "It is
 
the initial meaning of the word." (Du Marsais): "When the
 
word signifies that for which it was originally
 
established." However, the literal meaning does not have to
 
be the most ancient (the archaism is disorienting), but the
 
meaning immediately prior to the creation of the figure: the
 
literal, the true, once again, the preceding (the Father).
 
In classical Rhetoric, the preceding found itself
 
neutralized. Hence the paradox: how can the literal meaning
 
be the "natural" meaning and the figurative the "original"
 
meaning?
 
B.3.8. 	The function and origin of the Figures.
 
One can distinguish two groups of explications here.
 
Explications by function: (a) the second language arises
 
from the necessity to euphemize, to circumvent taboos; (b)
 
the second language is a technique of illusion (in the same
 
118
 
sense as a painting:, perspective, shading, visual
 
deception); it redistributes things, facts appear different
 
from what they are or as they are but more impressive; (c)
 
there is an inherent pleasure in the association of ideas
 
(we say: a ludic pleasure). II. Explications bv oriain;
 
these explications begin from the postulate that the figures
 
exist "in nature that is, in the "people" (Racine: "One
 
only has to listen to a dispute betv/een two lower-class
 
women: what a wealth of figures! They squander metonymy,
 
catachresis, hyperbole, etc."); and F. de Neufchateau: "In
 
the city, at the court, in the fields, at the mart, The
 
figures exhale the eloquence of the heart." How then to
 
reconcile the "natural" origin of the figures with their
 
secondary, posterior position in the structure of language?
 
The classical response is that the art chooses the figures
 
(in accordance v;ith an accurate assessment of their /',
 
distance, which must be measured). it does not create them;
 
in short, the figurative is an artificial combination of
 
natural elements. '
 
Vico and poetrv.
 
In leaving this last hypothesis (the figures have a
 
"natural" origin), we can distinguish two more types of
 
explication. The first is m.ythical, romantic, in the
 
broadest sense of the term: "literal" language is poor; it
 
does not satisfy all needs, but it is siipplemented by the
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irruption of anotlier language, "tlie divine blossoming of the
 
spirit which the Greeks called Tropes," (Hugo); or again ,v;
 
(Vlco according to Micheiet), Hoetry being the originai
 
language, the four great archetypal figures were invented in
 
the course of nature. not by writers, but by humanity in its
 
poetic age; Metaplior. then Metonvmv. then Synecdoche, then
 
Irony; originally they were employed naturally. How then
 
could they have become the "figures of rhetoric"? Vico
 
gives a highly structural response: when abstraction was
 
born, that is to say when the "figure" found itself caught
 
in a paradigmatic opposition with another language.
 
B.3.10♦ The language of the passions. 
The second explication is psychological: it is that of 
Lamy and the classicists: the figures are the language of 
the passions. The passions distort one's point of view on 
things and require peculiar words: "If men conceived all 
things which occur to their spirit simply, as they are in 
themselves, they would speak of them all in the same manner: 
geometers all speak the same language" (Lamy) . This is an 
interesting viewpoint, for if the figures are the 
"morphemes" of the passions, we can tell through the figures 
what the classical taxonomy of the passions is, especially 
the amorous passions from Racine to Proust. For example, 
the exclamation corresponds to the sudden abduction of 
speech, to emotional aphasia; the doubt. the dubitation (the 
name of a figure) corresponds to the torment of uncertainty
 
of conduct (What to do? this? that?), to the difficulty of
 
reading the pther person's "sighs't the ellipsis corresponds
 
to the censure of everything that generates passion; the
 
paralipsis (to say tliat one is not going to say what one
 
finally ends up saying) correspohds to the -resumption of the
 
"scene the spir1 to:offend; repetition corresponds to the
 
obsessive preoccupation with "good reasons"; hvpotvposis '
 
corresponds to the scene which one imagines vividly, to the
 
inner fantasy, to the mental scenario (desire, jealousy),
 
etc. One therefore understands better hov; the figurative
 
can be a language which is at the same time natural and
 
secondary; it is natural because the passions are natural;
 
it is secondary because morality demands that these same
 
passions, aIthough "hatural," be kept at a distance, placed
 
in the region of the Fault; it is because, for the
 
classicist, "nature" is bad, the figures of rhetoric are at
 
the same time both justified and suspect.
 
B.3.11. The compositio.
 
We must now return to the primary opposition, that
 
which serves as the origin of the network of the Elocutio: V
 
the compositid. the associative field of words in the
 
sentence, stands opposed to the electio, the substitutive
 
field of ornaiments. We will not take sides here on the
 
linguistic definition of the "sentence": for us it is merely
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that unit of disGourse which is intermediate between the
 
pars orationis (the major part of the oratio) and the fiaura
 
(a small groups of words) Rhetoric cbdified,two
 
types of "construction": (iV a; tgeometxlc":construction: :
 
that of the periodic Sentence (Aristotle): "a sentence
 
having in itself a beginning, an end, an a range that one
 
could easily grasp"; the structure of the sentence depends
 
on an internal system of commas (individua1 characters) and
 
colons (sections); the number of them is variable and open
 
to dispute; in general, one needs 3 or 4 colons, subject to
 
opposition (1/3 or 1-2/3-4); the frame of reference of this
 
system is organic (the in-and-out motion of breathing) or
 
sportive (the sentence reproduces the ellipsis of the
 
stadium: a journey out, a curve, a trip back); (2) a
 
"dynamic" construction (Dionysius of Halicarnassus): in this
 
case the sentence is conceived as a sublimated periodic
 
sentence, animated, transcended by "movement"; it is no
 
longer a matter of a trip out and a trip back, but of an
 
ascent and a descent; this sort of "swing" is more important
 
than the choice of words: it depends on a sort of innate
 
sense of the writer. This "movement" has three modes: (1)
 
brutal, hard-edged (Pindar, Thucydides), (2) smooth.
 
encased, lubricated (Sappho, Isocrates, Cicero), (3) mixed.
 
the reserve of undecided cases.
 
Thus ends the rhetorical network—since we have
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decideel to leave out those parts of the techne rhetorike
 
which are strictly theatrical, hysterical, bound to the
 
voice: actio and memoria. The slightest historical
 
conclusion would exceed the purely didactic intention of
 
this simple handbook (moreover, there would be some ironv in
 
my constructing a second meta-languaae. which we have iust
 
used for a peroration which originates from the first meta
 
language). However, in taking leave of ancient Rhetoric. I
 
would like to sav what endures for me personally of this
 
memorable yoyage (the descent in time, the descent into the
 
network, as of a double riyer). "What endures for me"
 
means; the questions that come to me from that ancient
 
empire in my present work, and which, haying once approached
 
Rhetoric. I am no longer able to evade.
 
First the conviction that many features of our
 
literature, our education, our institutions of language (and
 
is there a single institution without language?) would be
 
clarified or understood differently if we thoroughly knew
 
(that is to say, if we would not censure) the rhetorical
 
code which gave its language to our culture; neither a
 
technique, nor an aesthetic, nor a morality of Rhetoric is
 
any longer possible, but a history? Yes, a history of
 
Rhetoric (as research, as book, as education). extended by a
 
new way of thinking (linguistics, semiology. historical
 
science, psychoanalysis. Marxism), is necessary today.
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Next this idea that there is a sort of obstinate
 
agreement between Aristotle (from whom rhetoric Qriainates)
 
and the so-called mass culture, as if Aristoteliahism. dead
 
since the Renaissance as philosophy and as logic, dead as an
 
aesthetics since Romanticism, has survived in a degraded.
 
diffuse, inarticulate state in the cultural experience of
 
Occidental societies—an experience founded through
 
democracy on an ideology of "the greatest number." the
 
majority rule, the current opinion: all this indicates that
 
a sort of Aristotelian vulgate still defines a type of
 
trans-historic Occident, a ciyilization (our own) which is
 
that of the endoxa: how does one avoid the evidence that
 
Aristotle (poetics, logic. rhetoric) furnishes a complete.
 
analytic grid for all language—narrative, discursive.
 
argumentatiye--which is conveyed bv "mass communication." a
 
complete analytic grid (from the notion of "verisimilitude")
 
and that he represents this optimal homogeneity of a meta
 
language and a language-object which can define an applied
 
science? In a democratic regime. Aristotelianism would
 
therefore be the best of cultural sociologies.
 
„ Finally, this statement, rather troubling in its
 
brevity, that all our literature, formed bv Rhetoric and
 
sublimated bv Humanism, has issued from a politico-judicial
 
practice (unless we hold to the mistaken view which limits
 
Rhetoric to the "figures"): in that arena where the most
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brutal conflicts—of money, property, social class—are
 
taken up. contained, domesticated, and maintained bv the
 
power of the State; wbere the institution regulates feigned
 
speech and codifies all recourse tO:what is significant: it
 
is there where our literature is born. This is why to let
 
Rhetoric fall to the level of a fully and simply historical
 
obnect to claim, in the name of the text^ of writing a new
 
application of language—and never to cut oneself off from
 
revoluntionarv knowledge—these are one and the same
 
pursuit■ 
Roland Barthes 
Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris 
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NOTES;\
 
^ Roland Barthes,; rancienne aide-

m^moire," Conmiunications 16 (1970): 172-229. :
 
^ Ernst R. Curtiu;;, La 11tt^rature eiirop^ene et la
 
nvoven ^ge latin. trans. J. Br^joux (Paris: PUF; 1956).
 
First German ed. 1948. European Literature arid the Lati n
 
Middle Ages, trans. Wiliard R. Trask (Princeton: princeton
 
UP, 1953). Charies S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic
 
Tnterpreted from RepresentativeV Works (Gionrpc;t-Pr ^ Macc . :
 
(Peter Smith, 1959). First edV, 1924. Medieval Rhetoric Anri
 
Poetic (to 1400) Interpreted from Representative Works
 
(Gloucester, Mass. V Pet^r; Smith; 1959).:(F ed;, 1928. ^
 
Rend^Bray. La formation de la doctrine classiaue en France
 
(Paris: Nizet,; 1951); Ferdinand Brunot, Historie de la
 
lanque francaise (Paris, 1923). ;Henri MOrier, Pictidnaira
 
de dodtiaue et de!thdtoriaue (Paris1'pUf; 1961),
 
_ ^ There ape nhmerous obscene jokes on the dasus and
 
coniunctio (which are in fact grammatical terms) of which
 
this drawn out irtetaphor^ from A Thousand and One
 
Nights can give an idea: "He used the preposition in the 
correct construction and joined the subordinate clause v/ith 
the conjunction, but his spouse fell like the nominal ending 
before the genetive." More nobly, Alain de Lille explains 
that humanity commits barbarisms in the union of the sexes, 
the metaplasms (abuses) which infringe upon the rules of 
Venus; man falls into the anastrophes (inversions of 
construction); in his folly, he goes as far as the 
tmesis (Curtius, 512-513); likewise Calderdn commenting 
upon the situation of a woman spied upon while she goes to 
see her lover, "It is a great barbarism of love to go to see 
and be seen, because, 1ike a bad grammarian, it make a 
passive person out of an active person." One knows in which 
anatomical sense P. Klossovski revived the terms of the 
scholastic (untrumsit. sed contra. vacuum. auidest• "the 
quidest of the inspectress"). It goes without saying that 
the collusion between grammar (or rhetoric or scholastics) 
and the erotic is not only "funny"; it ■ traces with precision 
and, gravity a transgressive place where two taboos are 
raised: that of language and that of sex. 
^ T.N. Annette Lavers in Roland Barthes: Structuralism
 
and After, attributes the term "monumental history" to
 
Nietzsche (35-36).
 
Atticism: this ethnocentrism is evidently connected
 
to that which one could call the racism of class: one must
 
not forget that the "classical" expression ("classicism")
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has as its origin the opposition proposed by Aulus Gellius '
 
(second century) between the author classicus and the
 
proletarius: the allusion to tlie constitution of Servias
 
Tulliuis who divided citizerts according to their wealth into
 
five classes, the first of which formed the classici (the
 
proletarii was beyond class); therefore classiaue means ­
etymological]y: that which pertains to the social "upper
 
crust" (wealth and power).
 
® T.N. Robert lists an "acroamatique: an oral lesson,
 
the teaching of Aristotle," vol. 1, 44. There is no similar
 
listing in the Oxford English Dictionarv.
 
^ There was a mnemonic list of the seven arts: Gram 
(matica) loquitur. : Dia(lectica) vera docet. Rhe(torica) 
verba colorat. Mu(sica) canit. Ar(ithmetica) numerat. 
Ge(ometria) ponderat. As(tronomia) colit astra. An 
Allegory by Alain de Lille (twelfth century) accounts for ^ 
the system in all its complexity: the Seven Arts are 
summoned in order to furnish a carriage for Prudentia. which 
seeks to guide man; Grammatica furnishes the pole, Loaica 
(or Dialectica) the axle, which Rhetorics adorns with 
jewels; the quadrivium furnishes the four wheels, the horses 
are the five senses harnessed by Ratio: the carriage goes 
toward the saints,■. Mary, God; when the limits of human power 
are reached, Theoloaia takes over for Prudentia (education 
is redemption. 
The phantom is always on the prowl. Outside of 
France today, in certain countries where it is necessary, bi 
opposition to a colonial past, to reduce French to the 
status of a foreign language, one hears it affirmed that it 
must be taught, that.is,,only the French language, • not the 
literature: as if there were a barrier between language and 
literature, as if language were here and not there, as if 
one could hold back some part, beyond which there were 
simply inessential supplements, whence literature. 
"Suprema manus apponit. opusoue sororum 
Perficit ataue semel factum perfectius ornat." 
(Rhetoric applies the finishing touches, completes the work 
of her sisters and embellishes the act in a most 
accomplished fashion. ) 
The wheel of Virgil is a figurative classification 
of the three "styles"; each of the three sectors of the 
wheel gathers together a homogeneous ensemble of terms and 
symbols: 
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' . AEMlip: J • BUCOLICS: : CEQRGICS'
 
grayis ;$tylus, hurailis styXiis : mediocrus stylus
 
;miles dominans pastor otiosus agricola
 
Hector, Ajax Tilyrus, Meliboeus TriptolemusC : :
 
c':;,;, .;- -■■ ...eguiis . ■ /C :;: . ^-^vls r '''^ bos VI ' 
gladius baculus aratrum 
urbs, castrum pascua ager.
laurus, cedrus fagus ; p^ 
; eParanetic:; "Of , pertaining to; or , of the' nature 
Of paranesiS:; a;dyisory, hortatory. . ; .i . • A hortatoiry ' 
composition. Obs." Oxford English Dictionary, vol. VII, 
451. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978) . , . ■ 
In pointing out certain ancient sources of the 
Middle Ages, one must recall that the unrivalied inter­
textua1 foundation, if you wiit, is Aristotle, and even, in 
a sense, Aristotle over against Plato. Plato was 
transmitted partially by St. Augustine and in the twelfth 
century fostered the school of Chartres (a "literary" 
school, as opposed to the logical, Aristotelian school of ■ 
Paris.) and the Abbey . of St. : Victor ; yet in the thirteenth ; : \ 
century, the only genuine translations were those of the 
Phaedrus and the Menp, which were moreover little known. in 
. the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, a bitter struggle . 
arose against Aristotle in the name of Plato (Marsilio
Ficino and Giordano Bruno) . As for Aristotle, he is 
introduced into the Middle Ages on two occasions: the first 
time, in the fifth and sixth centuries, partially by
Martinus Cape11a, the Categories of Prophyry, Boethius; the 
second time, in full force, in the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries: in the ninth century all of Aristotle has been 
translated into Arabic; in the twelfth century, one had at 
one's disposal integral translations, either in Greek or in 
Arabic: this is the massive intrusion of the Posterior 
Analytics, tlie Topics, the Refutations, tlie Physics and the 
Metaphysics; Aristotle is Christianized (St. Thomas) . The 
third introduction of Aristotle will be that of his Poetics 
in the sixteenth century in Italy and in the seventeenth 
century in France. . ■ 'Vl ■ 
The death of Christ on the cross is itself 
assimilated in the scenario of the Disputatio (today some 
would find this reduction of the Passion to a school 
exercise a sacrilege; others, on the contrary, would admire " 
the liberty of spirit of the Middle Ages, which would never 
breech any taboo against the "drama" of intellect) : Circa 
tertiam vel sextam ascendunt magistri (in theoloaia) 
cathedram suam ad disputandum et auerunt unam questionem. 
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Cui questioni respondet unus assistentiiiin. Post cuius
 
responioriem maaisLer determinat quest et auandd vult
 
el defferre et honorem facere. nihil aliud determinat auant
 
quQd dixerat respondens. Sic fecit liddie Christus in cruce .­
uni ascendit ad disputandum: eL proposuit unam guestionem
 
Ueo Parti; Eli. Eli. lamma sabachtani. Deus. Deus meus. quid
 
me dereliquisti? Et Pater resonditt Ha. Fiii mi. opera^
 
manuum tuarum ne despicias: non enim Pater redemit genus 

hamanum sine te. Et ille respondens ait: Ha. Pat.er. bene
 
determinasti questionem m.eam. Non determinabo earn post.
 
responsionem tuam. Non sicut ego volo. sed sicut tii vis.
 
Fiat voluntas tua. (Around the third or sixth hour, the
 
master (in theology) takes the pulpit in order to dispute ,
 
and pose a question. One of the assistants then responds to
 
this question. Following his response, the master settles
 
the question, and when he wants to confer an honor on him,
 
he says nothing other than what the respondent has said.
 
This was what Christ did on the cross one day, wlien he
 
yielded to dispute, posing a question to God the Father:
 
Eli, Eli, lamma sabachtani, My God, my God why have you
 
forsaken me? And the Father responds: my Son, do not doubt
 
the work of your hands, because the Father cannot redeem
 
mankind without you. .And Christ responds: my Father, you
 
have answered my question well. I can say nothing after
 
your response, etc.) , [T.N. There is no such dialogue;. . ;
 
betv;een the Father ; and Son in any of the canonica1 Gospels,
 
and a thorough check of concordances of the Apocrypha turned
 
up nothing either. This dialogue may come from som.e Latin
 
tract on teaching rhetoric.] .^ '
 
^' T.N. Mach^: "battle, fight, combat." George Ricker
 
Berry, Ph.D., comp. The Classical Greek Dictionarv
 
(Chicago: Follett, 1962). ;;' i
 
; - . Perelman, Chaim, and L. Obrechts-Tyteca, La , . 'Vt,
 
Nouvelle Rh^torique—Trait^ de 1'Argumentation. vo1.; 2
 
(Paris: PUF, 1958) The Hew Rhetoric; A Treatise on
 
Argumentation. trahs. John WiIkinson and Purcell Weaver
 
(Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame UP, 1969).
 
T.N. Precellence: "an exceling, exceeding,
 
surmounting, surpassing." Randle Cotgrave, comp., A
 
Dictionarie of the French and English Tongues. Reproduced
 
from the first edition with introduction by William S. Woods
 
(London: 1611; Columbia: U of South Carolina P, 1950).
 
T 7 ' ■ \ ' , • ' ■ ' - ■' - ' ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ t
(The sophistic of no among the mystics: "to belong 
to everything. be careful to belong to nothing in respect to 
nothing.") "By an easily explained paradox, this 
destructive logic is pleasing to conservatives: that is 
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because it is inoffensive; abolishing everything it touches
 
nothing. Deprived of any efficacy it is fundamentally only
 
a rhetoric: some false states of mind, some operations done
 
to the language, this is not what wili cliange the course of
 
the wor3d." Jean-Pau1 Sartre, Saint-Genet; Comedien et
 
Martvr (Paris: Galimard, 1952) 191. ; Saint Genet. Actor and
 
Martyr. trans. Bernard Freclitman (New York: George
 
Brazi1ler, 1963)
 
J. Kristeva, Semiotilc^ (Paris: Seuil, 1969).
 
^- Groups jji. Rhetoriaue g^n^ral. 1970. Group
 
General Rhetoric. trans. Paul B. Burrell and Edgar Slotlcin
 
(Baltimore: Johns Hoplcins UP, 1981).
 
20 "The disappearance of traditional Rhetoric has
 
created a void in the humanities, and stylistics has already
 
gone a long way to fill this void. In fact, it would not be
 
wrong to describe stylistics as a 'new rhetoric,'adapted to
 
the models and exingencies of modern studies in linguistics
 
and literature." S. Ullmann, Language and Style, 130.
 
21 See notably Jacques Durand, "Rh^torique et image
 
publicitaire ^" Communications 15 (1970).
 
22 71^ example of the exemplum given by Quintilian: "The
 
flute players who had retreated from Rome were called bac3c
 
by a decree of the Senate; all the more reason to remember
 
the great citizens who have deserved well of the Republic
 
and whom the misfortunes of the times have forced into
 
exile": a general lihlc in the inductive chain: the class of
 
uti1itarian people, first driven out then called back.
 
22 Exemplum a contrario: "These pictures, these statues 
that Marcellus returned to the enemies, Verres stole from 
allies." (Cicero). ■ , ; ' 
2"^ An example of the parable ta3cen from a Socratic
 
discourse: one must not chose magistrates by lot any more
 
than athletes and pilots. , i
 
25 T.N. "Epirus: In ancient geography, that part of
 
northern Greece which lies between I1lyria on the north,
 
Macedonia and Thessaly on the East, Aeto1ia, Acarnaria and
 
the Ambracian Gulf on the south, and the Ionian Sea on the
 
west." century Cyclopedia of Names. ed. Benjamin E. Smith,
 
A.M. (New Yorlc: The Century Co., 1894).
 
25 An extended epicheireme: The who1e Pro Milone by
 
Cicero: 1) ]ci11ing those whom we set traps for is permitted.
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2) proof, drawn Vfrom natural law^ . the nights of; the peopie, , ,
 
the exempla, 3.) Glpdius . set a trap for Milo 41'prodf. d
 
from facts, 5) Milo is therefore permitted to hin clodius.
 
The maxim (gnomd. sententia) is a formuTa which
 
expresses the general., but only the general which has
 
actions (those which are chosen or avoided), as its object;
 
for AristotTe, the fouhdetioh of the gnome, is always the
 
eikos. in accordance v/ith liis definition of the enthymeme by
 
the content of tlie premises: but for the academics, who
 
define the enthymeme by its "truncation," the maxim is
 
essentially an "abridgment": "it tlierefore happens sometimes
 
tliat one encompasses tv/o propositions in a single
 
proposition: the enthymematic sentence" (for example:
 
Mortal, do not harbor an immortal hatred):1 .
 
T.M. This hind of discoyefihg is quite similar to 
what Michael Poidi^.Yi describes ■ .as. "taC;it khowing" in the.­
first,chapter of The TaCit: Dimension .(Garden City, New York: 
Doubleday & Co., 1956). 
. An example of an apt abridgment: this line from
 
Medea by Ovid, "which contains a very elegant enthymeme":
 
Servare potui> perdere an passim roaas? I was able to save
 
you, therefore you could die. (That which can be saved can
 
die, now I can save you, therefore you could die.)
 
These topical grids are stupid; they liave nothing ■ 
whatsoever to do with "life," "truth," and there has been 
good reason to banish them from modern teaching, etc. 
Without doubt: sti11 the "subjects" (of obligation, of 
dissertation) must follow this great movement. At the 
moment I write this, I mean that one of tlie "siibjects" for : ; 
the final diploma is something like tliis: Must one respect . : 
one's elders? A stupid subject, an indispensible topic. i 
. The excusatlo propter infirmitatem still.reigns
 
abundantly in our writing. Witness this joking excusatio of
 
Michel Cournot (Nouvelle observateur. 4 March, 1965): "I am
 
not laughing this week, the Gospel is my subject, and v;hy
 
hot^say it at once, I'm not up to it, etc."
 
Two examples of advnaton: : .
 
Bellile: Soon the black crow unites with the swallov;;
 
< ,Soon the unfaithful dove will go without dread ■ " . 
To her love, far from the marriage bed
 
And witliout fear will give her . heart and fidelity
 
To the savage sparrow hawk, his heart and honor.
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Theophile de Viau: This brook flows backwards in its
 
course,
 
An ox climbs the belltower,
 
Blood runs from this rock,
 
An asp mates with a she-bear.
 
At the top of this old tower
 
A serpent tears open a vulture;
 
Fire burns inside the ice,
 
The sun has become black,
 
I see the moon falling.
 
This tree has left its place.
 
T.N. Elsewhere Barthes translates this as "It may
 
be," which seems to work well here also.
 
T.N. "Aedes, n. m. (Gr. aiodos. singer). A poet-

singer in ancient Greece. Orpheus was an aede." Robert
 
vol. 1, 58. There is no listing for this item in the Oxford
 
English Dictionary.
 
85 • .

T.N. Tm English example might be: "Borne on the bier
 
with white and bristly beard." In any case, the English
 
tradition here is quite unlike the French.
 
or
 
T.N. The numbers in the original text are incorrect.
 
I have corrected them here.
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APPENDIX I
 
RHETORIC: CHRONOLOGY
 
Before Christ
 
5th century
 
(480-460)
 
4th century
 
(395-375)
 
(329-323)
 
3rd-2nd century
 
1st century
 
(116-27)
 
(107-43)
 
(ca. 85)
 
(65-8)
 
(43 B.C.-A.D. 16)
 
-Sicily: rhetoric taught.
 
-Corax: first division of the Oratio.
 
-Gorqias at Athens: Prose rhetorified.
 
-Hippias of Elis.: everyday culture
 
opposed to Philosophy: distant.origin
 
of the Liberal Arts of the Middle
 
Ages.
 
-Plato: dialogues concerning Rhetoric.
 
-The Rhetoric of Aristotle.
 
-Zeno of Citium. Greek Stoicism and
 
philosophical grammar.
 
-The Alexanderians: Quarrel between the
 
Analogists and the Anomolists. (The
 
Analogists postulate that grammar is
 
rule-governed and that this regularity
 
reflects the regularity of the world
 
and the spirit. The Ai^iomolists
 
searched for irregularities,
 
exceptions.)
 
-Varro: a) mediation in the quarrel
 
between the Analogists and the
 
Anomolists. b) Revival of the liberal
 
disciplines.
 
-Cicero: practice of Aristotelian
 
rhetoric.
 
-Rhetorica ad Herennium.
 
-Horace: The Art of Poetry.
 
-Ovid: fusion of Rhetoric and Poetry.
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After Christ
 
1st century
 
(40-118)
 
(45-125)
 
(55-120)
 
2nd century
 
3rd century
 
4th century
 
(310-393)
 
(ca. 350)
 
(354-430)
 
5th century
 
(ca. 420)
 
(end of 5th c.,
 
beginning of
 
6th c.)
 
6th century
 
(480-524)
 
(490-575)
 
-Ouintilian: pedagogy of Aristotelian
 
rhetoric.
 
-Plutarch: moralization of rhetoric.
 
-Tacitus: unification of all the arts
 
of discourse under the name of
 
eloquentia.
 
-Peri Hvpsos: treatise On the Sublime.
 
-The Second Sophistic or Neo-Rhetoric,
 
Asianism against Atticism.
 
-Prophvrv; Eisagoge (Categories);
 
introduction to Aristotle's logic.
 
-Ausonius: transmits Neo-Rhetoric to
 
the Middle Ages.
 
-Donatus. grammarian.
 
-St. Augustine: Christian Rhetoric.
 
-Sidonius Apollinaris: transmits Neo-

Rhetoric to the Middle Ages.
 
-Martianus Cape11a: the establishing of
 
the Seven Liberal Arts.
 
-Priscian. grammarian.
 
-Boethius; the first entry of
 
Aristotle: logic limited.
 
-Cassiodorus: Christianization of the
 
Liberal Arts and notably the figures
 
of Rhetoric.
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7th century
 
(570-636) -Isadore of Seville: (Etvmoloav):
 
confinnation of the Trivium.
 
8th century
 
(673-735)7	 Bede: Rhetoric applied systematical3y
 
to the Bible.
 
9th century
 
-Carolingian reform of the schools:
 
Alculn.
 
-Aristotle translated into Arabic.
 
11th century
 
-Scot Eriaene and Real isin.
 
-Roscelin and Nominalism.
 
12th century
 
-Second entry of Aristotle: the
 
complete Logic.
 
-Conflict betveen,.Chartres. and,Paris
 
betv/een Rhetorica and Dialectica. .
 
between;Literature and Phildsophvy
 
between the Studium dnd .the
 
Sacerdotium. ,Victory of Paris and
 
Dialectica.
 
(1096-11,41) -New classifications of the Trivium
 
under the dominance of Dialectica:
 
Hugh■of St. Victor. ■ 
(1128-1202) -Alaih de Li11e; Allegory of the 
Chariot. ' . ■ ■.v ; ,9 , V:;, ; ,9.";^ ; 
(ca. 1150) -Peter Helias: beginning of speculative 
grammar. 
93th century
 
(1200); :	 -Founding of the University of Paris. 
-The Modistae. 
14th century
 
-Ars obligatoria, code of the 
Disputatio. , 
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15th century
 
16th century
 
(1521)
 
(1555)
 
(1555)
 
(1592)
 
17th century
 
(ca. 1630)
 
(1675)
 
18th century
 
(1730)
 
(1783)
 
19th century
 
(1807)
 
(end of the
 
19th century)
 
-Arts of the Second Rhetoric = poetic
 
arts (from the point of view of verbal
 
forms and not of composition).
 
-Entry of Aristotld's Poetics into
 
Italy: Castelvetro, Scaliger, Veda.
 
-Fabri's Comprehensive Rhetoric.
 
-Ramus' (anti-Aristotelian) Dialectic
 
-Foclin's Rhetoric.
 
-Nunez's rhetoric in Latin.
 
-Rhetoric becomes the foundation of
 
Jesuit education.
 
-Entry of Aristotle's Poetics into
 
France.
 
-Bernard Lamv: the Rhetoric or the Art
 
of Speaking.
 
-DuMarsais: Treatise of the Tropes.
 
-Rhetoric of Hugh Blair.
 
-GaiHard: the Rhetoric for Young
 
Ladies.,
 
-Fontanier: Classic manual for the
 
study of the Tropes.
 
-Gradual extinction of treatises on
 
Rhetoric.
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APPENDIX II TO RHETORIC TREE
 
TEGHNE RHETORIKE
 
INVENTIO disp6sitio ELOGUTIO
 
I I : ■ 
Animps Hem Electio ComposltloTO gonvinge: TO MOVE
 
impellere Docere
 
■ ^''I ■ \ ■ ■ . ■ I ­
atechno1 entechnoi Dlsposi- Eniotions r : 1
 
Tropes Figures
 
(Character)
 
exempliim enthynieme
 
I 1
 
tekimerion semeion
 
eikos exprdlum epilogue Narratio Confirmatio
 
Captatio ^ Partitio
 
OJ TOPIC benevolentiae Facts Description
 
-J Piace
 
r
 
Common Special
 
quaestio
 
Thesis Hypothesis
 
Causa Propositic Argumentati6 Altercatio
 
I 1 '
 
epideictic Judicial deliberative
 
StatLs
 
Causae
 
Disceptatio
 
INDEX
 
Adynaton: B.1.21.
 
'4.11iteration: B.3.6.
 
Altercatio: B.2.10.
 
Anacoluthon: B.3.5.,6.
 
Antithesis: B.3.5.
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